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My dissertation consists of three chapters dealing with issues related to
economic development and conflict. The first and second chapters discuss military
expenditures and inequality from global and regional perspectives. The third
chapter focuses on the impact of wars on relative wages in the food sector.
In the first chapter we show that a substantial body of literature has
uncovered a robust relationship between institutions-including unionization and
political democracy- and economic inequality. This first chapter examines the
effect of military spending on inequality controlling for the size of armed forces,
GDP growth, per capita income and other possible determinants. Using a panel
regression with country level observations from 1987-1997, we obtained consistent
estimates that there is a positive effect of military expenditure on pay inequality.
This relationship is robust across variable definitions and model specification.
Given the close relationship between pay and income this result suggests that a
country’s reduction in military spending could reduce income inequality.
vii
Studying the inequality of the Middle East and North African (MENA)
countries provides an opportunity to assess factors that shape the countries’ suc-
cess in distributing the wealth by looking beyond simple measures of wealth
creation. This second chapter examines two issues presented in the first chapter
with more emphasis on the regional dynamics. The empirical results indicate
that again the military spending has strong and positive effect on inequality. A
systematic reduction in military spending could reduce the level of inequality
since it frees resources for other social and economic development programs.
The final chapter introduces a new perspective in considering the impact
of wars on relative wages in the food sector. In a state of war people are at risk
of losing one of their most basic rights — food. Millions may live in the shadow
of famine and poverty. Micro-level analyses of "food-cost ratio" during civil or
international wars give us insight into governments’ ability, or inability to mobilize
the resources to counter the danger of hunger and famine. Understanding the
factors that make the food-cost ratio rise may help to formulate policy responses
that mitigate human suffering in wartime environments. Therefore, this paper
examines two questions: first, the effect of wars on the food-cost ratio; second,
what are policies likely reduce the food-cost ratio? To answer these research
questions we use panel data for 50 countries from the 1960s to the 1990s. The
results of this paper will show that civil wars positively affect the food-cost ratio,
while international wars apparently do not. The policy implication of this analysis
is that in the event of a civil war, policy makers lack the resources to exert control
on rising food-cost ratio. A rise in the food-cost ratio could be translated into
viii
higher food prices or lower purchasing power over food, either of which may
havedevastating impacts on social and economic well-being. In the event of an
international war, as opposed to civil war, governments have a greater capacity
to prioritize and mobilize resources. Food imports remain an effective tool to
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Chapter 1
Military Expenditures and Inequality:
Empirical Evidence from Global Data
1.1 Introduction
A substantial body of literature has uncovered relationships between in-
equality and economic and political institutions. Gradstein, Milanovic and Ying
(2001) showed that democratization can reduce inequality. More generally, afflu-
ence has been correlated with the presence of democratic institutions1 (Lipset,
Seong, Torres (1993) and Diamond (1992a)). Rodrik (1999) strongly suggested
that democratic institutions are associated with higher wages; institutions do
matter to distributive outcomes. Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) have
1The term "institution" has different meanings: in economics and sociology it often denotes
the incorporation of values or norms into conventional patterns of social behavior that are
sanctioned and enforced by formal and informal authority. "Institution" may be used in broader
sense to denote a complex social, political and economic system which incorporates values and
discharges services to the community (Esman 1964). This commonly accepted use of the term
institution is a point of departure in our inquiry into using the military expenditures and size
of the armed forces as institutional parameters.
1
shown that de-unionization is an important factor explaining the rise in wage
inequality from 1979 to 1988. Differences in labor market institutions, chiefly
the relative decentralization of the wage-setting mechanism, provide a widely ac-
cepted explanation of wage inequality in the U.S. as compared with other OECD
countries (Blau and Kahn, 1996).
Although much work has been done on the relationship between military
spending and economic growth, I am not aware of any research that addresses
inequality and military spending. A watershed study by Knight, Loazy and
Villanueva (1996) extended a standard growth model and obtained consistent
panel data estimates of the growth- retarding effects of military spending via
its adverse impact on capital formation and resource allocation. This paper
emulates Knight, Loazy and Villanueva’s purpose and approach. However, we
treat economic growth as a control variable rather than a dependent variable, and
emphasize instead the relationship between military spending and inequality.
There are three ways by which higher military spending may increase
economic inequality. First, increases in military spending could be at the expense
of public spending on social programs such as health and education - which
have an equalizing effect. The military as an institution, therefore, competes for
scarce resources with other social entitlements and reduces the special advantages
conferred by those social programs2.
2Dreze (2000) for example, has criticized the Indian government’s unwillingness to spend
an additional 0.5 percent of GDP to ensure universal elementary education while it endorsed
proposals for larger increases in military spending.
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Second, the taxes required to support military spending may fall dispro-
portionately on the middle classes; if so post-tax income inequality may be in-
creased. Third, high levels of military spending may reflect the use of violence
as a means of social control, notably against trade unions and other egalitarian
social forces. It is not surprising to observe that higher military spending means
more societal control and a sacrifice of egalitarian values.
On the other hand, certain aspects of the military experience may cut
in the other direction. The military absorbs low-skilled labor, which may raise
wages for the young and unskilled. Mobilization for war may require equalizing
concession to labor’s interests. In general, the more equipment-intensive military
expenditure, the more we expect the inequality-increasing effects to dominate;
the more labor-intensive the military and home grown the military production,
the more we might expect to find inequality-reduction effects in the data.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine two important questions. First,
to what extent does military spending affect inequality? Second, what are the
factors that tend to influence or determine levels of military expenditure?
We note that the inequality and the military expenditure variables are
both endogenous. The causation between them may run both ways - from mili-
tary expenditure to inequality and from inequality to military expenditure. Con-
sequently, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the effect of military ex-
penditures on inequality are likely to understate the magnitude of the effect. Our
objective therefore, is to obtain estimates of the effect of military expenditure on
inequality that are unaffected by simultaneity bias.
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The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data on in-
equality, and the key variables such as military spending, armed forces and other
control variables: GDP growth, per capita real income, and size of imports.
Section 3 presents empirical methodology for the model specifications. Section
4 presents panel regression estimates of the effects of military spending on in-
equality, using a two-stage least squares regression. Section 5 shows the military
expenditures estimates. Section 6 presents a sensitivity analysis to examine ro-
bustness of the effect of military spending inequality. Section 7 discusses findings
and draws some conclusions.
1.2 Data on Inequality and the Key Variables
Research on inequality and growth can be divided into two paradigms.
One paradigm originated from Kuznets: growth has an impact on inequality
that varies with a country’s stage of development. Kuznets’ idea was developed
further by Robinson (1976). In the early stages of the development of an economy,
as industrialization intrudes on agrarian economy, the economy’s overall level of
inequality increases. Later on, as the industrial sector grows, the relative wages
of the poor grow faster relative to those of richer workers. Therefore in the later
stages of growth the overall level of inequality decreases. The other paradigm
relies on a causal relation between inequality and growth. For instance Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995) discuss the growth enhancing factors such as technological
changes, while Birdsall and et al. (1995.) argue that lower inequality is growth
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enhancing.
Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) argued that the Kuznets curve fits better for
a cross-section of countries than for panel data. On contrary, Barro (1999) used
panel data to estimate inequality measured using the Gini coefficient as a func-
tion of growth and reaffirmed that the Kuznets curve shows up empirically and
regularly across countries and overtime. Our model uses a modified Kuznets
curve framework, taking account of both per capital income, GDP growth in
the determination of inequality. In addition, we seek other variables that may
independently influence this relationship.
This section describes the key variables: (1) inequality measures and
trends, (2) indicators of military activities and (3) economic and conflict vari-
ables.
1.2.1 Inequality Measures and Trend
As Galbraith and Conceição (2001) have shown, the partition of pay data
based on the International Standard Industrial classification (ISIC) is a useful way
to compute between-group Theil T statistics and to construct from them long and
dense measures of industrial pay inequality. The between-groups component of












 where n is the number of industry groups
in the sample, yi is the earnings in industry i (i = 1, 2, ...., n) and y = total wage
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earnings. N and Ni represent total employment and employment of industry
i respectively. For a detailed discussion on the properties of the Theil’s T one
may refer to Theil (1979), Galbraith (1998), Galbraith and Berner (2001). Com-
prehensive data on industrial pay inequality world wide are available from the
University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP)3 with measures of Theil indexes
computed for 160 countries over the period 1987-1997.
In the sample used in this paper, there is generally an increase of in-
equality in most countries from 1987-1997. Figure 1.1 shows a selected group of
countries from different regions of the world. Countries in South America, Cen-
tral America, Western Europe, South America, North Africa and the Middle East
demonstrate a consistent upsurge of inequality from 1987-1997. In East Asian
countries Malaysia and Taiwan show declining inequality in the 1990s, while the
Philippines and Korea show cyclical patterns.
1.2.2 Indicators of Military Activities
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1998) reports that
world military expenditures in the decade from 1987 to 1997 were an average
of $237 dollars per capita. By comparison, some countries in Africa have an
average per capita income of $250 dollars or less. Military expenditures in poor
countries are often high relative to income and also to military need. Collier
and Hoeffler (2002) for example, found that during a long period of military
3For most recent data on Theil index refers to UTIP web-site at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu.
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Figure 1: Industrial Pay Inequality within Selected Countries (1987-1997) 
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Figure 1.1: Industrial Pay Inequality within Selected Countries (1987-1997)
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government in Nigeria, the navy accumulated more admirals than it had ships.
This high expenditure on admirals reflects the preferences of the naval officers
in the government, rather than the operational needs of the navy. Alternatively
pressure from interest groups can sway policymakers to extract greater shares
from government budgets for military purposes. Tanzi (1998) estimated that
bribes account on average as much as 15 percent of the total spending on weapon
acquisition. Corruption in campaign financing may also tend to increase public
spending on the military and arms trade Pieth (1999).
To understand the impact of military expenditure on economic inequality,
we will introduce the two most important indicators of military institutions: per
capita military spending (MILEN) and size of the armed forces (ARMF).
1.2.2.1 Per Capita Military Spending
Data on aggregated military spending are provided by the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Table 1.1 shows that in most regions
of the world, military expenditures decline after the end of the ColdWar; however,
East Asia, South Asia and Central Africa show increases in military expenditures.
1.2.2.2 The Size of Armed Forces
The military remains a major employer and provider of jobs and this func-






1987 1993 1997 1993 1997
World 1360 885 842 −34.9 −38.1
Developed 1120 688 610 −38.6 −45.5
Developing 234 197 232 −15.8 −0.9
Region
North America 389 334 288 −14.1 −26.0
Western Europe 218 198 186 −9.2 −14.7
East Asia 121 145 174 19.8 43.8
Eastern Europe 472 88 65 −81.4 −86.2
Middle East 92 55.1 52.4 −40.1 −43.0
South America 22.1 21.5 28.7 −2.7 29.9
South Asia 11.8 12.7 16.3 7.6 38.1
Central America 3.1 1.6 1.7 −48.4 −45.2
Southern Africa 7.1 5.2 5.1 −26.8 −28.2
North Africa 5.8 4.3 5.5 −25.9 −5.2
Central Africa 3.5 4.9 4.3 40.0 22.9
Central Asia −− 5.4 4.4 −−
Europe, all 691 286 251 −58.6 −63.7
Africa, all 16.4 14.4 14.9 −12.2 −9.1
Table 1.1: World Military Expenditures ( in constant 1987 dollars)
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independently to capture the full impact of military activity on inequality. Why
not treat armed forces as an endogenous variable? Because a country can retain
large standing forces as the result of conscription. Conscripts cannot voluntary
withdraw their services, and when government allocates military spending the
size of the armed forces may therefore be taken as predetermined. Our hypothe-
sis is that as the size of the armed forces increases, other things equal, inequality
decreases. Due to supply-side pressure on low-skilled labor market. Table 1.2
shows the size of armed forces on the decline in most regions of the world ex-
cept for South Asia and southen African countries. Overall employment in the
military is on the decline following the end of the Cold War.
1.2.3 The Economic and Conflict Variables
1.2.3.1 GDP growth and Per Capita Income
It is conventional in inequality models to incorporate GDP growth (GDPG)
and per capita income (RGDP1) into the analysis of income distribution. The
theoretical argument is based on the Kuznets hypothesis and a voluminous lit-
erature on inequality (Galbraith (1999), Loury (1981), Champernowne, (1953)).
In general, we anticipate that as per capita income increases inequality should
fall; most countries are on a downward sloping portion of the Kuznets curve. The
literature gives a mixed view of the relationship between the economic growth
rate and inequality; ours is simply that in booms jobs are plentiful and pay in-






1987 1993 1997 1993 1997
World 28.3 24 22.3 −15.2 −21.2
Developed 12.00 8.2 7.18 −31.7 −40.2
Developing 16.4 15.8 15.1 −03.7 −7.9
Region
North America 2.51 2.07 1.84 −17.5 −26.7
Western Europe 3.87 3.21 3.02 −17.1 −22.0
East Asia 8.05 7.75 6.96 −3.7 −13.5
Eastern Europe 5.65 3.21 2.8 −43.2 −50.4
Middle East 2.70 2.45 2.47 −09.3 −8.5
South America 1.19 0.91 0.94 −23.3 −21.2
South Asia 1.95 2.15 2.18 10.3 11.8
Central America 0.54 0.36 0.17 −34.7 −68.0
Southern Africa 0.44 0.45 0.36 03.7 −18.0
North Africa 0.49 0.44 0.42 −11.6 −15.0
Central Africa 0.83 0.69 0.71 −15.6 −14.1
Central Asia −− 0.19 0.29 −− −−
Europe, all 9.52 6.42 5.82 −32.6 −38.9
Africa, all 1.76 1.59 1.49 −09.7 −15.3
Table 1.2: World Armed Forces
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from Penn World Tables (1998).
1.2.3.2 Imports
Countries have different measures of protection against the import of
goods and services. In general, we expect countries with high barriers and low
import shares to be relatively more equal - the function of protection is, after all,
to protect. Data on the volume of imports are obtained from ACDA (1998).
1.2.3.3 Conflict Variables
Our study includes 160 countries that are divided into two groups by intro-
ducing control variables; known internal security threats (INTSEC) and known
external security threats (EXTSEC). (INTSEC) and (EXTSEC) correspond to
civil and international wars respectively. The source of the data is from Heidel-
berg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIKE) (1998-1999). HIIKE
used qualitative definitions including the duration and magnitude of deaths to
define violent conflicts. We hypothesize that conflicts increase inequality, while
periods of peace tend to improve the prospects for inequality reduction. Con-
trolling for known security threats therefore is important to improve the model
specification.
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1.3 Model and Empirical Methodology
This section describes the econometric model. We use a panel regression,
on country level observations, extending from 1987 to 1997. We initially discuss
the determinants of inequality followed by a specification for the demand for
military expenditures.
1.3.1 Regression Model
We first use a single equation to investigate the impact of military spending
on inequality. Our starting point is the following model for pay inequality:
THEILit = β1 + β2MILENit + β3GDPGit + β4RGDP1it +
β5TIMNit + β6ARMFit + β7G ∗ TIMNit + (1.1)
β8RGDPWGit + β9INTSECit + β10EXTSECit + νi + εit
For a description of the variables in equation (1.1) refer to Table A.5
in the appendix. Equation (1.1) regresses inequality (THEIL) on explanatory
variables: military expenditure (MILEN), GDP growth rate (GDPG), the share
of imports in GNP (TIMN), the size of armed forces (ARMF), known internal
security threats (INTSEC), known external security threats (EXTSEC)and in-
teractions between GDPG, and TIMN (G*TIMN) and GDP growth with RGDP
(RGDPWG). v is a country specific factor such as geopolitical, cultural and other
13
attributes. ε represents a white noise error term.
Regression results are valid as long as there is one endogenous variable.
What if we have more than one endogenous variable? What if, in other words,
pay inequality and military spending are determined simultaneously? In such
cases we need to deal with the issue of endogeneity and to find ways to obtain
unbiased and consistent estimates.
1.3.2 Simultaneous Regression Model
Unequal societies may choose higher military spending because increased
military spending can bring stability, for example through suppression of dissi-
dents. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of higher military spending can
lead to more inequality. If estimates using a single equation model are biased and
inconsistent, then it becomes necessary to estimate the determinants of military
spending with instruments that may be used to treat the simultaneity bias. This
is the standard method of simultaneous equations models.
We postulate two endogenous variables: THEIL and MILEN, and several
predetermined variables (instruments), to be described below. The process of
implementing 2SLS is as follows: in the first-stage regression, we obtain the
"estimated THEIL" and the "estimated MILEN". In the second stage we replace
the MILEN by the "estimated MILEN" in equation (1.1) to obtain coefficient
ˆ
βi for equation (1.1). In order to obtain unbiased estimates for the original
postulated coefficients αi in equation (1.2) see below we need to replace the
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THEIL by the "estimated THEIL" as an instrumental variable in equation (1.2).
1.3.2.1 Military Expenditure Equation
Our model defines per capita military expenditure as a function of levels of
inequality (THEIL), per capita income (RGDP1), share of arms imports in total
imports (AITI), size of the armed forces (ARMF), and level of engagement in the
arms trade (ARMTR), and known security threats (INTSEC) and (EXTSEC).
v represents the country effects and η represents the error term. The military
expenditures equation is:
MILENit = α1 + α2THEILit + α3RGDP1it + α4AITIit +
α5ARMFit + α6ARMTRit + α7INSECit +
α8EXTSECit + Vi + ηit (1.2)
1.3.2.2 Determinants of Military Expenditures
It should be recognized that there are no unique models for estimating
determinants of military expenditure; for discussion see Smith (1977). Recent
writings on the demand for military expenditures emphasize social choice theory:
resources committed for public and private consumption and investment is deter-
mined by a benevolent leadership whose objective is to maximize social welfare
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(Hewitt, 1992). From public choice theory, military spending is a type of public
good but imperfect information makes it difficult for economic agents to assess
the true value of military spending.
The public-choice-based discussion of military expenditure obscures the
politics and competing alternatives that are ruled out due to pressures from
interest groups. Military issues involve secrecy; sometimes threats are manufac-
tured to justify military spending. These concerns make it difficult to justify
using models based on social choice theory.
In economic theory of alliance Sander and Hartley (1995) have shown
in partial equilibrium model that military expenditure is a function of level of
income, threat and relative price of defense goods to non-defense. They have
shown that income level is a crucial determinant of military expenditures. Given
that many alliances fell apart or changed after the end of the Cold War, we
borrow part of Sander and Hartley model without the alliances variable.
Inequality (THEIL)
We believe the level of inequality has an impact on the demand for military spend-
ing. Unequal societies encounter a greater social and political unrest that require
an increase in military spending to maintain social stability, especially in devel-
oping countries. As inequality increases, military spending therefore should be
expected to rise.
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Per Capita Income (RGDP1)
Sander and Hartley (1995) suggested that as income rises the nation has both
more resources to protect and greater means to provide protection. In general,
the higher the per capita income, the higher the military spending; the military
needs are normal goods.
Armed Forces (ARMF)
The size of the armed forces is of course an important determinant of military ex-
penditures. Once military institution commits to a specific size of armed forces,
they maintain forces in most cases and military expenditure is therefore is an
endogenous consequence of free structure. As the size of armed forces increases
military spending should increase.
Arms Imports (AITI)
Arms imports are a component of military spending, but they may be funded off-
budget, by credit and by grant aid. This can create a substitution effect so
that a government will spend less on the military overall, from budget resources
than would otherwise be the case. Arms importers also face a foreign exchange
constraint, and may have less powerful local lobbies than arms producers. For
this reason, we expect that countries which import a larger share of their arma-




The armaments trades may be a separate reason for high military spending, and
therefore a useful instrument for predicting MILEN. Brauer (2000) created a so-
phisticated index with an arms export step dummy from 0 for non-exporters, 1 for
occasional exporters, to 2 for regular exporters, to 3 for high-volume exporters.
We create a simple index (ARMTR) to distinguish countries that both import
and export arms from countries that only import them. This measure is created
by the interaction of a dummy variable that defines whether a country is an arms
exporter with the variable AITI.
Conflict Variables
Conflict variables categorize countries according to known security threats both
internal and external; this is done in view of the hypothesis that known security
threats matter to level of military expenditure. Controlling for the level of con-
flicts is important to isolate the impact of other variables on military spending.
However, it is difficult to determine the direction of movement of military expen-
diture as threat levels increase. Our interpretation is that at an initial level of
conflict military spending rises.
1.4 Estimation Results
To have valid instruments at least one instrument must enter into the first
stage and be relevant. In our model we used arms import as instrument for model
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1. The F-statistics at the first-stage on military expenditure equation is 120.11.
The rule-of-thumb; if the first stage F-statistics is less than 10, then the set of the
instruments are weak. All reported F-statistics are strictly greater than 10 so the
instruments aren’t weak. Further the explanatory power of the first-stage is 94
percent enforce the notions that we have good instruments that have predictive
power.
Table 1.3 presents descriptive statistics for pay inequality. Single equation
estimates for equation (1.1) are reported in Table 1.4; given that they are biased
and inconsistent we will not discuss them.We conduct the Hausman test if vari-
able military expenditure and inequality are correlated with vi. The test of this
hypothesis shows that the residuals for model (1)-(3) are statistically different
from zero. So we conclude that endogeneity bias is serious in this case. Equation
(1.1) and (1.2) are estimated using two-stage least squares. The regression re-
sults explaining variation in inequality in equation (1.1) are reported in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5 shows that the estimates generated from the system of equations are ro-
bust. In regression (1)-(3) the variables -GDPG, RGDP1, G*TIMN, RGDPWG
and INTSEC and EXTSEC are significant at the 0.05 significant level.
The results show a positive and significant — though of course small-
relationship between military spending and inequality. Consistent with previous
work, the rate of GDP growth and level of per capita income show evidence of
a negative relationship with inequality. This result supports our hypothesis and
much evidence from other work. The interaction between GDP growth and the
level of income (RGDPWG) has a negative impact on inequality. If a country
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
Theil 1106 0.081 0.096 0.001 0.893
MILEN 1556 239.662 713.015 0 17800
GDPG 1435 3.155 6.462 -41.054 54.949
AITI 1708 4.731 22.038 0 604
ARMF 1693 7.170 8.055 0 75.400
TIMN 1694 0.304 0.224 0 1.838
RGDP1 1396 7241.17 7234.90 276.00 37511.00
GDPTI 1394 2300.65 3787.31 0 44492.66
INTSEC 1725 0.201 0.400 0 1
EXTSEC 1725 0.103 0.305 0 1
Table 1.3: Simple Statistics on Military Expenditures and Pay Inequality
satisfies the condition of high income and high growth, inequality should fall
because people are getting plenty of jobs with high pay.
The interaction term between the size of imports andGDP growth (G*TIMN)
is also significant at the 0.05 significance level. Importing capital goods; such as
machines and equipment promotes growth, while importing non-capital goods
such as luxury items is detrimental to growth.
Estimates of the size of armed forces appear to have significant and neg-
ative effects on inequality. The known external security threats and known in-
ternal security threats variables are statistically significant. The G*TIMN and
RGDPWG regressors are able to account for some variations in inequality. Over-
all, we find that the inequality model in Table 1.5 column (1) - (3) provide the
best fit to the data, with an R-squared ranging from 64 percent to 68 percent.
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F − statistics 16.43 16.87 17.02
R− squared 0.70 0.69 0.70
Number 776 776 776
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 1.4: OLS One-way Fixed Effect; Dependent Variable Theil
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F − statistics 12.66 13.27 14.04
R− squared 0.64 0.66 0.68
Observation 774 712 712
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 1.5: 2SLS One-way Fixed Effect; Dependent Variable Theil
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F − statistics 120.11 115.78 139.13
R− squared 0.94 0.94 0.95
Observation 774 712 712
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 1.6: Simultaneous Equation Estimation ; the Dependent variable is Military
Expenditure
1.5 The Military Expenditures Estimates
The regression results from equation (1.2) are estimates of the demand for
military expenditures. Table 1.6 presents evidence on the empirical relationship
between military expenditures and THEIL, level of income, size of arms imports,
and intensity of arms trade.
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1.5.1 Military Variables
The significance of the coefficients on arms imports, intensity of arms
trade and the size of armed forces supports the main hypothesis of the model
of determinants of military expenditures. Table 1.6 indicates that there is clear
evidence of a positive link between the intensity of the arms trade and military
expenditures. The coefficient of arms trade is significant at 0.05 significance
levels. Also the coefficient of the armed forces is remains positive and significant
at 0.05 levels across the model.The size of arms imports is also found to be at
0.05 level of significance and the coefficient is negative as expected.
1.5.2 Economic Variables
The per capita income variable in Table 1.6 shows that for every dollar
increase in income, $0.03 dollars are spent on the military after controlling for
the other factors.
1.5.3 Inequality Variable
Not surprisingly, more unequal societies spend larger amounts on military
spending. Table 1.6 shows the Theil variable has a positive and significant rela-
tionship with military expenditure as shown by column (1) and (2). In column
3, the inequality measures is insignificat becuase the variable RGDPW from the
equation (1.1) has weaken some of determinants of military expenditure variable
like Theil.
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1.5.4 Conflict Variables Reassessment
The coefficients on variables measuring external and internal security
threats are consistent with predictions for the inequality model; as threat level
increases inequality increases. On the other hand, the conflict variables contra-
dict our premise that as threats increases military expenditure increases. The
contradiction on the second part of the model could be stemming from one of
three scenarios: a) model misspecification b) problems with the way the variables
are measured and/or c) Our interpretation of these variables
To examine each scenario carefully we dropped the conflict variable all
together and introduce regional dummies the inequality model to reduce hetero-
geneity problems associated with comparing small countries with big countries.
These regional control variables are North Africa, Central Africa, South Africa,
North America, Central America, South America, East Asia, South Asia, Middle
East, Western Europe and Eastern Europe.
The operative assumption is that regional dynamics such as excessive mil-
itary spending by neighbors or wars in the region can affect inequality. On the
other hand dividends of peace and prosperity can be shared among neighboring
countries, which can reduce levels of inequality. Controlling for regional variation
is important for estimating inequality, since countries can export the plague of
inequality across their territory to neighbors. Our study includes 160 countries
divided into eleven regions.
The model that controls for the regional variables is shown on Table 1.7.
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The results and the findings are consistent with our theoretical prediction; as
level of military expenditure increases inequality increases. Also Table 1.7 shows
that coefficient estimates have expected signs. The magnitude for the military
expenditure, GDP growth, per capita income and size of the armed forces vari-
ables are almost identical to their magnitude in Table 1.5. The R-squared is
slightly higher than in Table 1.5. Dropping the conflict variable never distorts
the results in the inequality model.
On the military expenditure model in Table 1.8, the absence of conflict
variables does not change the theoretical underpinning of the model, however the
magnitude of the Theil variable dropped bymore than 50 percent across the model
specification. However, the coefficient of the other variables: per capita income,
arms trade and arms imports, and armed forces, did not change drastically as
shown by Table 1.8 and Table 1.6. Therefore, with the exception of the value of
Theil the rest of the variables have similar magnitudes of model results in Table
1.6. Therefore I assert that our model specification is robust and we rule out the
possibility of misspecification.
The other possible scenario to investigate is whether the conflict variables
are wrongly measured. The internal and external security threats are categorical
dummy variables — too little can be done to redefine the terms. We confess that
countries have different levels and intensities of security threats. We gave up any
attempt to recode the conflict variables.
The last scenario regarding the interpretation of these variables and the
type of information they convey are worthy of investigation. Whenever an attack
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occurs, there is physical destruction and disruption of internal functions of gov-
ernment. These conflict variables may be capturing the destruction of wealth or
disruption of internal functions of government by internal or external forces. The
disruption of internal functions of government can increase the level of inequality,
which is consistent with our theoretical assumptions. In addition, disruption of
internal functions of government could negatively effect military spending due to
"coordination failure". Even though the internal and external security variables
when they were designed, it was intended to measure threats, but in reality they
measure the disruption of internal functions of government. Therefore, the se-
curity threats variables are a good proxy for wealth destruction or disruption of
internal functions of government. For any conflict to achieve its goal the prereq-
uisite is to win the conflict by inflicting the maximum and sustainable damage to
prevent the utilization of human and physical capital through time, and that is
what is shown by our model results in Table 1.5. This finding that the internal
and external threats variables convey information on coordination failure is pro-
found, with broader implications for future uses of this data as proxy for it. Even
though the data was originally coded for one purpose but it can also be used for
multiple other purposes. We only need to be patient and not only let the data
speak for itself but also we should critically assess what its means in the context
of our model.
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Re gressions (1) t− val1 (2) t− val (3) t− val
Intercept 0.2002 7.1 0.2126 6.8 0.2222 7.5
MILEN 0.0001 2.8 0.0002 3.1 0.0002 3.1
GDPG −.00107 3.3 −.00148 4.3 −.00288 7.0
RGDP1 −.00001 3.6 −.00001 3.4 −.000001 3.7
TIMN −.03728 2.1 0.07832 2.5 0.08509 2.8
ARMF −.00104 2.3 −.00149 2.8 −0.00138 2.9
G ∗ TIMN −−−− −− −.00001 3.9 −.00001 3.7
RGDPWG −−−− −− −−−− −− −.000001 4.9
NAFRICA −.01246 0.2 −.01721 0.2 −.00902 0.1
CAFRICA −.15411 4.9 −.18900 5.5 −.19842 6.1
SAFRICA −.10374 3.4 −.13622 4.1 −.14380 4.6
CAMERIC −.12690 4.1 −.16159 4.9 −.16965 7.5
SAMERIC −.09064 2.9 −.12532 3.8 −.13402 4.3
MEAST −.09666 2.8 −.12069 3.3 −.13007 3.8
EASIA −.13673 4.8 −.17811 5.6 −.18576 6.1
SASIA −.10419 3.4 −.14577 4.44 −.15323 4.9
EUROPE −.01737 0.7 −.01719 0.6 −.01642 0.7
WUROPE −.13671 4.7 −.18394 5.6 −.18546 5.9
F − statistics 13.46 −− 11.86 −− 13.25 −−
R− squared 0.67 −− 0.65 −− 0.68 −−
Observation 774 −− 712 −− 712 −−
1t− val indicates t− value
Table 1.7: 2SLS the Dependent Variable Theil
28











































F − statistics 139.31 139.87 142.54
R− squared 0.95 0.95 0.95
Observation 774 712 712
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 1.8: Simultaneous Equation Estimation the Dependent Variable Military
Expenditure
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1.5.5 One-way vs Two-way Fixed Effects Model
After exploring the one-way fixed effect model we experiment with a two-
way fixed effects model, controlling for the factors that are consistent across
time and space. The regression results in Table 1.9 show that the time dummy
variables are correlated with the size of the armed forces, rendering this variable
to be insignificant. However, the signs for the variables military expenditure,
GDP growth, real per capita income, and conflict remain unchanged compared
with the model results in Table 1.5. In addition, the estimated coefficients for the
real per capita income, GDP growth, and military expenditure did not change
from what has been reported in Table 1.5. The estimated coefficients for the
conflict variables are slightly higher in the one-way fixed effect model.
The military expenditure model in Table 1.10 shows no significant differ-
ences in coefficient magnitude between two-way and one-way fixed effects model.
The inequality variable has a slightly higher value in Table 1.10 than Table 1.6.
The value of R-squared does not change in Table 1.10, which led us to infer that
the time effect model does not contribute significantly compared to the country
effect model.
1.6 Sensitivity Analysis
To examine the robustness of our regression results we experimented with
three cases. In the first case, the dependent variable was changed from Theil
to Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII). For the second case, we ex-
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F − statistics 15.16 15.17 15.53
R− squared 0.70 0.71 0.72
Observation 774 712 712
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 1.9: 2SLS Two-way Fixed Effects; Dependent Variable Theil
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F − statistics 123.07 118.74 129.53
R− squared 0.94 0.95 0.96
Observation 774 712 712
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 1.10: Simultaneous Equation Estimation Two-way Fixed Effects the De-
pendent Variable Military Expenditure
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perimented with the functional form by trying logs for the military expenditure
and per capita income variables. In the third case we estimated the inequal-
ity equation separately for each region to see if the relationship is significantly
different.
1.6.1 Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII)
Much of our analysis rests on industrial pay inequality as a reasonable
proxy for overall inequality, with data from a number of non-industrial countries
in Africa, Latin America and Asia4. To reaffirm the usefulness of this measure
as a good proxy for inequality, we need to introduce alternative measures to test
the robustness of our model. We use the Estimated Household Income Inequality
(EHII)5 data as an alternative measure. EHII data are a combination of industrial
pay inequality data and Deininger and Squire data accounting for sample design
with adjustment due to missing data. In other words EHII data are weighted
data from a probability sample anchored on industrial pay inequality to improve
upon Deininger and Squire data, which is widely used as a measure of household
income inequality.
Results in Table 1.11 show that military expenditure positively affects
EHII. Higher military spending corresponds with greater inequality within coun-
4We thank Jurgen Brauer for the idea to argue that the industrial pay inequality data are
not heavily weighted towards industrial countries due to their strong industrial base that could
biased upwards the industrial pay inequality estimates.


























































































F − statistics 14.26 5.33 14.16 5.70
R− squared 0.64 0.43 0.64 0.45
Number 777 704 777 704
∗∗, ∗ indicate p values significance at the
5 and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 1.11: Military Expenditure and Inequality: Dependent Variable Estimated
Household Income Inequality
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tries. The relationship between the size of armed forces and EHII remains neg-
ative, consistent with findings when we have used pay inequality. The results
suggest that the regression would be improved by adding additional variables in
the interaction between economic growth and level of income (RGDPWG). As
shown by Table 1.11, column 4 of the regression results, all the estimated coef-
ficients indicate the expected direction of change and are statistically significant
at a 5 percent p-value. Therefore, Table 1.11 shows that the results are not fun-
damentally different when the household income inequality is substituted for pay
inequality.
1.6.2 Functional Forms
When estimating equation (1.1), we assumed a linear form. To check the
robustness, of the model, we substituted a linear-log model.6 The dependent vari-
able THEIL was unchanged but the military expenditure and per capita income
variables appear in logarithmic form. Table 1.12 shows that Log military expen-
diture (LMILLEN) has a positive and significant effect on THEIL. In regard to
log per capita income (LRGDP1), Table 1.12 shows that the marginal increases
in THEIL is a decreasing function of per capita income; the P-values illustrate
that per capita income is statistically significant. The Linear model in equation
(1.1) remains robust to change in the functional form.


























































































F − statistics 16.96 15.40 17.08 15.72
R− squared 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70
Number 773 709 773 709
∗, ∗ ∗ indicate p values significance at the
10 and 5 percent level respectively.
Table 1.12: Log military Expenditure and Inequality: Dependent Variable Theil
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1.6.3 Regional Inequality
We shift from an analysis of inequality and military spending in all coun-
tries to an analysis of inequality and military spending on a regional level. For
example, we would expect the relationship between military expenditure and in-
equality to be different between Europe and Latin America. In Table A.1 in the
appendix the military expenditure variable in the West Europe remains statisti-
cally significant but with a negative coefficient. However, the coefficient for the
size of armed forces remains negative increasing armed forces creates jobs and
lowers inequality. Table A.2 in the appendix shows estimates of inequality in
Sub-Saharan Africa. The military expenditure variable has a positive effect on
inequality which is consistent with our original hypothesis. Results of estimating
variables such as per capita income, GDP growth, and size of the armed forces
have an expected sign except for TIMN and RGDPWG and EXTSEC. These
results show that Europe and Latin America are distinctly different.
Similar to Sub-Saharan Africa, Table A.3 in the appendix shows that
inequality estimates in Latin America have similar signs and are statistically
significant, except that internal and external security threats are statistically
insignificant. In contrast with Africa and Latin America, Table A.4 in the ap-
pendix shows that not only does military expenditure in Asia have a negative
impact on inequality but also that the coefficient of GDP growth and level of per




This study has attempted to examine the relationship between military
spending and inequality. Our hypothesis is that as per capita military expenditure
increases, inequality increases, controlling for the size of armed forces, and for
known security threats and economic variables. Our findings lend support to
the hypothesis that expenditure on militarization drains resources from public
spending on human, other social programs and infrastructure development that
may lend to promote development and reduce economic inequality. On the other
hand, employment by the military is helpful for reducing the level of inequality.
Also we developed a simple model of determinants of military spending as
a function of economic, and institutional variables, and the level of inequality. We
obtain estimates that are robust and that suggest a causal relation between the
level of inequality and military expenditures. However, the issue of the causation
remains worthy of further research. The sensitivity analysis reveals robustness of
the model across the variable definition, and model specification. However, the
regional analysis shows heterogeneity among regions. The relationship between
military spending and inequality in the regional level is distinctly different from
the estimates of the global sample in West Europe and East Asia.
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Chapter 2
Inequality and Military Spending in the Middle
East and North Africa
2.1 Introduction
A recent report from United Nations Development Program (2002), com-
missioned by Arab intellectuals, fleshed out the state of human development in 22
countries from the Maghreb to the Gulf. Overall the report shows that the Mid-
dle East and North African countries (MENA) have made substantial progress
in human development over the past three decades. However the report also
underlines how far the MENA countries must advance to tackle the human de-
velopment and economic scourge of unemployment rates, which greatly exceeds
the rates in other developing regions of the world. Another report prepared by
the RAND Corporation portrays the economic challenges facing the Middle East
countries. These challenges include low growth, population expansion, unemploy-
ment among youth, and environmental degradations. In the final assessment,
the study indicates Washington consensus policies- such as balancing the budget,
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maintaining low inflation, reducing regulation and promoting free market - has
produced a dismal economic result (Richards, 2001).
Studying the inequality of MENA1 countries provides an opportunity to
assess factors that shape the countries’ success in distributing the wealth by look-
ing beyond simple measures of wealth creation. It has been a long established
tradition to relate income distribution to economic and political variables. Af-
fluence and higher growth rates have been correlated with the presence of low
inequality. Adams and Page (2001) have shown that MENA countries have had
the lowest regional incidence of extreme poverty in recent years, with less than
2.5 percent of the population living on or below the $1 per day income level.
The authors attributed the decline of poverty levels to egalitarian income dis-
tribution practices and economic growth. In contrast to the Adams and Page
study, which focuses on censured distribution of individuals or households below
a certain poverty line, we will instead focus on inequality as a broader concept
to define the whole distribution. One can easily object to the use of absolute
poverty measures because as we increase the poverty line, the number of des-
titute will rise as well. Given that the per capita incomes in MENA countries
are much higher than the poorest countries of the world, it will be misleading to
use absolute poverty measures to make a comparative study with the rest of the
world.
As discussed in chapter one, many factors affect inequality, such as per
1The countries in MENA are Iran and Arab countries; including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jor-
dan, Morocco, Tunisia, and GCC countries.
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capita income, GDP growth, and democratic institutions. While acknowledging
that all these factors are important for inequality, we will instead consider a novel
factor that we believe contributes to the rise of inequality: military expenditures.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine two research questions raised in Chapter
One with more emphasis on regional dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on in-
equality, growth, and military spending in MENA countries. Section 3 describes
the data on inequality and key variables, such as military spending, other con-
trol variables, like GDP growth, per capita real income, and the size of arms
imports. Section 4 presents empirical methodology for the model specifications.
Section 5 presents panel regression estimates of the effects of military spending
on inequality. Section 6 discusses findings and draws some conclusions.
2.2 Inequality, Growth and Military Spending
2.2.1 Inequality in MENA
Richards and Waterbury (1996) argued that all governments in MENA
countries have proclaimed that reducing and achieving a more equitable distri-
bution of income are central goals. They contend that poor data quality and
most of the information about income distribution comes from sample surveys
plagued by conceptual and methodological inconsistencies. Evaluating whether
countries achieved their stated goals for equal distribution of wealth cannot be
verified. Most analysts agree that the poverty problem is very serious for surveys
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conducted in 1984-1985 and in 1990-1991 for Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan. For
Egypt the poverty level fell between 1974-1975 and 1981-1982 but increased by
the 1990s. A study by Eeghen (1998) provided analysis from household expendi-
ture surveys from six countries: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and
Iran. It indicates that economic growth has been the most important determinant
of poverty performance in MENA.
In this study we use the same conceptual framework of Chapter One to
analyze inequality. We use data collected by United Nation Industrial Devel-
opment Organization (UNIDO). The Theil index for each country describes the
dispersion of wage earnings across industries for 17 countries. The preliminary
statistics of the panel data on inequality support the Kuznets hypothesis2; how-
ever, the apparent upsurge of inequality in most of the MENA countries is not
only attributed to slow of economic growth but also the current level of military
expenditures in MENA countries.
Figure 2.1 shows the region experiencing rising inequality from 1987-1997,
particularly after the Gulf War. The increase in inequality is more pronounced in
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. In MENA countries, only Algeria, Syria, and
Oman showed decrease in inequality from 1996 to 1997. There should be other
underlying institutional parameters that are responsible for the rise in inequality.
By incorporating economic growth and military expenditure and arms imports
variables, we can obtain consistent estimates of inequality parameters. In the
2Kuznets postulates that in the early stages of development, both a country’s economic
growth and its income inequality rise. For MENA countries income inequality showed a ten-
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Figure 2.1: Inequality in North Africa and the Middle East
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subsection below, we provide a brief overview of the economic growth issue in
MENA countries.
2.2.2 Economic Growth in MENA Countries
Growth rates do matter when addressing the issue of inequality (Kuznets,
1955; Lipset, Seong, Torres, 1993; Galbraith, 1998). The divergence in growth
across countries can be translated into a divergence of inequality. From the 1960s
through the first half of the 1980s, the MENA countries experienced an economic
boom; however, by the second half of 1980s, the growth collapsed (Page, 1998).
MENA countries are facing challenges, including a high level of inequality and
low economic growth rates. Despite the regional endowment of natural resources,
including 46 percents of the world’s oil reserves and 15 percents of its natural
gas reserves, economic growth remains below regional expectations. Real GDP
growth has been marginally negative on average from 1980 to 2000, compared to
global real GDP growth of 3 percent (Azzam, 2002). Moreover, the population
size in MENA countries, excluding Iran, has more than doubled in the last 20
years, increasing from approximately 140 million persons in 1980 to nearly 278
million in 2000 from which 3 percent to 8 percent of the population are expatriates
in the GCC. The accelerating growth in population strains both the government
budget and infrastructures such as housing, sewerage, and garbage collection.
The economic aftermath of the Gulf War has placed countries like Sudan,
Yemen, Syria, Egypt and, Jordan on brink of bankruptcy with broader politi-
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cal and economic implications. These countries cite deep economic crises, heavy
external debts, and severe balance of payments problem. Economic relations be-
tween these non-oil producing countries and the GCC are cases of dependence
labor remittance and oil — two dominant forms of capital inflow in the Middle
East (Chaudhry, 1997). The trends and business cycles can be easily transmitted
from one country to the other based on this mutual economic interdependence.
Countries in the region shared the dividends of growth in 1970s and misery in-
dexes of last two decades.
Historically, governments of the region invested directly in industrial ca-
pacity, financial institutions and utilities; however, the fiscal constraints and glob-
alization in recent years have caused a profound shift in the role of government
to become a referee rather than a player (Azzam, 2002). The implementation
of neoliberal reforms or "Washington consensus policies" is politically motivated
from the Western governments and encourages neither social equity nor advanced
growth in Middle East. The prevailing sentiment in the region is that economic
openness is unfavorable to development, and the persistent volatility of commod-
ity prices is seen by many countries as serious source of vulnerability.
Increasing globalization of economic activities deepens the crisis of depend-
ing on oil to generate revenue. Middle Eastern economies have become extremely
vulnerable to the external shocks. Oil revenue precipitously declined during the
past decade, and most analysts suggest that there is a high correlation between
the growth and the oil—price. Most changes in the oil price are translated into
some level of output, but not necessarily all the change in economic growth is
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attributed to oil price movement. In this study we include both the oil price and
GDP growth to measure their impacts on inequality. Since our study covers the
period from 1987-1997, the price of the oil remains relatively stable, and we an-
ticipate it may have no impact on income distribution but the economic growth
does impact the inequality.
Figure 2.2 shows that most MENA countries posted improvement of GDP
growth from 1989-1991, except for Iraq and Kuwait. Iran showed high economic
growth rates between 1989-1991, followed by period of precipitously declining in
growth. In 1990-1991, higher growth rates were attributed to regional conflicts
and the mass-war mobilization in Qatar, Egypt Saudi Arabia and Oman. The
high growth rate was more pronounced in Saudi Arabia, which is logistical based
for the war efforts. Even though Kuwait was in period of war during 1991 and
the economic growth was negative, after the war recovery was rapid and growth
reached 77.4 percent in 1992. In general, MENA countries experienced their
lowest levels of growth after 1993, except for Algeria.
2.2.3 Military Spending
Before we proceed into a substantive discussion on the relation between
military spending and inequality, several comments need to be made aboutMENA
countries. One facet of military expenditure is the fiscal strains it puts on gov-
ernment spending priorities on social spending such as education, health, and
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Figure 2.2: GDP Growth in North Africa and the Middle East from 1987-1997
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higher inequality. The other facet of military spending is related to arms imports
which is more visible in MENA than the rest of the World. Military industrializa-
tion and technology acquisition are the most important elements behind massive
arms imports. Transferring technology that is embodied in weaponry systems
promotes import substitution. We therefore expect that there is a negative rela-
tionship between inequality and arms imports. In the section below, we discuss
these two facets of military spending.
2.2.3.1 Military Spending vs. Social Spending
Putting aside the ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict, the most recent conflicts
in MENA countries include the Iran-Iraq War from (1981-1988), the Gulf War
from (1990-1991) and ongoing internal conflicts in Sudan and Algeria. National
and international pressure sparked an arms race in the region. The Middle East
accounts for 3 percent of the population but consumed more than 30 percent of
the world’s military goods and services in the 1980s. From 1989 to 1991, the
Middle East accounted for 57.5 percent of arms transfer agreements and 53.4
percent of arms imports (Said Aly, 1997).
Figure 2.3 shows military expenditures in MENA countries as prepared
by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Stockholm
International Peace Institute (SIPRI). ACDA uses official and unofficial reports
to estimate military expenditures, while SIPRI uses official reports to in their
estimates. Despite differences in the measurement between ACDA and SIPRI in
48
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Figure 2.3: Military Expenditure in North Africa and the Middle East
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estimating military expenditures, however, there are similarities in the patterns
within countries. As shown in Figure 2.3, ACDA military spending was about 25
percent of GNP in Oman, 14 percent in Jordan, 7 percent in Egypt, 27 percent
in Saudi Arabia, and about 12 percent in Qatar. Tunisia and Algeria spent
far less, between 3 to 4 percent of their GNP. Nevertheless, we can observe
similar patterns and trends in military expenditures when we use SIPRI military
expenditure estimates. Only Oman, and Iran show some divergence between
ACDA and SIPRI estimates of military expenditures.
After the Gulf War, the United States signed defense agreements with
Oman (1990), Saudi Arabia (1990), Bahrain (1990), Kuwait (1991), Qatar (1992)
and the United Arab Emirates (1994). These agreements are long-term military
relationships between U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Deployment
of the military assets resulted in a spike on military spending in the region as
reported in figure 2.3. As Table 2.1 shows, five of the world largest military
spender in 1997 included four from MENA countries: Oman (second), Saudi
Arabia (fourth), Bahrain (fifth) and Qatar (eighth). The largest arms importers
in the world in 1997 are: Saudi Arabia (second), Kuwait (third), Qatar (fourth)
and Egypt (seventh). Eight of MENA countries ranked in the top 20 in terms of
military expenditures in 1997.
Lavy and Sheffer (1997) argued that defense spending represented 55 per-
cent to 65 percent of total public consumption in Jordan and Syria between 1985
and 1987, crowding out social and economic services and leaving fewer resources
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Rank MILEN Rank AIMT
Country
Saudi Arabia 4 14.4 2 40.4
Kuwait 11 7.5 3 24.3
Qatar 8 NA 4 14.3
Egypt 62 2.8 7 12.1
Iran 59 3.0 12 5.8
Algeria 44 3.9 13 5.7
Yemen 9 8.0 14 5.5
United Arab E. 12 6.8 16 4.7
Oman 2 26.1 23 3.2
Jordan 7 9.0 24 3.2
Bahrain 55 10.3 31 2.2
Morocco 36 4.3 35 1.9
Syria 22 5.6 38 1.7
Lebanon 58 3.0 73 0.5
Libya 23 NA 121 0.1
Iraq 29 4.9
Table 2.1: Country Rank in 1997 by Military Expenditures and Arms Imports
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for social development. The rapid rise of military spending in the GCC stripped
most of their oil revenue. To counter this strain in fiscal spending, the government
scaled down social spending. Most of the analysts agreed that the Gulf War made
the region as whole much poorer than it was in 1989, and inequality between the
"have and have not" states is likely even to have become pronounced. Military
expenditures have crowded out expenditures in health care, education, housing
and infrastructure. The military expenditure caused subsidies to be reduced and
taxes increased, leading to an increase in inequality (Sadowski, 1991). The op-
portunity cost of building this massive military machine is very high, given the
level of economic development. Since the regimes in the region are in closely tied
to the military establishments, it is not surprising that military institutions have
received a disproportionate share of resources.
2.2.3.2 Military Industrialization and Imports Substitution
It is a very complex issue to parse out the benefits and costs of arms
imports. In general, the type of arms imported is critical to the effect on social
welfare. MENA countries are more interested in acquiring military technology
than on importing light arms or ammunition. In that regard, the benefits of arms
imports could outweigh their cost.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we assume there is a negative rela-
tionship between arms imports and inequality in the MENA countries. We can
justify this assumption based on two strands of argument. Our first strand of
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argument suggests that most of the countries in the region have encouraged mil-
itary industrialization for economic and strategic reasons. Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Iran, and Iraq are major arms importers and producers as well. Import substitu-
tion is a driving force behind arms imports in general and technology importation
in particular. Economic and commercial considerations add importance to arms
imports, and military industrialization fosters technology through research and
development. Therefore, one of the purposes of the arms imports is to foster pro-
duction and consequently, to encourage import substitution. Brzoska and Ohlson
(1986) argued that the most important economic incentive for defense production
is that it should substitute for imports. Higher arms imports are indicative of
where countries stand on the ladder of military industrialization.
The second strand of our defense of the negative relationship between
arms imports and inequality is that arms may be purchased with external loans
or grants or financed by the oil revenues. The payments may be spread out over
period of many years, so that the full cost does not reflect the defense budget as
argued by (Sayigh, 1992), who contends that most arms purchases are financed
by oil wealth or debt. Nearly half of Arab countries have accumulated large debts
to foreign nations, substantial parts of which are from loans to buy major arms
items and other military needs. For example Egypt accumulated military debt as
high as 20 percent of GDP. Countries that defer payment of arms imports could
ease pressure on domestic resources and lower their inequality.
It is extremely difficult to quantify which strands of the arguments are the
more powerful. Evidence from figure B.1 in the appendix shows that countries
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like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, with high military industrialization have shown no
tendency to scale back on arms imports from 1987 to 1997. Contrary to Iran,
Jordan and Morocco, countries like Oman and Qatar showed upsurges in arms
imports after the Gulf War. The price of oil between 1987 to1997 remained
relatively flat and economic conditions in the MENA countries deteriorated. Why
do countries needs to import arms? The only pressing needs for arms import are
to expand the industrial base and diversify the exports. In other words, desire for
import substitution is one of reasons for arms imports and technology transfers.
Therefore, we support the first strand of our argument, that arms imports from
1987-1997 are related to military industrialization to expand the technological,
economical and import substitution, all of which which could greatly affect the
level of inequality.
2.3 Data Sources
The Theil index is used to measure inequality. It is computed using in-
dustrial wages and employment from United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO). The Theil Index gives measures of manufacturing pay
inequality in MENA countries from 1987-1997. By using the Theil index, we are
able to overcome the data deficiencies that characterize MENA countries due to
lack of transparency.
The other key policy variable is military expenditure. There are two data
sources for this key variable. One source is the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
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ment Agency (ACDA), which publishes estimates on military spending. These
estimates are based on official and unofficial sources. We define the military ex-
penditure from ACDA sources as "ACDA military expenditure." ACDA military
expenditure is measures as percentage to GNP.
The other data source is Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) their estimates of military expenditures are based on official sources and
sometimes adjusted if official data are considered to be partial. The military
expenditure data from SIPRI is defined as "SIPRI Military Expenditures." SIPRI
military expenditures is measured as percentage of GNP.
As mentioned in Chapter One, we are aware of the problems related to
accuracy and reliability of military expenditure estimates. Countries tend to
disguise their military spending under different banners or other government’s
departments. Military secrecy makes verifying the data’s accuracy even more
difficult. To strengthen our arguments, we use two data sources to test the
validity of our model’s specification and its robustness.
The arms import variable is percentage arms import out of total imports.
This variable comes from ACDA, the Department of Commerce, the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Census, and the Department of Defense.
The other control variables, GDP growth, per capita income, are from different
sources, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
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2.4 Model and Empirical Methodology
This section describes the econometric method that is used to estimate
inequality. We use a panel regression, country level observation, extend from
1987-1997. We initially discuss the determinants of inequality followed by a
specification for the demand for military expenditures. This system of equations
is used to estimate the parameters of inequality that is unbiased and consistent.
2.4.1 Determinants of Inequality
We use a system of equations to investigate the impact of military
spending on inequality. Our starting point is the following model for inequality:
THEILit = β1 + β2MILENit + β3GDPGit + β4RGDP1it +
β5OILPRit + β6MAJit + β7AITIit + (2.1)
β8AITI ∗MAJit + νi + εit
For a description of the variables in equation (1) refer to Table B.1 in
the appendix. Equation (2.1) describes the inequality (THEIL) with explanatory
variables: military expenditure3 (MILEN), GDP growth rate (GDPG), per capita
income (RDDP1), oil price (OILPR), major arms conflict (MAJ), arms import
3MILEN in equation (1) is used as a generic term to describe military expenditures variables
regardless of the source of the data, whether from SIPRI or ACDA.
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(AITI) and interactions between arms import and major conflict (AITI*MAJ).
ν is a country specific factor, such as geopolitical, cultural and other attributes.
ε represents a white noise error term. Inequality and military spending are de-
termined simultaneously; in other words the Theil index and the military expen-
ditures are jointly determined. As stated in Chapter One, military expenditure
and inequality are both endogenous variables: the military spending influences
inequality and vice versa.
Table B.3 and B.4 in the appendix depict regression results from equation
(2.1) using the data on military expenditures from ACDA and SIPRI. Regression
results from Table B.3 and B.4 suggest that even though the coefficient of mili-
tary expenditures is statistically significant, it ignores the simultaneity bias. The
MILENit is correlated with stochastic disturbance term εit. Therefore, we pro-
pose simultaneous equation models to correct for this endogeneity problem. The
estimates using the single—equation model is not meaningful, and the information
provided by the other equation of demand for military spending is critical to the
model specification. The causal chain between the THEILit andMILENit runs
in both direction.
We need to specify the demand for the military expenditure with better
instruments to treat simultaneity bias. However, before specifying the demand for
military expenditures, we need to clarify the process of using the "proxy" to get
better estimates for our model. We postulate two endogenous variables THEILit
andMILENit, and predetermined variables (instruments): GDPGit, RGDP1it,
OILPRit,MAJit, AITIit, AITI∗MAJit, ARMFit,and ISRALit. The estimation
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results of 2SLS are sensitive to the chosen list of instrumental variables. The input
of sound list of instrumental variables would definitely improve the estimation
results. As you will see later, when we will specify equation (2.2), Equation (2.1)
and (2.2) are over-identified. It means the reduced-form method cannot be used
to obtain the original postulated parameters for equation (2.1) and (2.2) from the
estimated coefficients of the reduced-form equations. Thus, the two-stage least
squares (2SLS) method can be used to estimate both equations (2.1) and (2.2).
The process of implementing 2SLS as follows: in the first-stage regression, we
can obtain the "estimated THEILit " and the "estimated MILENit". In the
stage-two we replace the MILENit by the "estimated MILENit” in equation
(2.1) to obtain coefficient, βi , for equation(2.1). In order to obtain the unbiased
estimates for original postulated coefficients αi, in equation (2.2), we need to
replace the THEILit by the "estimated THEILit" as an instruments variable in
the equation (2.2) to get estimated coefficients αi. Next, we discuss the demand
for the military expenditures and it specifications.
2.4.1.1 Demand for Military Expenditures
Our model defines per capita military expenditure as a function of levels
of inequality (THEIL), per capita income (RGDP1), GDP growth rate (GDPG),
share of arms imports (AIMT), size of the armed forces (ARMF), interaction term
between arms import and major conflict (AITI*MAJ), and Israel military expen-
diture (ISRAL). ν is the country effects and η represents the error term. The mili-
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tary expenditures equation is:
MILENit = α1 + α2THEILit + α3RGDP1it + α4AITIit +
α5ARMFit + α6GDPGit + α7ISRALit +
α8AITI ∗MAJit + Vi + ηit (2.2)
The determinants of the military expenditures are driven by three forces.
First, the institutional variables, such as size of the armed forces, and arms
imports are relevant to military spending. We suggest that arms imports, size of
arms forces, and level of inequality that exists in the country all positively affect
military spending. The other control variables, such as Israeli military spending,
reveals the degree to which countries are engaged in building armaments that
can export their negative externality to the region. MENA countries concerned
with their own security, either from neighbors or from Israel, bear the full cost of
obtaining a military edge over their rivals.
The other determinants of military expenditures are GDP growth and per
capita income; the higher the GDP growth the higher the military spending. Re-
garding per capita income; rich countries can afford to increase military spending
and income effect is dominant given that the military needs are normal goods.
The level of inequality in countries has a greater impact on the level of government
spending in general. The correlation between military spending and inequality
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is 0.79. Unequal societies encounter a greater social and political unrest that
requires an increase on military spending to maintain the social stability, espe-
cially in countries like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. As inequality increases, military
spending should rise to protect the institutions of the state and to maintain law
and order.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Determinants of Inequality Standard
In Chapter 2 the natural tendency to examine the impact of military
spending on inequality is to standardize the model presented in Chapter 1. As
mentioned previously this study is conducted over the 1987 to 1997 time-period.
Table 2.2 and 2.3 report the results of 2SLS regression based upon the standard
model in Chapter 1. As presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, the overall specification
appears to fail to support the theoretical premise of relationship between military
expenditures and Inequality except in model 3. This relationship is statistically
significant in model 3 in Table 2.2 and 2.3. The standard model presents weak
results in Chapter 2 for possible reasons: the first reason is the model specifica-
tion; we cannot standardize the model to fit in every case. The MENA countries
are middle income countries that embroiled with conflicts that latent and some
times it surfaces with waves of violence. Something that is unique to this region
of the world. Further, the Israel’s-Arab’s conflict for decades set a new dynamics
and reality that cannot captured by the standardized model of chapter 1. The
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second reason, there is correlation between the known security threats variables
and country and time dummies. We need to find a better variable to define the
security threats; instead we used the major security threats variables that code
only the bloody and devastating conflicts. Also not only the variable measures
the size of imports is highly correlated with the arms imports, but also the arms
imports is correlated with conflicts. Therefore the model specification in equation
2.1 (non-standard) better describes the reality in the MENA countries given the
poor quality of data in MENA countries as discussed previously.
2.5.2 Determinants of Inequality Non-standard
Tables B.3 and B.4 in the appendix present panel results from 1987-1997
for inequality, however, they biased and inconsistent. The results on determinants
of inequality estimates that are consistent and unbiased are presented in Tables
2.4 and 2.5. As expected, military expenditure turns out to be an important
determinant of inequality. In Table 2.4, regression 1 to 3 shows as we increase
military expenditures, the inequality increases. Table 2.5 shows the regression
results on military expenditure again has positive and significant relationship
with inequality. Regression 2.1 in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 indicates that as military
expenditure increases, the inequality increases by (0.0190) and (0.0201) unit re-
spectively. Regardless of which data source is used, there is robust relationship
between inequality and military spending. Both ACDA and SIPRI measures of
military spending have a strong and positive impact on inequality across the
models in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.
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F − statistics 7.78 4.25 3.91
R− squared 0.69 0.68 0.69
Observation 78 78 76
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 2.2: Simultaneous Equation Estimation Using ACDA Military Expendi-
tures: Two-way Fixed Effects the dependent variable is Theil
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F − statistics 9.47 4.41 3.00
R− squared 0.82 0.68 0.69
Observation 80 78 78
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 2.3: Simultaneous Equation Estimation Using SIPRI Military Expendi-
tures: Two-way Fixed Effects the dependent variable is Theil
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F − statistics 13.45 14.04 12.95
R− squared 0.76 0.78 0.78
Observation 78 78 78
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 2.4: Simultaneous Equation Estimation One-way Fixed Effect Using ACDA
Military Expenditures; the dependent variable is Theil
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F − statistics 14.34 16.16 15.08
R− squared 0.77 0.80 0.80
Observation 80 80 80
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 2.5: Simultaneous Equation Estimation One-way Fixed Effect Using SIPRI
Military Expenditures; the dependent variable is Theil
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The regression coefficients in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 explain 76 to 80 percent
of the variation in inequality. The coefficients of military spending remain sig-
nificant at the (0.05) level of significance. These results emphasize our central
message, that the level of military expenditure has a strong and positive effect
on inequality. The public policy implication is that any reduction in military
spending is desirable, since it frees the resources for other social and economic
development programs.
The regressions in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 also reveal that the size of arms
imports has a significant and negative coefficient. Even after controlling for GDP
growth, and major conflict, the higher level of arms import is associated with
lower level of inequality. One explanation for the significant and negative rela-
tionship is demonstrated by arms imports: the core of the military industrializa-
tion is protected and empowered by importing military hardware and technology
embodied in weapons systems to expand the industrial base. The tendency of
MENA countries to follow the path of import substitution was reinforced by
need for indigenous technology implanted from abroad. Technology transfers
and modernization can be achieved through imports in general and arms import
in particular for strategic and economic reasons. To check the robustness of the
arms import variable we added additional regressors such as (AITI*MAJ). The
coefficient of arms import in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 remains stable and significant.
Oil price (OILPR) in regressions of Tables 2.4 and 2.5 remains insignifi-
cant for determining the inequality, because a significant share of oil is sold on
the basis of long term contracts, the price changes do not reflect the short—term
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fluctuations. However, the GDP growth shows a significant and negative re-
lationship with inequality. GDP growth captures the urbanization and general
economic prosperity, which narrows the gap between "haves and have-nots" in
the region.
Surprisingly, in MENA countries, as per capita income rises, inequality
rises. There are general possible interpretations for this relationship. One in-
terpretation is that MENA countries are polarized in terms of wealth, and it is
possible that income divergence is skewed toward the poorest countries in the
distribution. For a relatively poor country, as income rises, the inequality will
rise. This finding is consistent with Kuznets hypothesis. Another possible inter-
pretation: during the period from-1987-97, MENA countries were plagued with
economic recessions prior to and after the Gulf War and overall income level
remained stagnant. Governments in this period introduced major cuts in social
spending, causing reduction in safety nets and further increasing wealth polar-
ization in the region.
2.5.3 Regression Estimates of Military Expenditures
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the estimates of the demand function for mili-
tary spending. We have two types of demand functions for military spending; one
demand function is known as "ACDA demand for military expenditures" and the
other is "SIPRI demand for military expenditure." These two demand functions
are drawn from different data sources with different definitions. The purpose of
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introducing two data sets, as mentioned earlier, is to check whether demand for
military expenditure is robust to the data change. Using more than one data
source to estimate the demand for military expenditure addresses the contested
debate among policy analysts on the validity of using one data set or the other.
We agree with the critics that the greater risk pertains to the use of a single-data
source to validate results that could have broader social, political and economic
implications. Using ACDA and SIPRI measures of military spending give more
tools to investigate the model specification and weigh the validity of our results
more carefully.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present evidence on empirical relationships between
inequality and military expenditures. Regression (1) - (3) shows that the level
of inequality significantly affect military expenditures, controlling for other fac-
tors. This robust relationship between military expenditure and inequality across
the models in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 confirms our original hypothesis that unequal
societies choose higher military spending. There are possible explanations why
unequal societies choose higher military spending, including: unequal societies
tend to be unstable, and increasing military spending brings some sort of stabil-
ity. Governments in unequal societies are keen to cement their ties to military
institutions and win their allegiance or neutralize them from meddling in political
affairs.
In regressions (1) to (3) in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, we introduce the size of arms
imports. As countries imports more arms, military expenditure rises. In Table
2.6, as we increase the arms imports, ACDA military expenditures increases from
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F − statistics 170.73 94.00 91.25
R− squared 0.98 0.96 0.96
Observation 78 78 78
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 2.6: Simultaneous Equation Estimation One-way Fixed Effect; the depen-
dent variable is ACDA Military Expenditure
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F − statistics 120.73 115.65 110.24
R− squared 0.97 0.97 0.97
Observation 80 80 80
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table 2.7: Simultaneous Equation Estimation One-way Fixed Effect; the depen-
dent variable is SIPRI Military Expenditures
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0.173 percent in regression (1) to 0.20 percent in regression (3). In contrast to
Table 2.7, as the arms imports increase, SIPRI military expenditures in regression
(1) will increase to 0.08 percent and to 0.09 percent in regression 3.
Table 2.6 shows that the size of the armed forces is not statistically sig-
nificant while it is positive and significant in its relation with SIPRI military
expenditures in model (2) and (3) in Table 2.7. The findings of Table 2.6 on
size of armed forces are consistent with our original hypothesis that the size of
the armed forces in MENA countries remains stable with no significant changes
through the decade. Therefore, we should not expect that the size of the armed
forces has any impact on the variation of military expenditure that we observe
here. However, the results form Table 2.7 regressions (2) and (3) have put some
doubt on this hypothesis. We infer that the relationship between the armed forces
and military expenditures is inconclusive.
The per capita income variable (RGDP1) in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 does not
support the conventional wisdom that rich countries spend more on the military.
On the contrary, for MENA countries, higher per capita income is associated with
lower military spending. For example in regression (1) on Table 2.6, for every
dollar increase in income, the ACDA military expenditures decline by $0.0004. In
Table 2.7 regression (1) for every dollar increase in income, the military spending
falls by $0.00012. On other hand, the GDP growth (GDPG) variable supports
our hypothesis that as economy grows, more resources will be available for mili-
tary spending, holding other factors constant. GDP growth across the model in
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 shows a positive and statistically significant relation between
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military expenditures and GDP growth in the MENA countries. Table 2.6 shows
that Israel military spending positively affects military spending in the MENA
countries, however that result is far from conclusive in Table 2.7.
The regressions in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 explain about 95 percent of variation
in ACDA military expenditures, while regressions in Table 2.7 explain 80 percent
of variation in SIPRI military expenditures. Overall we have a good and robust
model estimating the demand for military expenditures.
2.5.4 One-way vs Two-way Fixed Effects Model
The appendix Table B.5 and B.6 show regression results for the inequality
model controlling for time and country dummies. The coefficient of inequality in
the model does not fluctuate in sign. However there is fluctuation in the signifi-
cance level. As Table B.5 reports , military expenditure is significant across the
model specifications except in model 3. Also the coefficient of arms imports, GDP
growth and major conflict variables are statistically significant. Not surprisingly,
the coefficient of oil price is insignificant because it works through the economic
growth variable.
Similar findings have been reported in Table B.6, the coefficients for eco-
nomic and military variables remains statistically significant except for coefficient
of oil price and the interaction terms (AITI*MAJ). As far as the dependent vari-
able is concerned, controlling for time dummies does not alter the model results
compare to a one-way fixed effect model. Nevertheless, the one-way fixed effect
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shows a superior results compared with the two-way fixed effect model, when
ACDA military expenditure data is used.
Table B.7 and B.8 show the coefficient of inequality remained significant
and robust across the model specification except in Table B.7, model 2. Overall
inequality affects military expenditure regardless of type of data used. Likewise,
Israel’s military expenditure has a profound impact on the size of military spend-
ing by MENA countries.
2.6 Discussion
This chapter focuses on identifying a connection between military spend-
ing and inequality in the MENA countries. It shows that military spending does
matter for inequality. Specifically, this chapter’s finding is consistent with the
first chapter’s argument that established a positive relationship between mili-
tary spending and inequality. This result can be explained by assuming that
increases in military spending, for instance, could come at the expense of bud-
getary spending on social programs, such as education, health and housing. The
military spending in essence crowding out spending on social entitlements. More-
over, oil price changes do not appear toaffect the level of inequality directly. Also,
our measure of the impact of major conflicts and arms import associated with
major conflicts on inequality are not conclusive.
Second, the paper has empirically assessed the demand for military spend-
ing. The factors such as level of inequality, per capita income, GDP growth and
73
size of arms imports are important determinants of military spending. The level
of inequality, GDP growth and size of arms imports also give a boost to mili-
tary spending. The impact of Israeli’s military spending on military spending
in MENA countries is not conclusive. The policy implication of this study lends
support to the conclusion that reductions in military spending are desirable, since
they free resources for other social and economic development programs.
74
Chapter 3
War and the Relative Cost of Food
3.1 Introduction
In a state of war people are at risk of losing access to one of life most
basic necessities — food. Millions may live in the shadow of famine and poverty.
According to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 2002, at
the end of 2000, violent conflict and its aftermath had left 24 million people
in 28 countries with a shortfall of food. Armed conflict disrupts infrastructure,
markets and human resources required for food production. A further study by
Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol (2003) shows that infant mortality rates increase by
13 percent during wartime. A study by Guha-Sapir and Panhuis (2002) shows
evidence that adult mortality rates are even higher than infant mortality. As
levels of violence intensify majorities of populations are displaced or moved into
urban centers or neighboring countries for protection and survival.
Alternative measures are needed to assess adequately failures in food sup-
plies and the extent of human suffering during wartime. A fundamental and
common problem of conflict is the collapse of purchasing power over food. This
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may happen either because of a rise in the nominal price of the food (food cost in-
flation) or because of collapses in income outside the food-producing sector. The
two causes have equivalent effects, but may be difficult to measure systematically
from price data alone. Our approach is to define a “food-cost ratio” from data
on the wage structure-essentially the relative wage paid to food producing versus
other sectors. This ratio is the fundamental observable in this study. Much of
the past analysis focuses on food aid, with no emphasis on the impact of war
on food-cost ratio. Cost of inputs in the food industry — wages in particular
—could be used as a reasonable indicator to explain why such a high fraction of
the populations is malnourished in war-torn countries.
The unique circumstances of war create economic activities that respond
to war: such as informal market, corruption and commodity speculation; we
can call such an economy a ’war-time economy’. In this war-time economy rent-
seeking behavior is very rational for the following reason. On one hand, shortages
of the food supply can fuel execessive demand and more speculation on the food
commodity. On the other hand, individuals may take advantage of labor shortage
during the conflict to demand high wages. According to Stewart, Huang and
Wang (2001) survey data for 18 countries affected by civil war, in 13 countries
food production had fallen drastically. Given the shortages of food there is an
economic incentive to engage in rent seeking-behavior.
In regard to the political economy of wars, sometimes there are oppor-
tunities for self-enrichment over the course of the conflict. Warlords and other
parties engaged in conflicts can enrich themselves from trading and speculating
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with food, fuels and arms for enormous financial gains. Commercialization of
food during war could be one of the reasons why wages in the food remains
enormously high.
Assume that war is organized violence motivated by political and eco-
nomic purposes. We distinguish between international1 and civil wars2 in terms
of destructive capacity. In civil wars, we witness a severe destruction of prevailing
economic, social and legal norms. In international wars, there is relatively less
social and economic destruction. Micro-level analyses of the food-cost ratio dur-
ing civil or international wars give us insight into governments’ ability or inability
to mobilize the resources to counter the danger of hunger and famine. Under-
standing the factors that makes food-cost ratio rise may help to formulate policy
responses that mitigate human suffering in wartime environments. Therefore,
this paper examines two questions: first, what is the effect of wars on food-cost
ratio; second, what policies are likely to reduce food-cost ratio? To answer these
research questions we use panel data for 50 countries from the 1960s to the 1990s.
The results of this paper will show that civil wars positively affect the
food-cost ratio, while international wars might not affect the food-cost ratio.
The policy implication of this analysis is that in the event of a civil war, policy
1Singer and Small describe two types of international wars: Interstate wars, in which a nation
that qualifies as an interstate system engages in a war with another member of interstate system.
Extra-systemic wars, in which a nation that qualifies as an interstate system engages in a war
with political entity that is not member of interstate system. Our definition of international
war is so broad that we hardly distinguish between the two types of international wars.
2Singer and Small define civil war on three criteria: Military action within the boundary of
the country, active participation of the national government, and effective resistance by both
sides.
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makers lack the resources to exert control on rising food-cost ratio. A rising food-
cost ratio could be translated into higher food prices, which may have devastating
impacts on social and economic well-being. In the event of an international war,
as opposed to civil war, governments have a greater capacity to prioritize and
mobilize resources. In international wars, there are no significant changes in food
sector wages for the following reason: (1) international wars tend to be brief
and levels of publicity and food aid curbs the rent-seeking behavior in the food
industry. (2) Measures such as price controls and rationing could be activated to
mitigate the devastating consequences of international wars. Food imports does
remain an effective tool to reduce the increase in the food-cost ratio.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review.
Section 3 discusses the data and the variables, and Section 4 sets the model of
food wages. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 provides discussion .
3.2 Literature Review
We divide the literature into two broad categories: one group focus on
peace time food crisis and emphasizes on macroeconomic stability as way to
resolve the food crisis. The other category of the literature focuses on the food
crisis as result of social and political conflicts. This study draws from both
categories of the literature but draws heavily on the second category. Singer
(1989) argued that African food crises dated back 25 years, he attributed the
reasons for the crisis to insufficient foreign exchange, which were caused by low
78
world food prices and other external shocks. Rao (1977) concluded that effort
should be put toward not only increasing investment but also to establish new
mechanisms to assure equitable distribution of food.
Singer and Rao discussed the food crisis on context of a normal and peace-
ful environment, contrary to our study which discusses the food crisis in context
of the society that engaged in a bloody conflict. Williamson (2001) pointed out
that food security has been treated as a broader aspect of global poverty, reflected
in insufficient income to produce food available on global markets. Sen’s (1981)
theory of famines, eschews the focus on food availability in favor of examining
exchange entitlements. During war people fail to establish command over food
for many reasons: lack of social order and displacement, collapse of exchange
entitlements due to job loses.
A study by the World Hunger Organization (WHO) (2000) supports the
notion that food insecurity, or poverty-related hunger, follows from armed vio-
lence that disrupts markets and denies households the command entitlement to
acquire food. Cramer (1998) elaborates the possible relationship between income
distribution and conflict in LDCs. There is a complex and shady interlinking
between distribution, conflict and economic growth.
Most of the literature emphasizes demand-side arguments over supply-side
arguments. However, studying the food-cost ratio shifts the debate to supply-side
arguments, since labor is an important input to food producing industries.
79
3.3 Data
Country level data available from the 1970’s through the 1990’s from the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Bank,
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are used to conduct this study.
3.3.1 Food-cost Ratio
We use industrial wages and employment data on the food sector collected
by the United Nation Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The food-
cost ratio is measured as a share of wages paid to the food sector versus total
manufacturing wages. Most countries included in this study experienced intense
and prolonged wars during the period under consideration. Table 3.1 shows food-
cost ratio and dates for the beginning and end of wars for countries in our sample.
Countries like Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, Colombia, Peru, and Uganda
show the largest increases in food-cost ratio. In data for 37 countries, more
than 26 countries experienced a rise in food-cost ratio. It is no surprise to learn
that the common characteristic shared by these countries is conflict,hunger and
starvation.
The legacy of war perpetuates through generations in terms of misery
and malnutrition.WHO (2000) argued that conflicts that were linked with food
shortages set the stages for years of food emergencies after fighting officially
ceased. As wars end food-cost ratio remained high, except for few countries like
Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and Sierra Leone. This result may further explain why the
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food-cost ratio remains high after conflict end; demand pressures cause wages to
remain high. This food gap might be overcome by national and international
efforts.
3.3.2 Food-cost Ratio and conflict
Evidence in figure 3.1 shows that food-cost ratio rose sharply during con-
flict, particularly in Guatemala, Iraq, Nicaragua and Peru. Syria showed ac-
celerating increases in food-cost ratio, especially after the insurrection in Hama
in 1982. However, Iran managed to keep the food-cost ratio from accelerating
during its war with Iraq. Prior to the Iranian revolution the food-cost ratio was
extremely high compared to the period after the revolution.
To provide a comparison between conflict and movement of the food-cost
ratio, figure C.1 in the appendix shows that countries like Afghanistan, Burundi,
Colombia, Algeria and Ethiopia experienced a spike in food-cost ratio. In El
Salvador in early 1960s, a problem of land distribution and tensions resulting
from large-scale emigration to neighboring countries affected the food-cost ratio;
despite an election in 1977, the level of violence and conflict persisted and as
food-cost ratio showed a modest increase.
Figure C.2 in the appendix shows food-cost ratio rising persistently in
South Africa during the apartheid period. We think that sanctions in South
Africa in combination with conflict have an impact on the food-cost ratio. Also,
figure C.2 shows that Zimbabwe and Yugoslavia experienced sharp rises in food-
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Years of War Food-cost Ratio
Country Start End Start End
Afghanistan 1987 1992 0.07 0.11
Algeria 1962 1992 0.49 0.57
Angola 1975 1991 0.20 0.27
Burundi 1965 1998 0.04 0.36
Colombia 1978 1994 0.26 0.44
Cyprus 1963 1964 0.16 0.15
Dominican 1955 1965 0.75 0.75
El Salvador 1978 1992 0.46 0.27
Ethiopia 1977 1991 0.13 0.22
Guatemala 1966 1994 0.51 0.68
Indonesia 1975 1986 0.20 0.15
Iran 1978 1990 0.22 0.11
Iraq 1961 1991 0.17 0.13
Israel 1950 1997 0.13 0.10
Kenya 1991 1993 0.20 0.22
Kuwait 1990 1991 0.07 0.05
Mexico 1992 1994 0.08 0.08
Morocco 1975 1989 0.10 0.17
Mozambique 1979 1992 0.35 0.32
Nicaragua 1978 1989 0.70 0.76
Nigeria 1967 1970 0.10 0.12
Pakistan 1971 1977 0.09 0.12
Papua NG 1988 1991 0.21 0.23
Peru 1980 1996 0.30 0.44
Philippines 1972 1996 0.20 0.17
Russia 1994 1996 0.13 0.13
Sierra Leone 1991 1996 0.51 0.42
South Africa 1976 1994 0.17 0.22
Table 3.1: The Food-cost Ratio before and after the War
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Figure 3.1: Food-cost Ratio
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cost ratio during their conflicts. In the case of Uganda, given the poor data,
especially during the wartime, those spikes on food-cost ratio should be treated
with caution. The picture that emerges from comparing graphs from 16 countries
in the appendix figures (C.1-C.2) and figure 3.1 show that the food-cost ratio
move to a higher rates as levels of violent increase during conflicts. In section 4
we discuss the impact of wars on food-cost ratio.
3.3.3 Civil Wars (civilwar)
To quantify the impact of civil wars on the food-cost ratio, we create a
dummy variable that has a value of one if there is a civil war in a particular year
and zero otherwise. We used historical records and data from the Heidelberg
Institute for International Conflict Research to determine the duration of wars.
During civil wars governments lack effective mechanisms to mobilize resources.
Also labor displacement due to war can contribute to a rising food-cost ratio. In
the environment of civil war, rent-seeking behavior will accelerate, especially in
the food sector. We expect that civil wars have a positive impact on food-cost
ratio.
3.3.4 International Wars (interwar)
In defining international wars we use a broader definition that not only
includes violent engagement between member states but also wars against colonial
rule as defined by Singer and Small. A dummy variable is created to indicate if
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an international war has occurred or not. Contrary to civil wars, in international
wars governments have the capacity to control rent seeking behavior in food
sectors. Also countries experience labor market stability. Women can step up
and fill the gap of labor shortages and suppress rising food-cost ratio. Therefore,
we expect that international wars negatively affect the food-cost ratio.
3.3.5 Arable Land (landus_tl)
Expanding the amount of arable land plays indispensable part in an over-
all strategy to expand the availability of food. There are two ways in which ex-
panding agricultural land increases food-cost ratio: first, expanding arable land
directly supports the farming community to an extent that reverses the migration
to urban centers of individuals seeking a living wage. Increasing the amount of
arable land increases the productivity of average farmers and the landless, and
they contribute more to and become less of a burden to the society. This leads to
an increase in the demand for labor in the food sector and consequently higher
food-cost ratio. The only challenging to expand the arable land is the ability of
the government to neutralize the conflict and offer protection to farmers.
Second, land, labor and capital are important factors in the production
process. During war, land and capital are scarce; therefore the relative factor
cost is expensive. We assume that food producers will adjust their employment
of labor so that the rate at which one input can be traded with another input in
production will be equal the rate at which one input cost can be substituted for
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another input cost. In other words, to minimize cost, the producer should employ
inputs in such a way that the marginal product per dollar spent is equal across
all inputs. Producers expanding the size of planted arable land require more
labor, results in relatively higher food-cost ratio. In both scenarios, increasing
the amount of arable land positively affects food-cost ratio.
3.3.6 Foreign Aid (aid_gni)
Foreign aid is a flow of capital to LDC’s that meets two criteria: (1) it
is non-commercial from the point of view of the donor (2) it is in confessional
terms, in other words the interest rates and repayment period are lower than
general market rates for such financing.(Todaro, and Smith, 2002). Aid is closely
associated with importing technology and capital-intensive goods. Conflict em-
broiled countries are likely to import agricultural equipment or technology to
provide food for their soldiers and those under their protection. Availability of
better technology in the food sector may make labor more productive and may
put pressure on demand for labor and labor earnings rise. However, if labor is
substituted for capital, a flow of capital reduces labor demand and as results in a
decrease of food-cost ratio. Here we assume that foreign aid is not mismanaged
or abused by recipient countries.
Aid-in-kind such as food, with availability of proper channels for food
distribution, may expand the supply of food and lower prices. Therefore, high
cost producers and speculators might exit from the market. The sign of the
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coefficient for the foreign aid to war-torn countries should be indeterminate.
3.3.7 Food Imports (fim_ti)
In a state of war, governments import essential commodities; food, fuel
and arms. We assume that governments do not use food as an instrument to
starve populations or for ethnic cleansing. Importing food increases the capacity
of the government to serve the public and restore some trust in the government.
Therefore, importing food will increase the food supply and put downward pres-
sure on price levels and reduce speculation on food commodities. Governments
can use the imported food to counter any excessive pricing of food; therefore
input cost will fall, including labor wages.
3.3.8 Economic Variables
In this study we control for purchasing power parity, consumption ex-
penditure, food value added and a food production index. We control for these
economic variables to isolate their impact.
3.4 Model of Food-cost Ratio
The basic model of food-cost ratio:
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log foodcoit = φ1 + φ2civilwarit + φ3interwarit + φ3landusit
+φ4fprodinit + φ5pppit + φ6consit + φ7aid_gniit (3.1)
+φ8favd_mf + φ9fim_tiit + ui + vt + εit,
where log food-cost ratio in equation (3.1) is denoted as (log foodcoit).
civilwarit and interwarit are the civil war and international war, landus is land
use as percentage of land area, fprodinit and pppit are food production index
(1989-91=100) and purchasing power parity respectively. consit is consumption
as percentage of GDP, aid_gniit is aid as percentage of GNI, fvad_mfit is food
and beverage as value added in manufacturing, fim_tiit is food imports, ui is
country dummy, vt is time dummy. and εit is the error term. In this model we
assume that increases in the food-cost ratio cannot influence the probability of
war, but wars have an impact on food-cost ratio. i.e. wars are an exogenous shock
to the food-cost ratio. The model should test the effect of civil and international




foodcos Food-cost Ratio (as share of total Manufacturing wages)
Civilwar Civil War
Interwar International War
Landus_tl Land use, arable land (% land area)
fprodin_91 Food production index (1989-91=100)
PPP Purchasing power parity conversion factor
cons_gdp Final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)
aid_gni Aid as % of GNI
fvad_mf Food and Beverage (% of value added in manufacturing)
fim_ti Food imports (% of merchandise imports)
Table 3.2: Description of Variables and their Data Units
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
foodco 1214 0.30481 0.17822 0.01994 0.82496
civilwar 1258 0.24642 0.431099 0 1
interwar 1257 0.14001 0.347142 0 1
landus_tl 1179 15.2076 14.65292 0.033123 70.6153
fprodin_91 1175 79.8454 23.97113 19.000 169.4000
ppp 44.5198 117.267 4.5673 836.8484
cons_gdp 1050 83.5069 12.3031 22.10595 166.9532
Aid_gni 418 35.4355 44.4209 1.899 239.6960
fvad_mf 994 0.00004 .000005 −2.93846 0.0011
fim_ti 1055 15.8914 9.03238 0.86318 62.63169
Table 3.3: Simple Statistics
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Equations (1) t− value (2) t− value (3) t− val
Intercept −1.296 0.49 −1.301 0.50 −1.689 1.09
civilwar 0.5993 2.24 0.599 2.25 0.547 2.80
interwar 0.0919 0.24 0.0924 0.24 0.1456 0.48
landus_tl 0.3482 2.84 0.3487 2.85 0.3540 2.85
fprodin_91 −.0117 2.37 −0.0118 2.44 −.0116 2.96
ppp −.0001 3.80 −.0001 3.80 −.0001 3.88
cons_gdp −.05906 3.15 −.0591 3.15 −.0626 3.44
Aid_gni 0.0022 0.06 −−−− −−− −.0013 2.22
fvad_mf −.0228 1.46 −.0227 1.47 −−− −−−
fim_ti −.05324 1.92 −.0532 1.93 −.0578 2.34
F − statistics 186 −− 191 −− 190 −−
R− squared 0.96 −− 0.96 −− 0.96 −−
Number 331 −− 330 −− 330 −−
Table 3.4: Country-effects Model the Dependent Variable is log Food-cost Ratio
3.5.1 One-way Fixed effects
Table 3.3 presents simple statistics for variables included in this study.
Table 3.4 reports estimates of the linear specification of the log-food-cost ra-
tio. Columns (1) through (3) report ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates with
country fixed-effects. The coefficient for civil war remains positive and statisti-
cally significant at the .01 level of significance across the columns. Acts of warfare
may seize the market supply of food and encourage speculation and rent seeking
behavior. According to column (1) civil war has, on average, the effect of in-
creasing food-cost ratio by 59 percent, while columns (2) and (3) show that food
prices increased by 65 percent and 63 percent, respectively. Therefore we infer
that civil war contributed enormously to the rise of the food-cost ratio.
The coefficient of international war in Table 3.4, remains statistically in-
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significant across the columns, which is consistent with our hypothesis. Interna-
tional wars tend to be brief and humanitarian assistance curbs surges in wages.
However the coefficient estimate for arable land in Table 3.4 is positive and sta-
tistically significant. Increasing the arable land helps food-cost ratio to grow by
32.3 percent, holding constant the other factors.
The variable foreign aid in columns (2) and (3) is significant, however it
is insignificant in column (1) when we controlled for value added in the food
industry. The impact of foreign aid on food-cost ratio is not conclusive. Also
Table 3.4 shows the coefficient on food imports are negative and statistically
significant. Importing more food heads-off the wage pressure in the food market.
Overall R-squared is 96 percent — very high even though we excluded the time
dummies for estimates on Table 3.4.
3.5.2 Two-way Fixed Effects
In Table 3.5, columns (1) to (3) show the coefficient of civil war is statis-
tically significant and its sign remains unchanged. The incident of war increases
food-cost ratio by 49 percent in column (1) and 46 to 43 percent in column (2)
and (3). The range of wages movement is lower in Table 3.5 than Table 3.4
estimates, because we used a two-way fixed effects model instead of a one-way
fixed effects model. Controlling for the time variable improved the model results
overall.
The coefficient of international war remains insignificant in column (1).
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However, when we exclude the variable foreign aid, international war regains its
significance. The possible interpretation is that the impact of international war
on food-cost ratio is mitigated by foreign aid.
Equations (1) t− value (2) t− value (3) t− val
Intercept −2.961 1.12 −3.115 1.27 −4.145 1.75
civilwar 0.4989 1.84 0.4606 1.87 0.4394 1.93
interwar 0.5693 1.44 0.6004 1.77 0.6235 2.00
landus_tl 0.2939 2.36 0.3024 2.64 0.3052 2.75
fprodin_91 .01602 2.12 0.0137 1.99 0.0151 2.26
ppp −0.0001 3.00 −0.0001 3.22 −0.0001 3.19
cons_gdp −.0512 2.63 −.0492 2.71 −.0457 2.62
Aid_gni 0.0117 0.31 −−−− −−− −0.0007 2.22
fvad_mf −.0187 1.20 −.0179 1.22 −−−− −−−
fim_ti −.0509 1.83 −.0516 1.97 −.0510 2.09
F − statistics 138 −− 154 −− 159 −−
R− squared 0.97 −− 0.97 −− 0.97 −−
Number 331 −− 360 −− 386 −−
Table 3.5: Fixed-effects Model the Dependent Variable is log Food-cost Ratio
In addition, we did find an interesting exception. Columns (1) and (2),
show the coefficient of foreign aid is significant only when we drop the control
variable manufacturing value added in the food sector. The impact of foreign aid
on food-cost ratio is far from conclusive. A more extensive empirical analysis of
relationships between food-cost ratio and foreign aid is left for future research.
Columns (1) to (3) indicate that the coefficient of food imports remains
stable and significant. Importing foods lowers food-cost ratio since it mitigates
speculation on the food commodity. Table 3.5 shows a high value for R-squared;
97 percent. Overall the results from Tables 3.4 and 3.5 are quite convincingly
92
point out that civil war has a positive impact on food-cost ratio. However, the
impact of international war on food-cost ratio is inconclusive.
The results presented in Tables (3.4) and (3.5) are robust to a variety
of alternative specifications. The magnitudes of the coefficient of the civil war
variable rang from 59 to 65 percent in Table 3.4, and from 49 to 43 percent in
Table 3.5, controlling for economic variables. When we added the time dummy
variables, the model predictability is improved, as shown by Table 3.5.
3.5.3 Policy Alternative counteract rising wages
Having demonstrated in the previous section the relationship between
food-cost ratio and wars in general. There should be alternative food policies
to counteract the rising of food-cost ratio during conflicts. An easy solution is
price control but it is not feasible to be enforcing with the absence of the rule
of law, a common feature of civil wars. For any government that is concerned
with general public welfare, importing food certainly reduces the intensity of rent
seeking behavior in the food sector. The greatest impact to reduce food-cost ratio
comes from food imports, not foreign aid. It will be wise to allocate some part if
not all of foreign aid to import food.
The policy makers and the international community should be concerned
about the price stability in the food sector. In addition to food distribution by
different agencies, there should be an effort to supply means of production to
displaced farmers to start producing food. It is possible that increasing demand
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for labor increase the food-cost ratio in general, however, provding displaced
people with means of production reduces the speculative activity in food markets
and depresses food-cost ratio.
3.5.4 War Circumstances and Terms of Trade
In this section I have chosen three narrative accounts of the relationship
between war and the terms of trade between food and non-food items. The ratio
can change not only as a result of either the numerator or the denominator.
So some change in the denominator during war will be useful for clarifying the
concept and will shed light on terms of trade between food and non-food items.
Figure 3.2 shows the movement of the cost-ratio for food and non-food
items in South Africa. The predominant industries in South Africa are food,
iron, transportation equipment, and fabricated and metal products. The rest
are small in size and less responsive to war shocks. The cost-ratio for fabricated
metal products remained high from 1963 to 1998 as the level of violence between
the perpetrators of apartheid and the National African Congress (ANC) per-
sisted. However, the costs of fabricated metal products, iron, and transportation
equipment reacted sharply after 1983 when the international sanction movement
intensified. Sanctions crippled those industries, while the food industry boomed.
The smaller-scale industries remained steady, seeing no drastic changes in their
cost-ratios. The movement of the food-cost ratio far exceeded the falling of the
relatively small industries, and reflects changes within the food industry. This is
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reasonable proof that war creates term of trade favoring the food industry.
Figure 3.3 shows extreme cases where the food industry is dominating
other manufacturing sectors. In Ethiopia, the food-cost ratio reached a global
maximum in 1966 and 1975. Both pinnacle points are associated with series
of bloody purges between the government and the Eritrean People’s Liberation
Front (EPLF). The food-cost ratio reacted strongly to conflict. Also the cost-ratio
for beverages as a second industry after food grew steadily since 1975. The cost-
ratios in the tobacco, wood product, etc industries remained flat except after
Eritrean independence, they showed signs of a boom while the food-cost ratio
started leveling-off. Again, war improved the terms of trade for the food and
beverage industries in this agrarian society.
Figure 3.4 shows a case of a country that has a very weak industrial base
and for which food is the essential production sector. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 and an increase in the general revolt led by the Mujahidin
resulted in a higher food-cost ratio. From 1983 to 1986 there was an upswing in
the industrial chemical product-cost ratio. It fell near to pre-war levels after the
Soviet withdraw. The rest of the sectors remained stable as the war effort con-
tinued. Following these cases, I conclude that the food-cost ratio reacts sharply
to events during wartime, and in ways that are uncharacteristic of other sectors.
The movement of the numerator far exceeds the downfall of the denominator.
Therefore, rising food-cost ratios reflect rising numerators (increased food costs)
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Food products Beverage
Tobacco Textiles
Wearing apparel Leather products
Footwear Wood products
Furniture Paper and products
Printing and publishing Industrial Chemical
Other chemicals Petroleum refineries
misc. petroleum and coal product Rubber products
Pottery
Glass and products Other non-metallic mineral products
Iron and Steel Non-ferrous metals
Fabricated metal products Machinery, except electrical
Machinery electric Transportation equipments
Professional and scientific equipments Other manufactured products
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Petroleum refineries misc. petroleum and coal product
Rubber products
Pottery Glass and products
Other non-metallic mineral products Iron and Steel
Non-ferrous metals Fabricated metal products
Machinery, except electrical Machinery electric
Transportation equipments














Paper and products Printing and publishing
Industrial Chemical Other chmeicals
Petroleum refineries misc. petroleum and coal product
Pottery Glass and products
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Transportation equipments Professional and scientific equipment
Figure 3.4: Cost-ratio for Food and non-food Products
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3.6 Discussion
Studying the food-cost ratio not only helps us understand the causes of
hunger and malnutrition but also sheds light on effective methods to deal with
aiding those who are in need. In case of the civil war the human suffering is
enormous than the international war because the food-cost ratio rising faster in
the civil war. Urgent and sustainable assistant is needed in the case of the civil
war than the international war. Responsible government and the international
community should provide in kind-assistant food and means of producing foods
to displaced population as effective mechanism to curb the excessive rent-seeking
































































































F − statistics 102.95 121.45 105.53 128.13
R− squared 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.95
Number 154 151 154 151
∗, ∗ ∗ indicate p values significance at the
10 and 5 percent level respectively.



























































































F − statistics 15.52 6.87 14.84 5.14
R− squared 0.76 0.67 0.77 0.62
Number 148 111 148 111
∗, ∗ ∗ indicate p values significance at the
10 and 5 percent level respectively.



























































































F − statistics 22.87 10.23 22.01 9.57
R− squared 0.79 0.64 0.79 0.64
Number 189 178 189 178
∗, ∗ ∗ indicate p values significance at the
10 and 5 percent level respectively.



























































































F − statistics 14.12 13.10 13.57 11.98
R− squared 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.70
Number 121 121 121 121
∗, ∗ ∗ indicate p values significance at
the 10 and 5 percent level respectively.





MILEN Per capita Military Expenditure in (1997 dollars)
GDPG GDP Growth Rate
AITI Arms Imports as % Total Imports
ARMF Armed Forces per 1000 People
TIMN Total Imports as % of GNP
RGDP1 Real GDP per Capita (1997 price)
G ∗ TIMN Interaction term of GDP growth and TIMN
RGDPWG Interaction term of GDP growth and RGDP1
INTSEC Known internal security threats
EXTSEC Known external security threats






MILEN Military expenditure (% total output)
GDPG Real GDP growth rate
RGDP1 Real per capita income (1997 price)
ARMF Armed forces per 1000 people
MAJ Major conflict defines as1 if a country involves in
a conflict and 0 otherwise
AITI*MAJ Interaction term of AITI and MAJ
Table B.1: Description of Variables and their Data Units
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
THEIL 142 0.13889 0.14609 0.00042 0.58934
MILEN (ACDA) 135 10.1733 12.2440 1.70000 101.900
MILEN (SIPRI) 130 8.3158 11.5328 1.23729 116.145
GDPG 142 3.87817 9.51422 −14.0000 77.4000
AITI 142 10.7422 14.5851 0 81.0000
ARMF 142 14.3915 10.0963 3.30000 61.9000
OILPR 142 16.5801 1.9352 13.2000 20.5000
RGDP1 84 5696 4855 1714 26997
MAJ 142 0.15493 0.36312 0 1
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Figure B.1: Arms Imports in North Africa and the Middle East
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F − statistics 14.67 15.56 14.46
R− squared 0.78 0.80 0.80
Number 78 78 78
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table B.3: Single Equation Using ACDA Military Expenditures: Econometrics
estimates the dependent variable is Theil
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F − statistics 16.32 17.02 16.04
R− squared 0.79 0.80 0.81
Number 80 80 80
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table B.4: Single Equation Using SIPRI Military Expenditures: Econometrics
estimates the dependent variable is Theil
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F − statistics 9.66 11.15 9.61
R− squared 0.81 0.83 0.83
Observation 78 78 78
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table B.5: Simultaneous Equation Estimation Using ACDA Military Expendi-
tures: Two-way Fixed Effects the dependent variable is Theil
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F − statistics 10.80 12.14 9.82
R− squared 0.82 0.83 0.83
Observation 80 80 80
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table B.6: Simultaneous Equation Estimation Using SIPRI Military Expendi-
tures: Two-way Fixed Effects the dependent variable is Theil
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AITI ∗MAJ −− −−−−−−−−
0.02036
(0.46)
F − statistics 175 171.58 85.37
R− squared 0.98 0.98 0.97
Observation 78 78 78
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table B.7: Simultaneous Equation Estimation:Two-way Fixed Effects the depen-
dent variable is ACDA Military Expenditure
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AITI ∗MAJ −− −− −.03092
(0.67)
F − statistics 129.59 120.37 88.82
R− squared 0.98 0.98 0.98
Observation 80 80 80
∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗∗, ∗ indicate the t− value significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.
Table B.8: Simultaneous Equation Estimation:Two-way Fixed Effects the depen-
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Figure C.2: Food-cost Ratio
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Country Year Intsec extsec EHII Millen Theil Armtr
Albania 1987 0 1 35.67 63.54839 .... 0
Albania 1988 0 1 34.93 61.875 0.006319 0
Albania 1989 1 1 30.02 .... 0.004462 0
Albania 1990 1 1 29.01 .... 0.005888 0
Albania 1991 1 1 .... 58.48485 .... 0
Albania 1992 0 0 29.58 45.9375 .... 0
Albania 1993 0 0 34.49 34.6875 0.008516 0
Albania 1994 0 0 48.33 30.3125 0.358762 0
Albania 1995 0 0 44.25 29.6875 0.114919 0
Albania 1996 0 0 41.37 22.42424 0.053488 0
Albania 1997 0 0 40.09 19.39394 0.036701 0
Algeria 1987 0 0 35.05 51.06383 0.010304 0
Algeria 1988 1 0 35.98 56.0166 0.013835 0
Algeria 1989 1 0 34.98 52.22672 0.009913 0
Algeria 1990 1 0 34.47 33.46457 0.008239 0
Algeria 1991 1 0 34.03 26.65385 0.007124 0
Algeria 1992 1 0 35.15 29.66165 0.010052 0
Algeria 1993 1 0 34.99 43.58974 0.009423 0
Algeria 1994 1 0 34.9 49.10394 0.009066 0
Algeria 1995 1 0 38.08 47.01754 0.06187 0
Algeria 1996 1 0 41.9 50 0.159884 0
Algeria 1997 1 0 37.22 58.72483 0.015442 0
Angola 1987 1 0 .... 165.8228 .... 0
Angola 1988 1 0 .... 195.0617 .... 0
Angola 1989 1 0 .... 218.2927 .... 0
Angola 1990 1 0 .... 175 .... 0
Angola 1991 1 0 .... 126.4368 .... 0
Angola 1992 1 0 47.61 174.4444 0.237951 0
Angola 1993 1 0 49.74 79.78261 0.38514 0
Angola 1994 1 0 .... 126.3158 .... 0
Angola 1995 0 0 .... 116.1616 .... 0
Table C.1: The Inequality and Military Expenditure Data
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Angola 1996 0 0 .... 134.3137 .... 0
Angola 1997 1 0 .... 147.619 .... 0
Argentina 1987 0 1 38.79 194.2492 0.048672 1
Argentina 1988 0 1 39.39 184.5426 0.057889 1
Argentina 1989 0 1 40.34 165.8385 0.070855 1
Argentina 1990 0 1 39.93 120.5521 0.059883 1
Argentina 1991 0 1 .... 93.65559 .... 1
Argentina 1992 0 1 .... 143.7681 .... 1
Argentina 1993 0 1 39.64 134.4118 0.050455 1
Argentina 1994 0 1 39.73 145.3488 0.052444 1
Argentina 1995 0 1 39.76 136.9628 0.050862 1
Argentina 1996 0 1 40.14 129.4618 0.056051 1
Argentina 1997 0 1 .... 103.352 .... 0
Armenia 1992 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Armenia 1993 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Armenia 1994 1 0 41.93 76.57143 0.073131 0
Armenia 1995 1 0 46.53 82.57143 0.268216 0
Armenia 1996 1 0 47.81 110.8824 0.341856 0
Armenia 1997 1 0 47.89 100.5882 0.318585 0
Australia 1987 0 1 32.48 466.2577 0.012314 1
Australia 1988 0 0 32.17 415.1515 0.011361 1
Australia 1989 0 0 32.22 402.381 0.011381 1
Australia 1990 0 0 32.78 419.4118 0.012743 1
Australia 1991 0 0 33.3 453.7572 0.013955 1
Australia 1992 0 0 33.8 457.1429 0.015056 1
Australia 1993 0 0 35.23 498.8701 0.014623 1
Australia 1994 0 0 35.85 502.2346 0.01785 1
Australia 1995 0 0 35.78 483.4254 0.017441 1
Australia 1996 0 0 35.55 480.3279 0.015747 1
Australia 1997 0 0 35.64 459.7826 0.013896 1
Austria 1987 0 0 32.22 261.8421 0.018285 1
Austria 1988 0 0 32.03 248.6842 0.016619 1
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Austria 1989 0 0 32.09 253.9474 0.017483 1
Austria 1990 0 0 32.15 250.6494 0.01799 1
Austria 1991 0 0 32.21 242.3077 0.017024 1
Austria 1992 0 0 32.3 229.1139 0.01589 1
Austria 1993 0 0 32.72 227.5 0.016117 1
Austria 1994 0 0 32.72 230.8642 0.015644 1
Austria 1995 0 0 32.59 225.9259 0.018666 1
Austria 1996 0 0 32.82 225.9259 0.019647 1
Austria 1997 0 0 33.33 220.9877 0.022529 1
Azerbaijan 1992 0 1 34.77 78.10811 0.047063 0
Azerbaijan 1993 0 1 35.06 93.46667 0.02829 0
Azerbaijan 1994 0 1 38.01 69.86842 0.076267 0
Azerbaijan 1995 0 1 36.7 28.18182 .... 0
Azerbaijan 1996 0 1 40.24 28.83117 .... 0
Azerbaijan 1997 0 1 .... 28.84615 .... 0
Bahrain 1987 0 1 .... 428 0.36589 0
Bahrain 1988 0 1 .... 474 0.065341 0
Bahrain 1989 0 1 .... 476 0.38765 0
Bahrain 1990 0 1 .... 506 0.39867 0
Bahrain 1991 0 1 .... 630 0.29865 0
Bahrain 1992 0 0 44.64 1028 0.12789 0
Bahrain 1993 0 0 .... 1010 0.025689 0
Bahrain 1994 0 0 .... 846.6667 0.58934 0
Bahrain 1995 0 0 .... 865 0.045721 0
Bahrain 1996 0 0 .... 885 0.042312 0
Bahrain 1997 0 0 .... 888.3333 0.045321 0
Bangladesh 1987 1 0 40.19 3.387873 0.035835 0
Bangladesh 1988 1 0 40.54 3.371105 0.03963 0
Bangladesh 1989 1 0 41.84 3.268519 0.063694 0
Bangladesh 1990 1 0 41.43 3.197094 0.057087 0
Bangladesh 1991 1 0 42.29 3.440572 0.07336 0
Bangladesh 1992 1 0 42.42 3.773087 0.076564 0
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Bangladesh 1993 1 0 .... 3.965368 .... 0
Bangladesh 1994 1 0 .... 3.947144 .... 0
Bangladesh 1995 1 0 .... 3.842282 .... 0
Bangladesh 1996 1 0 .... 4.327002 .... 0
Bangladesh 1997 1 0 .... 4.809098 .... 0
Barbados 1987 0 0 38.41 33.33333 0.047922 0
Barbados 1988 0 0 38.68 43.33333 0.051206 0
Barbados 1989 0 0 39.3 40 0.050204 0
Barbados 1990 0 0 40.92 .... 0.074146 0
Barbados 1991 0 0 40.72 .... 0.098914 0
Barbados 1992 0 0 40.24 .... 0.085526 0
Barbados 1993 0 0 40.32 43.33333 0.084216 0
Barbados 1994 0 0 39.09 46.66667 0.053938 0
Barbados 1995 0 0 39.3 46.66667 0.05893 0
Barbados 1996 0 0 39.42 46.66667 0.063526 0
Barbados 1997 0 0 39.3 .... 0.063596 0
Belarus 1992 0 0 .... 105.8252 .... 0
Belarus 1993 0 0 .... 97.11538 .... 0
Belarus 1994 0 0 .... 80.38462 .... 1
Belarus 1995 0 0 .... 60.57692 .... 1
Belarus 1996 0 0 .... 51.34615 .... 1
Belarus 1997 0 0 .... 80.86538 .... 1
Belgium 1987 0 0 34.01 580.8081 0.207212 1
Belgium 1988 0 0 34.08 550.5051 0.20961 1
Belgium 1989 0 1 33.88 534.3434 0.208074 1
Belgium 1990 0 0 33.81 521 0.204363 1
Belgium 1991 0 0 33.98 513 0.20078 1
Belgium 1992 0 0 34.14 417 0.200972 1
Belgium 1993 0 0 .... 386.1386 .... 1
Belgium 1994 0 0 .... 385.1485 .... 1
Belgium 1995 0 0 .... 376.2376 .... 1
Belgium 1996 0 0 .... 366.6667 .... 1
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Belgium 1997 0 0 .... 361.7647 .... 1
Belize 1987 0 1 .... .... .... 0
Belize 1988 0 1 .... 25 .... 0
Belize 1989 0 1 .... 30 .... 0
Belize 1990 0 1 .... 30 .... 0
Belize 1991 0 1 41.5 30 0.112784 0
Belize 1992 0 1 40.97 35 0.099086 0
Belize 1993 0 1 .... 40 .... 0
Belize 1994 0 1 .... 45 .... 0
Belize 1995 0 1 .... 45 .... 0
Belize 1996 0 1 .... .... .... 0
Belize 1997 0 1 .... .... .... 0
Benin 1987 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Benin 1988 0 0 .... 8.181818 .... 0
Benin 1989 0 0 .... 7.555556 .... 0
Benin 1990 0 0 .... 6.595745 .... 0
Benin 1991 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Benin 1992 0 0 .... 4.2 .... 0
Benin 1993 0 0 .... 5.192308 .... 0
Benin 1994 0 0 .... 7.924528 .... 0
Benin 1995 0 0 .... 4.181818 .... 0
Benin 1996 0 0 .... 4.385965 .... 0
Benin 1997 0 0 .... 4.576271 .... 0
Bhutan 1987 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Bhutan 1988 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Bhutan 1989 0 0 .... .... 0.095371 0
Bhutan 1990 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Bhutan 1991 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Bhutan 1992 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Bhutan 1993 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Bhutan 1994 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Bhutan 1995 0 0 .... .... .... 0
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Bhutan 1996 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Bhutan 1997 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Bolivia 1987 0 1 42.74 37.41935 0.072202 0
Bolivia 1988 0 1 42.39 35.78125 0.067286 0
Bolivia 1989 0 1 42.42 30.46154 0.068118 0
Bolivia 1990 0 1 42.46 28.0303 0.06882 0
Bolivia 1991 0 1 43.39 21.47059 0.088853 0
Bolivia 1992 0 1 43.85 20 0.101041 0
Bolivia 1993 0 1 43.07 21.14286 0.082428 0
Bolivia 1994 0 1 44.1 21.25 0.108477 0
Bolivia 1995 0 1 43.84 19.45946 0.101285 0
Bolivia 1996 0 1 43.13 18.66667 0.085296 0
Bolivia 1997 0 1 43.08 19.48052 0.083996 0
BosniaH 1992 1 0 32.82 .... 0.021726 0
BosniaH 1993 1 0 34.91 .... 0.039259 0
BosniaH 1994 1 0 .... 69.72973 .... 0
BosniaH 1995 1 0 .... 105.7576 .... 0
BosniaH 1996 0 0 .... 61.6129 .... 0
BosniaH 1997 0 0 .... 80.9375 .... 0
Botswana 1987 0 0 40.88 98.33333 0.053014 0
Botswana 1988 0 0 41.02 108.3333 0.056552 0
Botswana 1989 0 0 .... 93.07692 .... 0
Botswana 1990 0 0 .... 129.2308 .... 0
Botswana 1991 0 0 .... 140 .... 0
Botswana 1992 0 0 41.19 140.7692 0.062815 0
Botswana 1993 0 0 40.83 167.8571 0.055286 0
Botswana 1994 0 0 40.85 165 0.056275 0
Botswana 1995 0 0 41.64 153.5714 0.072079 0
Botswana 1996 0 0 41.84 170.7143 0.074885 0
Botswana 1997 0 0 41.03 172.1429 0.059503 0
Brazil 1987 0 0 .... 48.91075 .... 1
Brazil 1988 0 0 .... 65.7931 .... 1
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Brazil 1989 0 0 .... 71.7671 .... 1
Brazil 1990 0 0 40.05 74.61692 0.061015 1
Brazil 1991 0 0 .... 55.57003 .... 1
Brazil 1992 0 0 41.53 47.20975 0.084341 1
Brazil 1993 0 0 41.48 57.6753 0.080126 1
Brazil 1994 0 0 41.75 52.70691 0.084685 1
Brazil 1995 0 0 41.66 71.12201 0.07787 1
Brazil 1996 0 0 .... 84.64329 .... 1
Brazil 1997 0 0 .... 84.07871 .... 1
Brunei 1987 0 0 .... 2260 .... 0
Brunei 1988 0 0 .... 2930 .... 0
Brunei 1989 0 0 .... 2415 .... 0
Brunei 1990 0 0 .... 1310 .... 0
Brunei 1991 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Brunei 1992 0 0 .... 1546.667 .... 0
Brunei 1993 0 0 .... 920 .... 0
Brunei 1994 0 0 .... 950 .... 0
Brunei 1995 0 0 .... 920 .... 0
Brunei 1996 0 0 .... 1073.333 .... 0
Brunei 1997 0 0 .... 1246.667 .... 0
Bulgaria 1987 0 0 28.15 936.6667 0.009669 1
Bulgaria 1988 0 0 27.71 824.4444 0.008109 1
Bulgaria 1989 0 0 26.12 795.5556 0.005999 1
Bulgaria 1990 0 0 26.61 505.5556 0.006356 1
Bulgaria 1991 0 0 30.96 186.5169 0.020781 1
Bulgaria 1992 0 0 33.79 138.2022 0.039545 1
Bulgaria 1993 0 0 34.77 125.8824 0.053382 1
Bulgaria 1994 0 0 36.1 125 0.067788 1
Bulgaria 1995 0 0 35.57 122.619 0.051007 1
Bulgaria 1996 0 0 36.56 101.8072 0.062738 1
Bulgaria 1997 0 0 38.08 114.3373 0.111736 1
Burkina 1987 0 0 .... 4.819277 .... 0
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Burkina 1988 0 0 .... 5.176471 .... 0
Burkina 1989 0 0 .... 5.909091 .... 0
Burkina 1990 0 0 .... 6.222222 .... 0
Burkina 1991 0 0 .... 5.376344 .... 0
Burkina 1992 0 0 .... 5.157895 .... 0
Burkina 1993 0 0 .... 4.489796 .... 0
Burkina 1994 0 0 .... 5.688073 .... 0
Burkina 1995 0 0 .... 5.961538 .... 0
Burkina 1996 0 0 .... 5.514019 .... 0
Burkina 1997 0 0 .... 6.090909 .... 0
Burma 1987 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Burma 1988 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Burma 1989 1 0 41.97 .... 0.05435 0
Burma 1990 1 0 41.44 .... 0.046905 0
Burma 1991 1 0 40.94 63.15789 0.040697 0
Burma 1992 1 0 40.39 78.87324 0.034832 0
Burma 1993 1 0 36.79 86.86636 0.01179 0
Burma 1994 1 0 41.52 79.63801 0.047627 0
Burma 1995 1 0 38.53 99.77778 0.020182 0
Burma 1996 1 0 39.21 88.18381 0.024709 0
Burma 1997 1 0 44.01 0 0.093543 0
Burundi 1987 0 0 42.31 6.666667 0.059611 0
Burundi 1988 1 0 43.11 6.415094 0.07407 0
Burundi 1989 0 0 45.05 5.090909 0.12361 0
Burundi 1990 0 0 44.84 5 0.117308 0
Burundi 1991 0 0 45.23 5.37037 0.129668 0
Burundi 1992 0 0 .... 6 .... 0
Burundi 1993 1 0 .... 5.535714 .... 0
Burundi 1994 1 0 .... 6.842105 .... 0
Burundi 1995 1 0 .... 9.056604 .... 0
Burundi 1996 1 0 .... 10.18868 .... 0
Burundi 1997 1 0 .... 10.55556 .... 0
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Cambodia 1987 0 1 .... .... .... 0
Cambodia 1988 0 1 .... .... .... 0
Cambodia 1989 0 1 .... .... .... 0
Cambodia 1990 0 1 .... .... .... 0
Cambodia 1991 0 1 .... 8.888889 .... 0
Cambodia 1992 0 0 .... 12.76596 .... 0
Cambodia 1993 0 0 .... 8.686869 .... 0
Cambodia 1994 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Cambodia 1995 0 0 .... 8.380952 .... 0
Cambodia 1996 0 0 .... 10.18519 .... 0
Cambodia 1997 0 0 .... 11.35135 .... 0
Cameroon 1987 0 0 .... 17.24771 .... 0
Cameroon 1988 0 0 .... 12.94643 .... 0
Cameroon 1989 0 0 46.29 10.43103 0.191987 0
Cameroon 1990 0 0 45.29 11.09244 0.142118 0
Cameroon 1991 0 0 46.86 9.349593 0.216282 0
Cameroon 1992 0 0 46.99 9.444444 0.220933 0
Cameroon 1993 0 0 47.87 9.615385 0.271036 0
Cameroon 1994 0 0 47.67 9.179104 0.255178 0
Cameroon 1995 0 0 48.04 14.13534 0.278239 0
Cameroon 1996 0 0 47.5 14.15493 0.244128 0
Cameroon 1997 0 0 47.26 16.43836 0.229767 0
Canada 1987 0 1 33.68 414.0625 0.02249 1
Canada 1988 0 1 33.4 413.1274 0.02155 1
Canada 1989 0 1 33.37 403.0418 0.021213 1
Canada 1990 1 1 33.55 406.015 0.020017 1
Canada 1991 1 1 34.09 355.8719 0.021114 1
Canada 1992 1 1 34.08 354.386 0.019622 1
Canada 1993 1 0 34.33 352.9412 0.020503 1
Canada 1994 1 0 34.51 334.8123 0.021911 1
Canada 1995 1 0 34.54 309.1216 0.022423 1
Canada 1996 1 0 34.57 278 0.022245 1
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Canada 1997 1 0 34.6 257.4257 0.022748 1
CapeVerde 1987 0 0 .... .... .... 0
CapeVerde 1988 0 0 .... .... .... 0
CapeVerde 1989 0 0 .... .... .... 0
CapeVerde 1990 0 0 .... .... .... 0
CapeVerde 1991 0 0 .... 10 .... 0
CapeVerde 1992 0 0 32.24 7.5 .... 0
CapeVerde 1993 0 0 35.54 7.5 0.007867 0
CapeVerde 1994 0 0 .... 10 .... 0
CapeVerde 1995 0 0 .... 10 .... 0
CapeVerde 1996 0 0 .... 10 .... 0
CapeVerde 1997 1 0 .... 10 .... 0
CenteralAfr 1987 0 0 41.91 5.384615 0.054359 0
CenteralAfr 1988 0 0 42.4 .... 0.062072 0
CenteralAfr 1989 0 0 43.17 5.185185 0.076134 0
CenteralAfr 1990 0 0 43.03 4.642857 0.073909 0
CenteralAfr 1991 0 0 43.92 4.827586 0.093048 0
CenteralAfr 1992 0 0 44.23 5.862069 0.100733 0
CenteralAfr 1993 0 0 44.83 7 0.117194 0
CenteralAfr 1994 0 0 .... 7.096774 .... 0
CenteralAfr 1995 0 0 .... 6.5625 .... 0
CenteralAfr 1996 0 0 .... 8.125 .... 0
CenteralAfr 1997 0 0 .... 11.81818 .... 0
Chad 1987 1 1 .... 5.555556 .... 0
Chad 1988 1 1 .... 5.535714 .... 0
Chad 1989 1 1 .... 8.947368 .... 0
Chad 1990 1 1 .... 7.118644 .... 0
Chad 1991 0 1 .... 8.166667 .... 0
Chad 1992 0 1 .... 9.193548 .... 0
Chad 1993 0 1 .... 0 .... 0
Chad 1994 0 1 .... 5.30303 .... 0
Chad 1995 0 0 .... 5 .... 0
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Chad 1996 0 0 .... 5.142857 .... 0
Chad 1997 0 0 .... 5.972222 .... 0
Chile 1987 0 1 42.41 139.2 0.093704 1
Chile 1988 0 1 41.81 113.3858 0.083259 1
Chile 1989 0 1 41.2 97.67442 0.073915 1
Chile 1990 0 1 41.12 106.1069 0.072321 1
Chile 1991 0 1 41.08 106.7669 0.072223 1
Chile 1992 0 1 40.65 97.79412 0.065464 1
Chile 1993 0 1 40.51 148.5507 0.062988 1
Chile 1994 0 1 40.42 148.5714 0.061083 0
Chile 1995 0 0 40.63 162.6761 0.064496 0
Chile 1996 0 0 40.86 167.3611 0.067913 0
Chile 1997 0 0 41.05 195.8904 0.070393 0
China 1987 0 0 .... 49.07407 .... 1
China 1988 0 0 .... 48.72727 .... 1
China 1989 1 0 .... 47.41071 .... 1
China 1990 0 0 .... 50.0885 .... 1
China 1991 0 0 .... 47.04348 .... 1
China 1992 0 0 .... 48.37607 .... 1
China 1993 0 0 .... 48.55932 .... 1
China 1994 0 0 .... 48.7395 .... 1
China 1995 0 0 .... 51.83333 .... 1
China 1996 0 0 .... 55.53719 .... 1
China 1997 0 0 .... 60.89431 .... 1
Colombia 1987 1 0 39.76 48.70968 0.039946 0
Colombia 1988 1 0 39.33 44.79495 0.035129 0
Colombia 1989 1 0 39.6 47.36842 0.037981 0
Colombia 1990 1 0 39.83 46.06061 0.04046 0
Colombia 1991 1 0 39.78 44.34524 0.039696 0
Colombia 1992 1 0 40.42 51.6035 0.05042 0
Colombia 1993 1 0 40.08 67.42857 0.045504 0
Colombia 1994 1 0 40.14 62.7451 0.045905 0
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Colombia 1995 1 0 40.14 70.05495 0.045258 0
Colombia 1996 1 0 40.07 85.44474 0.043502 0
Colombia 1997 1 0 40.08 91.29288 0.043113 0
CostaRica 1987 0 0 38 13.92857 0.046066 0
CostaRica 1988 0 0 36.88 16.55172 0.032581 0
CostaRica 1989 0 0 36.67 26.89655 0.032908 0
CostaRica 1990 0 0 36.46 29 0.030707 0
CostaRica 1991 0 0 37.33 23.87097 0.039398 0
CostaRica 1992 0 0 36.98 33.4375 0.037392 0
CostaRica 1993 0 0 36.3 34.375 0.031038 0
CostaRica 1994 0 0 37.59 30.60606 0.046267 0
CostaRica 1995 0 0 35.56 16.17647 0.024055 0
CostaRica 1996 0 0 37.6 14.28571 0.042612 0
CostaRica 1997 0 0 35.98 16.57143 0.025791 0
Croatia 1992 1 0 29.07 336.1702 0.035263 0
Croatia 1993 1 0 30.42 351.0638 0.005388 0
Croatia 1994 1 0 32.42 380.8511 0.008277 0
Croatia 1995 1 0 33.15 459.5745 0.015906 5
Croatia 1996 0 0 34.07 365.9574 0.019796 0
Croatia 1997 0 0 .... 317.0213 0.024641 0
Cuba 1987 0 0 29.03 167.6471 0.003484 0
Cuba 1988 0 0 28.76 166.0194 0.003168 1
Cuba 1989 0 0 29.34 161.5385 0.00414 1
Cuba 1990 0 0 .... 154.2857 .... 0
Cuba 1991 0 0 .... 123.5849 .... 0
Cuba 1992 0 0 .... 0 .... 0
Cuba 1993 0 0 .... 60 .... 0
Cuba 1994 0 0 .... 58.7963 .... 0
Cuba 1995 0 0 .... 56.97248 .... 0
Cuba 1996 0 0 .... 64.72727 .... 0
Cuba 1997 0 0 .... 65.45455 .... 0
Cyprus 1987 0 0 35.59 190 0.033091 0
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Cyprus 1988 0 0 35.55 184.2857 0.034909 0
Cyprus 1989 0 0 35.08 231.4286 0.030702 0
Cyprus 1990 0 0 35.14 274.2857 0.031454 0
Cyprus 1991 0 0 35.25 524.2857 0.031102 0
Cyprus 1992 0 0 35.24 0 0.030851 0
Cyprus 1993 0 0 35.76 294.2857 0.032965 0
Cyprus 1994 0 0 35.42 405.7143 0.027673 0
Cyprus 1995 0 0 35.89 557.1429 0.031658 0
Cyprus 1996 0 0 36.19 652.8571 0.032351 0
Cyprus 1997 0 0 36.37 722.8571 0.032506 0
CzechRepublic 1993 0 0 20.25 743.5897 0.00839 1
CzechRepublic 1994 0 0 20.27 737.1795 .... 1
CzechRepublic 1995 0 0 20.26 653.8462 .... 1
CzechRepublic 1996 0 0 20.42 330.5732 .... 1
CzechRepublic 1997 0 0 23.53 202.5478 0.015665 1
Czechoslovakia 1987 0 0 .... 0 0.004895 1
Czechoslovakia 1988 0 0 .... 244.6602 0.004185 1
Czechoslovakia 1989 0 0 .... 226.2136 0.003783 1
Czechoslovakia 1990 0 0 .... 211.6505 0.003791 1
Czechoslovakia 1991 1 0 .... 208.7379 0.005784 1
Czechoslovakia 1992 1 0 .... 193.2039 0.007115 1
Zaire 1987 0 0 45.24 .... .... 0
Zaire 1988 0 0 45.22 7.239437 .... 0
Zaire 1989 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Zaire 1990 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Zaire 1991 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Zaire 1992 1 0 .... 4.876847 .... 0
Zaire 1993 1 0 .... 7.040573 .... 0
Zaire 1994 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Zaire 1995 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Zaire 1996 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Zaire 1997 1 0 .... 5.294118 .... 0
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Denmark 1987 0 0 29.21 556.8627 0.005315 1
Denmark 1988 0 0 29.36 574.5098 0.00532 1
Denmark 1989 0 0 29.22 558.8235 0.005017 1
Denmark 1990 0 0 28.75 554.902 0.007279 1
Denmark 1991 0 0 29.01 553.8462 0.007535 1
Denmark 1992 0 0 29.13 542.3077 0.007371 1
Denmark 1993 0 0 29.51 546.1538 0.007722 1
Denmark 1994 0 0 28.74 530.7692 0.006242 1
Denmark 1995 0 0 28.88 525 0.006683 1
Denmark 1996 0 0 29.69 518.8679 0.008385 1
Denmark 1997 0 0 29.57 528.3019 0.008142 1
Djibouti 1987 0 0 .... 143.3333 .... 0
Djibouti 1988 0 0 .... 150 .... 0
Djibouti 1989 0 0 .... 77.5 .... 0
Djibouti 1990 0 0 .... 87.5 .... 0
Djibouti 1991 0 0 .... 100 .... 0
Djibouti 1992 0 0 .... 97.5 .... 0
Djibouti 1993 0 0 .... 67.5 .... 0
Djibouti 1994 0 0 .... 57.5 .... 0
Djibouti 1995 0 0 .... 52.5 .... 0
Djibouti 1996 0 0 .... 52.5 .... 0
Djibouti 1997 0 0 .... 50 .... 0
DominicanR 1987 0 0 .... 17.5 .... 0
DominicanR 1988 0 0 .... 13.18841 .... 0
DominicanR 1989 0 0 .... 13.09859 .... 0
DominicanR 1990 0 0 .... 14.58333 .... 0
DominicanR 1991 0 0 .... 10.56338 .... 0
DominicanR 1992 0 0 .... 13.42466 .... 0
DominicanR 1993 0 0 .... 18.10811 .... 0
DominicanR 1994 0 0 .... 18.13333 .... 0
DominicanR 1995 0 0 .... 22.10526 .... 0
DominicanR 1996 0 0 .... 21.68831 .... 0
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DominicanR 1997 0 0 .... 21.26582 .... 0
Ecuador 1987 0 0 40.11 36.91489 0.041143 0
Ecuador 1988 0 0 40.77 40.41667 0.049521 0
Ecuador 1989 0 0 40.64 36.16162 0.047472 0
Ecuador 1990 0 0 40.72 46.13861 0.048533 0
Ecuador 1991 0 0 41.41 52.71845 0.060328 0
Ecuador 1992 0 0 41.78 52.47706 0.066622 0
Ecuador 1993 0 0 42.12 45.4955 0.072055 0
Ecuador 1994 0 0 42.86 53.33333 0.088082 0
Ecuador 1995 0 1 41.43 54.13793 0.058323 0
Ecuador 1996 0 0 43.05 44.95798 0.090293 0
Ecuador 1997 0 0 43.01 61.65289 0.090465 0
Egypt 1987 0 0 37.42 83.74761 0.022684 1
Egypt 1988 1 0 38.24 67.28972 0.029461 1
Egypt 1989 1 0 39.05 39.48812 0.037651 1
Egypt 1990 1 0 39.19 32.79857 0.039304 1
Egypt 1991 1 0 40.26 36 0.054444 1
Egypt 1992 1 1 40.02 36.62692 0.049115 1
Egypt 1993 1 1 40.64 37.22871 0.057478 1
Egypt 1994 1 1 40.97 35.84288 0.064247 1
Egypt 1995 1 1 41.09 34.9359 0.067176 0
Egypt 1996 1 1 41.53 34.1195 0.074601 1
Egypt 1997 1 1 42.04 33.64198 0.084251 1
ELSalvador 1987 1 0 .... 76.66667 .... 0
ELSalvador 1988 1 0 .... 65.91837 .... 0
ELSalvador 1989 1 0 .... 66.6 .... 0
ELSalvador 1990 1 0 .... 57.2 .... 0
ELSalvador 1991 1 0 .... 51.37255 .... 0
ELSalvador 1992 1 0 .... 34.42308 .... 0
ELSalvador 1993 0 0 44.59 27.16981 0.130741 0
ELSalvador 1994 0 0 42.52 22.59259 0.076748 0
ELSalvador 1995 0 0 44.54 20.54545 0.132109 0
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ELSalvador 1996 0 0 41.61 18.75 0.068827 0
ELSalvador 1997 0 0 39.9 17.7193 0.047637 0
EquatorialG 1987 0 0 44.36 .... 0.10179 0
EquatorialG 1988 0 0 43.23 .... .... 0
EquatorialG 1989 0 0 .... .... .... 0
EquatorialG 1990 0 0 .... .... 0.076666 0
EquatorialG 1991 0 0 .... .... .... 0
EquatorialG 1992 0 0 .... .... .... 0
EquatorialG 1993 0 0 .... .... .... 0
EquatorialG 1994 0 0 .... 10 .... 0
EquatorialG 1995 0 0 .... 7.5 .... 0
EquatorialG 1996 0 0 .... 10 .... 0
EquatorialG 1997 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Eriteria 1993 0 0 38.58 .... 0.10179 0
Eriteria 1994 0 1 38.75 .... .... 0
Eriteria 1995 0 1 39.08 .... .... 0
Eriteria 1996 0 1 .... 15.83333 0.076666 0
Eriteria 1997 0 1 .... 17.56757 .... 0
Estonia 1992 0 0 .... 24.66667 .... 0
Estonia 1993 0 0 .... 34 .... 0
Estonia 1994 0 0 .... 45.33333 .... 5
Estonia 1995 0 0 .... 68 .... 0
Estonia 1996 0 0 .... 74 .... 0
Estonia 1997 0 0 .... 79.28571 .... 0
Ethiopia 1987 1 0 38.58 7.139535 .... 0
Ethiopia 1988 1 0 38.75 8.901345 .... 0
Ethiopia 1989 1 0 39.08 10.08621 .... 0
Ethiopia 1990 1 0 37.58 11.07884 0.015287 0
Ethiopia 1991 1 0 39.72 8.218623 0.029028 0
Ethiopia 1992 0 0 40.01 3.148515 0.031501 0
Ethiopia 1993 0 0 39.2 2.688588 0.024906 0
Ethiopia 1994 0 0 38.81 2.335217 0.022243 0
Table C.16: The Inequality and Military Expenditure Data
133
Ethiopia 1995 0 0 40.29 2.073394 0.0343 0
Ethiopia 1996 0 0 40.49 2.114695 0.036237 0
Ethiopia 1997 0 0 41.15 2.049037 0.043696 0
Fiji 1987 0 0 40.71 47.14286 0.058575 0
Fiji 1988 0 0 41.83 50 0.084786 0
Fiji 1989 0 0 41.99 58.57143 0.09975 0
Fiji 1990 0 0 41.48 58.57143 0.09129 0
Fiji 1991 0 0 42.85 58.57143 0.12565 0
Fiji 1992 0 0 .... 52.85714 0.088532 0
Fiji 1993 0 0 .... 47.5 .... 0
Fiji 1994 0 0 .... 47.5 .... 0
Fiji 1995 0 0 41.27 63.75 .... 0
Fiji 1996 0 0 37.09 61.25 0.027252 0
Fiji 1997 0 0 35.57 60 0.017356 0
Finland 1987 0 0 29.92 342.8571 0.01029 0
Finland 1988 0 0 29.86 355.102 0.009391 1
Finland 1989 0 0 30.05 356 0.009706 0
Finland 1990 0 0 30.23 358 0.009611 1
Finland 1991 0 0 30.74 426 0.00996 1
Finland 1992 0 0 31.21 430 0.009771 0
Finland 1993 0 0 31.41 398.0392 0.009366 1
Finland 1994 0 0 31.06 413.7255 0.008269 1
Finland 1995 0 0 32.43 407.8431 0.011186 1
Finland 1996 0 0 32.26 390.1961 0.010435 1
Finland 1997 0 0 32.34 384.3137 0.011013 1
France 1987 0 0 32.24 802.1583 0.016447 1
France 1988 0 0 32.35 796.0644 0.01654 1
France 1989 0 0 32.33 803.1915 0.016366 1
France 1990 0 0 32.09 797.1781 0.015067 1
France 1991 0 0 32.25 796.8476 0.01534 1
France 1992 0 0 32.24 770.0348 0.014264 1
France 1993 0 0 .... 753.8995 .... 1
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France 1994 0 0 .... 756.4767 .... 1
France 1995 0 0 .... 717.7281 .... 1
France 1996 0 0 .... 703.7671 .... 1
France 1997 0 0 .... 708.1911 .... 1
Gabon 1987 0 0 .... 141 .... 0
Gabon 1988 0 0 .... 143.6364 .... 0
Gabon 1989 0 0 .... 119.0909 .... 0
Gabon 1990 0 0 .... 102.7273 .... 0
Gabon 1991 0 0 43.59 104.5455 0.09955 0
Gabon 1992 0 0 44.89 105.4545 0.136765 0
Gabon 1993 0 0 44.8 113.6364 0.13291 0
Gabon 1994 0 0 45.45 75.45455 0.156312 0
Gabon 1995 0 0 45.79 85 0.170442 0
Gabon 1996 0 0 .... 73.33333 .... 0
Gabon 1997 0 0 .... 75.83333 .... 0
Gambia 1987 0 0 .... 0 .... 0
Gambia 1988 0 0 .... 3.333333 .... 0
Gambia 1989 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Gambia 1990 0 0 .... 3 .... 0
Gambia 1991 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Gambia 1992 0 0 .... 13 .... 0
Gambia 1993 0 0 .... 11.81818 .... 0
Gambia 1994 0 0 .... 12.72727 .... 0
Gambia 1995 0 0 .... 11.66667 .... 0
Gambia 1996 0 0 .... 11.66667 .... 0
Gambia 1997 0 0 .... 12.5 .... 0
Georgia 1992 1 0 .... 61.27273 .... 0
Georgia 1993 1 0 .... 23.33333 .... 0
Georgia 1994 1 0 .... 48.7037 .... 0
Georgia 1995 1 0 .... 26.03774 .... 0
Georgia 1996 1 0 .... 26.34615 .... 1
Georgia 1997 1 0 .... 30.38462 .... 0
Table C.18: The Inequality and Military Expenditure Data
135
German 1987 0 0 20.54 754.5008 0.010921 1
German 1988 0 0 30.57 744.2997 0.010925 1
German 1989 0 0 30.6 735.9098 0.011151 1
German 1990 0 0 30.55 603.2746 0.01094 1
German 1991 0 0 30.38 551.8102 0.010916 1
German 1992 0 0 30.33 519.2069 0.011093 1
German 1993 0 0 30.65 464.9446 .... 1
German 1994 0 0 30.2 433.8235 .... 1
German 1995 0 0 30.72 423.6874 .... 1
German 1996 0 0 .... 415.8537 .... 1
German 1997 0 0 .... 400.7308 .... 1
GermanE 1987 0 0 20.67 951.8072 .... 1
GermanE 1988 0 0 20.54 964.0719 .... 1
GermanE 1989 0 0 .... 1030.303 .... 1
GermanE 1990 0 0 .... .... .... 1
Ghana 1987 0 0 45.19 2.857143 0.144684 0
Ghana 1988 0 0 .... 1.458333 .... 0
Ghana 1989 0 0 .... 1.418919 .... 0
Ghana 1990 0 0 .... 1.578947 .... 0
Ghana 1991 0 0 .... 2.179487 .... 0
Ghana 1992 0 0 .... 2.9375 .... 0
Ghana 1993 0 0 45.51 3.636364 0.222321 0
Ghana 1994 1 0 45.51 2.485207 0.222368 0
Ghana 1995 1 0 45.51 2.774566 0.222249 0
Ghana 1996 1 0 .... 2.372881 .... 0
Ghana 1997 1 0 .... 2.596685 .... 0
Greece 1987 0 0 36.71 507 0.026072 1
Greece 1988 0 0 36.84 527 0.027161 1
Greece 1989 0 0 37.36 491 0.031877 0
Greece 1990 0 0 37.71 491.0891 0.034952 1
Greece 1991 0 0 38.11 454.3689 0.037385 0
Greece 1992 0 0 38.23 475.7282 0.037727 1
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Greece 1993 0 0 38.13 468.2692 0.035918 1
Greece 1994 0 0 38.69 472.381 0.042028 1
Greece 1995 0 0 39.11 482.8571 0.047111 1
Greece 1996 0 0 39.64 505.6604 0.054596 1
Greece 1997 0 0 39.91 521.6981 0.058752 1
Guatemala 1987 1 0 42.87 23.97727 0.082017 0
Guatemala 1988 1 0 42.24 22.63736 0.07458 0
Guatemala 1989 1 0 .... 21.59574 .... 0
Guatemala 1990 1 0 .... 20.52083 .... 0
Guatemala 1991 1 0 47.53 19.69697 0.262809 0
Guatemala 1992 1 0 47.32 20.78431 0.250284 0
Guatemala 1993 1 0 47.52 19.52381 0.262461 0
Guatemala 1994 1 0 46.55 19.72222 0.206434 0
Guatemala 1995 1 0 47.3 18.46847 0.249946 0
Guatemala 1996 1 0 .... 21.05263 0.071455 0
Guatemala 1997 1 0 42.54 .... 0.10488 0
Guinea 1987 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Guinea 1988 0 0 .... 5.272727 .... 0
Guinea 1989 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Guinea 1990 0 0 .... 5.423729 .... 0
Guinea 1991 0 0 .... 5.238095 .... 0
Guinea 1992 0 0 .... 6.060606 .... 0
Guinea 1993 0 0 .... 6.086957 .... 0
Guinea 1994 0 0 .... 7.142857 .... 0
Guinea 1995 0 0 .... 6.944444 .... 0
Guinea 1996 0 0 .... 7.260274 .... 0
Guinea 1997 0 0 .... 7.297297 .... 0
GuineaBissau 1987 0 0 .... 4.444444 .... 0
GuineaBissau 1988 0 0 .... .... .... 0
GuineaBissau 1989 0 0 .... 4 .... 0
GuineaBissau 1990 0 0 .... .... .... 0
GuineaBissau 1991 0 0 .... .... .... 0
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GuineaBissau 1992 0 0 .... 7 .... 0
GuineaBissau 1993 0 0 .... 7.272727 .... 0
GuineaBissau 1994 0 0 .... 7.272727 .... 0
GuineaBissau 1995 0 0 .... 6.363636 .... 0
GuineaBissau 1996 0 0 .... 8.333333 .... 0
GuineaBissau 1997 0 0 .... 6.666667 .... 0
Guyana 1987 0 0 .... 0 .... 0
Guyana 1988 0 0 .... 20 .... 0
Guyana 1989 0 0 .... 8.75 .... 0
Guyana 1990 0 0 .... 7.142857 .... 0
Guyana 1991 0 0 .... 5.714286 .... 0
Guyana 1992 0 0 .... 10 .... 0
Guyana 1993 0 0 .... 10 .... 0
Guyana 1994 0 0 .... 11.42857 .... 0
Guyana 1995 0 0 .... 10 .... 0
Guyana 1996 0 0 .... 10 .... 0
Guyana 1997 0 0 .... 11.42857 .... 0
Haiti 1987 0 0 40.05 13.33333 0.034541 0
Haiti 1988 0 0 40.41 12.58621 0.038051 0
Haiti 1989 0 0 .... 11.52542 0.039 0
Haiti 1990 0 0 .... 10.66667 0.0359 0
Haiti 1991 1 0 .... 9.836066 0.0452 0
Haiti 1992 1 0 .... 8.548387 0.0475 0
Haiti 1993 1 0 .... 8.571429 0.0492 0
Haiti 1994 1 0 .... .... 0.0562 0
Haiti 1995 0 0 .... .... 0.0667 0
Haiti 1996 0 0 .... .... 0.0781 0
Haiti 1997 0 0 .... .... 0.088 0
Honduras 1987 0 0 38.58 24.54545 0.147279 0
Honduras 1988 0 0 39.55 20.44444 0.158987 0
Honduras 1989 0 0 39.15 23.26087 0.161448 0
Honduras 1990 0 0 42.19 15.95745 0.083111 0
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Honduras 1991 0 0 42.86 11.63265 0.112704 0
Honduras 1992 0 0 41.96 10.4 0.091346 0
Honduras 1993 0 0 42.77 11.53846 0.118198 0
Honduras 1994 0 0 43.13 10.18868 0.138629 0
Honduras 1995 0 0 41.35 10 0.093456 0
Honduras 1996 0 0 .... .... 0.0056 0
Honduras 1997 0 0 .... .... 0.0066 0
Hungary 1987 0 0 27.65 500 0.007376 1
Hungary 1988 0 0 28.88 534.6154 0.011421 1
Hungary 1989 0 0 29.41 475.9615 0.013087 1
Hungary 1990 0 0 29.84 144.2308 0.013737 1
Hungary 1991 0 0 30.79 137.5 0.015322 1
Hungary 1992 0 0 32.79 133.0097 0.02273 1
Hungary 1993 0 0 34.45 119.4175 0.031066 1
Hungary 1994 0 0 34.7 120.3883 0.036035 0
Hungary 1995 0 0 35.32 93.98058 0.044438 1
Hungary 1996 0 0 35.95 107.767 0.054246 1
Hungary 1997 0 0 35.48 129.4118 0.049321 1
Iceland 1987 0 0 32.25 .... 0.047209 0
Iceland 1988 0 0 33.06 .... 0.045856 0
Iceland 1989 0 0 30.73 .... 0.013551 0
Iceland 1990 0 0 32.22 .... 0.020855 0
Iceland 1991 0 0 31.34 .... 0.014269 0
Iceland 1992 0 0 30.86 .... 0.009988 0
Iceland 1993 0 0 31.28 .... 0.01075 0
Iceland 1994 0 0 31.66 .... 0.012297 0
Iceland 1995 0 0 31.31 .... 0.011205 0
Iceland 1996 0 0 31.69 .... 0.013828 0
Iceland 1997 0 0 .... .... .... 0
India 1987 0 0 42.7 9.556356 0.079239 1
India 1988 0 1 42.52 9.651899 0.07511 0
India 1989 0 1 42.79 9.445438 0.081442 0
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India 1990 0 1 42.6 8.941094 0.077163 1
India 1991 0 1 42.43 8.167032 0.073507 1
India 1992 0 1 42.77 7.937946 0.08146 0
India 1993 0 1 42.54 8.793774 0.076065 1
India 1994 0 1 42.89 9.374659 0.084082 1
India 1995 0 1 43.06 8.753884 0.089471 1
India 1996 0 1 42.72 10.83982 0.081074 1
India 1997 0 1 43.1 11.27081 0.089705 1
Indonesia 1987 0 0 43.46 10.49383 0.102278 0
Indonesia 1988 0 0 42.8 9.702315 0.088689 1
Indonesia 1989 0 0 42.55 9.750813 0.084541 10
Indonesia 1990 0 1 41.01 10.01598 0.058049 1
Indonesia 1991 0 1 40.79 10.37192 0.05655 1
Indonesia 1992 0 1 41.06 10.46392 0.063257 1
Indonesia 1993 0 1 39.85 10.6998 0.045924 1
Indonesia 1994 0 1 40.25 12.18173 0.052662 1
Indonesia 1995 0 1 41.87 20.54054 0.086412 1
Indonesia 1996 0 1 40.75 20.57115 0.062984 1
Indonesia 1997 0 1 40.08 22.9266 0.045638 1
Iran 1987 0 1 35.2 182.6172 0.009526 0
Iran 1988 0 1 33.94 157.1698 0.006071 0
Iran 1989 0 0 34.88 124.2259 0.008378 0
Iran 1990 0 0 35.89 125.8348 0.011538 0
Iran 1991 0 0 36.08 116.6957 0.011995 1
Iran 1992 1 0 38.13 70.79796 0.022827 1
Iran 1993 1 0 38.96 82.91457 0.028936 1
Iran 1994 1 0 .... 78.97351 0.029936 1
Iran 1995 1 0 .... 59.18699 0.035936 1
Iran 1996 1 0 .... 62.9393 0.038936 1
Iran 1997 1 0 .... 74.48819 0.039936 1
Iraq 1987 0 1 37.36 2121.212 0.016859 1
Iraq 1988 0 1 .... 1941.52 .... 1
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Iraq 1989 0 0 .... 1440.678 .... 1
Iraq 1990 0 1 .... 1434.783 .... 1
Iraq 1991 0 1 40.15 114.2857 0.037254 0
Iraq 1992 0 1 41.92 111.7318 0.06119 0
Iraq 1993 0 1 .... 108.1081 0.0751 0
Iraq 1994 0 1 .... 78.53403 0.0926 0
Iraq 1995 0 0 .... 65.98985 0.0997 0
Iraq 1996 0 0 .... 61.27451 0.189 0
Iraq 1997 0 0 .... 59.52381 0.2 0
Ireland 1987 1 0 35.63 155.1429 0.027552 0
Ireland 1988 1 0 35.58 152.2857 0.027634 0
Ireland 1989 1 0 35.33 148.2857 0.026489 0
Ireland 1990 1 0 35.19 174.5714 0.026166 0
Ireland 1991 1 0 34.97 185.4286 0.024233 1
Ireland 1992 1 0 35.31 185.7143 0.027438 0
Ireland 1993 1 0 35.57 176.9444 0.029993 0
Ireland 1994 1 0 36.1 186.3889 0.03674 0
Ireland 1995 1 0 36.43 188.3333 0.044654 0
Ireland 1996 1 0 36.95 198.3333 0.054106 0
Ireland 1997 1 0 37.66 206.6667 0.072965 0
Israel 1987 1 0 36.72 2000 0.060058 1
Israel 1988 1 0 37.06 1925.581 0.061712 1
Israel 1989 1 0 36.86 1874.419 0.05734 1
Israel 1990 1 0 37.47 1915.556 0.064743 1
Israel 1991 1 0 38.03 1466.667 0.075072 1
Israel 1992 1 0 38.13 1781.633 0.076877 1
Israel 1993 1 1 37.85 1741.176 0.072538 1
Israel 1994 0 1 37.33 1601.923 0.06344 1
Israel 1995 0 1 37.78 1781.132 0.07031 1
Israel 1996 0 1 37.91 1757.407 0.070308 1
Israel 1997 0 1 .... 1698.182 0.073453 1
Italy 1987 0 0 34.21 410.1222 0.016922 1
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Italy 1988 0 0 36.43 412.892 0.033404 1
Italy 1989 0 0 33.9 413.913 0.014662 1
Italy 1990 0 0 33.44 393.4142 0.012328 1
Italy 1991 0 0 33.98 399.6479 0.014802 1
Italy 1992 0 0 34.22 388.4007 0.01763 1
Italy 1993 0 0 34.51 391.2281 0.018372 1
Italy 1994 0 0 34.4 382.8671 0.017447 1
Italy 1995 0 0 34.41 349.0401 0.017312 1
Italy 1996 0 0 34.58 379.7909 0.018138 1
Italy 1997 0 0 35.11 394.7826 0.021637 1
IvoryCoast 1987 0 0 .... 13.30189 .... 0
IvoryCoast 1988 0 0 .... 14.36364 .... 0
IvoryCoast 1989 0 0 .... 9.912281 .... 0
IvoryCoast 1990 0 0 .... 9.495798 .... 0
IvoryCoast 1991 0 0 .... 8.467742 .... 0
IvoryCoast 1992 0 0 .... 8.671875 .... 0
IvoryCoast 1993 0 0 .... 8.560606 .... 0
IvoryCoast 1994 0 0 42.91 6.940299 0.073056 0
IvoryCoast 1995 0 0 42.87 6.338028 0.073645 0
IvoryCoast 1996 0 0 43.82 5.782313 0.093458 0
IvoryCoast 1997 0 0 43.62 6.688742 0.09035 0
Jamaica 1987 0 0 45.98 18.75 0.261709 0
Jamaica 1988 0 0 46.37 20.41667 0.257952 0
Jamaica 1989 0 0 46.38 21.25 0.311556 0
Jamaica 1990 0 0 46.35 25.6 0.290792 0
Jamaica 1991 0 0 46.02 27.2 0.268348 0
Jamaica 1992 0 0 46.46 22.4 0.302519 0
Jamaica 1993 0 0 .... 18.4 .... 0
Jamaica 1994 0 0 .... 16.92308 .... 0
Jamaica 1995 0 0 .... 14.23077 .... 0
Jamaica 1996 0 0 .... 11.92308 .... 0
Jamaica 1997 0 0 .... 20.38462 .... 0
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Japan 1987 0 0 33.04 260.4423 0.026628 1
Japan 1988 0 0 33.02 270.7993 0.027039 1
Japan 1989 0 0 33.03 280.26 0.027364 1
Japan 1990 0 0 33.01 289.0688 0.029093 1
Japan 1991 0 0 32.77 295.9677 0.027578 1
Japan 1992 0 0 32.74 301.4469 0.02614 1
Japan 1993 0 0 32.88 303.9294 0.025842 1
Japan 1994 0 0 35.82 305.6 0.066 1
Japan 1995 0 0 35.85 309.9042 0.063338 1
Japan 1996 0 0 36 318.9793 0.063527 1
Japan 1997 0 0 36.12 324.5823 0.063637 1
Jordan 1987 0 0 43.15 280.3448 0.106126 1
Jordan 1988 0 0 43.06 208.6667 0.102617 1
Jordan 1989 0 0 42.58 168.7097 0.088293 1
Jordan 1990 0 0 40.89 142.7273 0.054923 0
Jordan 1991 0 0 40.78 132.7778 0.053819 0
Jordan 1992 0 0 40.53 123.6842 0.053515 0
Jordan 1993 0 0 40.87 122.3077 0.059058 0
Jordan 1994 0 0 40.27 133.75 0.053286 1
Jordan 1995 0 0 40.37 141.7073 0.054755 0
Jordan 1996 0 0 40.91 145 0.063501 0
Jordan 1997 0 0 40.97 145.5814 0.064557 0
Kazakstan 1992 1 0 .... 127.0588 .... 0
Kazakstan 1993 1 0 .... 101.7647 .... 0
Kazakstan 1994 1 0 .... 130 .... 0
Kazakstan 1995 1 0 .... 60.58824 .... 1
Kazakstan 1996 1 0 .... .... .... 1
Kazakstan 1997 1 0 .... 41.36095 .... 0
Kenya 1987 0 1 42.92 9.032258 0.083439 0
Kenya 1988 0 0 42.52 11.78571 0.074973 0
Kenya 1989 0 0 42.93 8.663793 0.083398 0
Kenya 1990 0 0 42.59 10.29289 0.076032 0
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Kenya 1991 1 0 42.69 9.877551 0.083 0
Kenya 1992 1 0 42.4 10.19685 0.077019 0
Kenya 1993 1 0 41.94 8.122605 0.068283 0
Kenya 1994 1 0 41.71 6.641509 0.059015 0
Kenya 1995 1 0 42.03 6.840149 0.064614 0
Kenya 1996 0 0 41.2 7.142857 0.050614 0
Kenya 1997 0 0 41.03 7.410072 0.048153 0
KoreaN 1987 0 0 .... 363.0542 0.023112 1
KoreaN 1988 0 0 .... 358.2524 0.023122 1
KoreaN 1989 0 0 .... 347.619 0.023562 1
KoreaN 1990 0 0 .... 325.2336 0.024728 1
KoreaN 1991 0 0 .... 277.451 0.019021 1
KoreaN 1992 0 0 .... 294.686 0.02038 1
KoreaN 1993 0 0 .... 271.09 0.01839 1
KoreaN 1994 0 0 .... 271.9626 0.020022 1
KoreaN 1995 0 0 .... 287.5 0.01712 1
KoreaN 1996 0 0 .... 283.7209 0.019579 1
KoreaS 1987 0 0 33.7 .... .... ....
KoreaS 1988 0 0 33.55 209.5465 .... 1
KoreaS 1989 0 0 33.71 220.5189 .... 1
KoreaS 1990 0 0 34.03 240.6542 .... 1
KoreaS 1991 0 0 33.54 265.7343 .... 1
KoreaS 1992 0 0 33.92 254.6296 .... 1
KoreaS 1993 0 0 33.55 267.7346 .... 1
KoreaS 1994 0 0 33.77 269.8413 .... 1
KoreaS 1995 0 0 33.34 278.0269 .... 1
KoreaS 1996 0 0 33.87 275.5556 .... 1
KoreaS 1997 0 0 33.92 314.2857 .... 1
Kuwait 1987 0 0 44.85 .... 0.229099 1
Kuwait 1988 0 0 45.09 857.8947 0.248943 1
Kuwait 1989 0 0 45.13 780 0.239025 0
Kuwait 1990 0 1 48.5 1155 0.533369 0
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Kuwait 1991 0 1 48.66 7238.095 0.583791 0
Kuwait 1992 0 1 45.56 17800 0.345113 1
Kuwait 1993 0 1 45.21 14785.71 0.332662 0
Kuwait 1994 0 1 45.3 2540 0.328071 0
Kuwait 1995 0 0 45.41 1993.75 0.339792 0
Kuwait 1996 0 0 45.17 2088.235 0.305069 0
Kyrgyzstan 1992 1 0 45.35 2166.667 0.078629 0
Kyrgyzstan 1993 1 0 38.37 .... 0.128383 ....
Kyrgyzstan 1994 1 0 40.17 .... 0.077791 0
Kyrgyzstan 1995 1 0 38.79 18.47826 0.084241 1
Kyrgyzstan 1996 1 0 39.71 18.44444 0.056408 1
Kyrgyzstan 1997 1 0 38.86 29.33333 0.085332 1
Laos 1987 0 0 .... 26.08696 .... 0
Laos 1988 0 0 .... 34.56522 .... 0
Laos 1989 0 0 .... .... 0.078629 0
Laos 1990 0 0 .... .... 0.128383 0
Laos 1991 0 0 .... .... 0.077791 0
Laos 1992 0 0 .... .... 0.084241 0
Laos 1993 0 0 .... .... 0.056408 0
Laos 1994 0 0 .... 27.72727 0.085332 0
Laos 1995 0 0 .... 25.86957 .... 0
Laos 1996 0 0 .... 17.44681 .... 0
Laos 1997 0 0 .... 15.625 .... 0
Latvia 1992 0 0 .... 13.6 0.003166 0
Latvia 1993 0 0 23.89 11.76471 0.002533 0
Latvia 1994 0 0 23.89 68.07692 0.00264 0
Latvia 1995 0 0 23.75 33.84615 .... 0
Latvia 1996 0 0 24.22 50 .... 0
Latvia 1997 0 0 35.63 34.8 0.024113 0
Lebanon 1987 0 1 .... 35.2 0.025679 0
Lebanon 1988 0 1 .... 40.41667 0.03589 0
Lebanon 1989 0 1 .... .... 0.045678 0
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Lebanon 1990 0 1 .... .... 0.056879 0
Lebanon 1991 0 0 .... .... 0.06789 0
Lebanon 1992 0 0 .... 108.8235 0.21564 0
Lebanon 1993 1 0 .... 125 0.19653 0
Lebanon 1994 1 0 .... 147.1875 0.201234 0
Lebanon 1995 1 0 .... 133.75 0.23679 0
Lebanon 1996 1 0 .... 163.9394 0.213546 0
Lebanon 1997 1 0 .... 168.4848 0.24098 0
Lesotho 1987 0 0 .... 165 .... 0
Lesotho 1988 0 0 .... 136.7647 .... 0
Lesotho 1989 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Lesotho 1990 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Lesotho 1991 0 0 .... 20.58824 .... 0
Lesotho 1992 0 0 44.58 30 0.125352 0
Lesotho 1993 0 0 44.49 .... 0.123041 0
Lesotho 1994 0 0 44.98 18.88889 0.144213 0
Lesotho 1995 0 0 .... 14.21053 .... 0
Lesotho 1996 0 0 .... 12.10526 .... 0
Lesotho 1997 0 0 .... 12 .... 0
Liberia 1987 1 0 .... 14 .... 0
Liberia 1988 1 0 .... 16 .... 0
Liberia 1989 1 0 .... 20 .... 0
Liberia 1990 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Liberia 1991 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Liberia 1992 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Liberia 1993 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Liberia 1994 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Liberia 1995 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Liberia 1996 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Liberia 1997 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Libya 1987 0 1 .... .... 0.09864 0
Libya 1988 0 1 .... .... 0.14532 0
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Libya 1989 0 1 .... 743.5897 0.045621 1
Libya 1990 0 0 .... .... 0.007654 1
Libya 1991 0 0 .... 645.2381 0.012389 1
Libya 1992 0 0 .... .... 0.014567 1
Libya 1993 0 0 .... 500 0.325432 1
Libya 1994 0 0 .... 456.8182 0.312456 1
Libya 1995 0 0 .... 306.6667 0.25698 0
Libya 1996 0 0 .... 269.5652 0.24398 0
Libya 1997 0 0 .... 187.234 0.433398 0
Lithuania 1992 0 0 36.27 .... 0.128935 0
Lithuania 1993 0 0 37.21 .... 0.127831 0
Lithuania 1994 0 0 33.3 .... 0.028292 0
Lithuania 1995 0 0 35.75 30.81081 .... 0
Lithuania 1996 0 0 .... 27.56757 .... 0
Lithuania 1997 0 0 .... 20.54054 0.035258 0
Luxembourg 1987 0 0 30.36 22.5 0.013326 0
Luxembourg 1988 0 0 31.24 35.27778 0.017272 0
Luxembourg 1989 0 0 31.66 240 0.020289 0
Luxembourg 1990 0 0 31.6 275 0.019125 0
Luxembourg 1991 0 0 31.06 250 0.015516 5
Luxembourg 1992 0 0 31.27 260 0.015614 0
Luxembourg 1993 0 0 32.19 292.5 0.019508 0
Luxembourg 1994 0 0 .... 302.5 0.016367 0
Luxembourg 1995 0 0 .... 285 .... 0
Luxembourg 1996 0 0 .... 305 .... 0
Luxembourg 1997 0 0 .... 300 .... 0
Macedonia 1993 0 0 34.44 315 0.032409 0
Macedonia 1994 0 0 35.22 .... 0.037 0
Macedonia 1995 0 0 36.26 .... 0.042058 0
Macedonia 1996 0 0 37.19 36.84211 0.051267 0
Macedonia 1997 0 0 .... 46.5 0.06457 0
Madagascar 1987 0 0 39.03 54.5 0.025028 0
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Madagascar 1988 0 0 39.04 41.5 0.025018 0
Madagascar 1989 0 0 .... 5 0.027 0
Madagascar 1990 0 0 .... 4.12844 0.029 0
Madagascar 1991 0 0 .... 3.75 0.321 0
Madagascar 1992 0 0 .... 3.478261 0.351 0
Madagascar 1993 0 0 .... 3.02521 0.377 0
Madagascar 1994 0 0 .... 2.868852 0.379 0
Madagascar 1995 0 0 .... 3.253968 0.389 0
Madagascar 1996 0 0 .... 2.55814 0.392 0
Madagascar 1997 0 0 .... 2.255639 0.399 0
Malawi 1987 0 0 45.7 3.065693 0.240912 0
Malawi 1988 0 0 46.87 3.758865 0.252409 0
Malawi 1989 0 0 44.81 4.102564 0.254932 0
Malawi 1990 0 0 44.22 3.373494 0.158224 0
Malawi 1991 0 0 44.46 3.333333 0.112221 0
Malawi 1992 0 0 45.67 2.637363 0.153587 0
Malawi 1993 0 0 45.6 2.446809 0.149998 0
Malawi 1994 0 0 44.55 2.44186 0.11539 0
Malawi 1995 0 0 45.49 2.142857 0.146878 0
Malawi 1996 0 0 45.01 3.258427 0.130736 0
Malawi 1997 0 0 46.46 1.808511 0.187195 0
Malaysia 1987 0 0 38.9 2.421053 0.046439 0
Malaysia 1988 0 0 38.69 2.680412 0.047788 0
Malaysia 1989 0 0 37.65 111.6564 0.038661 0
Malaysia 1990 0 0 36.77 69.46108 0.034435 0
Malaysia 1991 0 0 36.14 80.70175 0.032674 0
Malaysia 1992 0 0 35.6 84.57143 0.028652 0
Malaysia 1993 0 0 35.04 113.4078 0.026651 0
Malaysia 1994 0 0 35.03 108.1967 0.027928 0
Malaysia 1995 0 0 34.67 112.766 0.028774 0
Malaysia 1996 0 0 35.14 117.7083 0.034097 1
Malaysia 1997 0 0 35.03 120.4082 0.028855 1
Table C.31: The Inequality and Military Expenditure Data
148
Mali 1987 0 0 .... 110.9453 .... 1
Mali 1988 0 0 .... 101.9512 .... 1
Mali 1989 0 0 .... 5.194805 .... 0
Mali 1990 1 0 .... 5.316456 .... 0
Mali 1991 1 0 .... 5.308642 .... 1
Mali 1992 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Mali 1993 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Mali 1994 1 0 .... 5.051546 .... 0
Mali 1995 1 0 .... 5.172414 .... 0
Mali 1996 1 0 .... 4.105263 .... 0
Mali 1997 1 0 .... 4.23913 .... 0
Malta 1987 0 0 30.08 4.631579 0.007657 0
Malta 1988 0 0 30.59 4.387755 0.009023 0
Malta 1989 0 0 31.59 83.33333 0.013807 0
Malta 1990 0 0 31.53 76.66667 0.011991 0
Malta 1991 0 0 31.42 65 0.011219 0
Malta 1992 0 0 31.67 52.5 0.011943 0
Malta 1993 0 0 32.05 55 0.013231 0
Malta 1994 0 0 31.73 67.5 0.01177 0
Malta 1995 0 0 33.06 65 0.018907 0
Malta 1996 0 0 32.29 82.5 0.013346 0
Malta 1997 0 0 .... 77.5 .... 0
Mauritania 1987 0 0 .... 80 .... 0
Mauritania 1988 0 0 .... 77.5 .... 0
Mauritania 1989 0 1 .... 17.77778 .... 0
Mauritania 1990 0 1 .... 0 .... 0
Mauritania 1991 0 0 .... 18.42105 .... 0
Mauritania 1992 0 0 .... 17.36842 .... 0
Mauritania 1993 0 0 .... 15 .... 0
Mauritania 1994 0 0 .... 13.80952 .... 0
Mauritania 1995 0 0 .... 13.18182 .... 0
Mauritania 1996 0 0 .... 11.73913 .... 0
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Mauritania 1997 0 0 .... 11.73913 .... 0
Mauritius 1987 0 0 34.77 10.83333 0.073232 0
Mauritius 1988 0 0 33.77 10 0.058649 0
Mauritius 1989 0 0 33.86 5 0.062091 0
Mauritius 1990 0 0 33.52 5.454545 0.053985 0
Mauritius 1991 0 0 34.15 7.272727 0.069473 0
Mauritius 1992 0 0 33.42 9.090909 0.053613 0
Mauritius 1993 0 0 33.66 10 0.05157 0
Mauritius 1994 0 0 33.89 10.90909 0.050669 0
Mauritius 1995 0 0 34.01 10.90909 0.050033 0
Mauritius 1996 0 0 34.18 11.81818 0.048335 0
Mauritius 1997 0 0 34.39 12.72727 0.047392 0
Mexico 1987 0 0 38.23 11.81818 0.023995 0
Mexico 1988 0 0 38.72 10 0.027684 0
Mexico 1989 0 0 38.56 27.15895 0.026383 1
Mexico 1990 0 0 38.76 19.70624 0.027887 1
Mexico 1991 0 0 38.8 19.54436 0.027919 1
Mexico 1992 0 0 39.59 18.33137 0.034772 1
Mexico 1993 0 0 39.81 19.79167 0.035882 1
Mexico 1994 1 0 40.43 21.67991 0.042288 1
Mexico 1995 1 0 41.12 23.35929 0.050983 1
Mexico 1996 1 0 40.63 28.16594 0.044843 1
Mexico 1997 1 0 40.45 24.00857 0.043069 1
Moldova 1992 0 0 29.57 22.39748 0.00827 1
Moldova 1993 0 0 29.49 44.31818 0.075093 1
Moldova 1994 0 0 30.55 .... 0.075311 0
Moldova 1995 0 0 40.63 12.44444 0.08984 0
Moldova 1996 0 0 40.67 12.44444 .... 0
Moldova 1997 0 0 41.47 14.88889 .... 0
Mongolia 1987 0 0 .... 13.55556 .... 0
Mongolia 1988 0 0 .... 13.77778 .... 0
Mongolia 1989 0 0 .... 44 .... 0
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Mongolia 1990 0 0 45.13 44.7619 0.227617 0
Mongolia 1991 0 0 44.46 40.45455 0.187362 0
Mongolia 1992 0 0 45.89 38.18182 0.228852 0
Mongolia 1993 0 0 52.46 20.43478 1.025714 0
Mongolia 1994 0 0 51.37 9.565217 0.879758 0
Mongolia 1995 0 0 42.85 10.41667 0.104713 0
Mongolia 1996 0 0 .... 9.166667 .... 0
Mongolia 1997 0 0 .... 8.4 .... 0
Morocco 1987 0 1 41.82 8.8 0.067571 0
Morocco 1988 0 1 42.07 7.6 0.074276 0
Morocco 1989 0 1 42.49 60.65574 0.085537 0
Morocco 1990 0 1 43.32 56.4 0.103924 0
Morocco 1991 0 1 42.71 57.8125 0.095464 0
Morocco 1992 0 0 41.64 57.63359 0.073723 0
Morocco 1993 0 0 42.08 51.19048 0.083226 0
Morocco 1994 0 0 41.9 50.3876 0.078718 0
Morocco 1995 0 0 41.48 50 0.069926 0
Morocco 1996 0 0 41.72 49.81413 0.074863 0
Morocco 1997 0 0 42.11 46.54545 0.083751 0
Mozambique 1987 1 0 .... 46.78571 .... 0
Mozambique 1988 1 0 .... 48.6014 .... 0
Mozambique 1989 1 0 .... 8.93617 .... 0
Mozambique 1990 1 0 43.79 8.489209 0.098626 0
Mozambique 1991 1 0 44.32 10.14388 0.112097 0
Mozambique 1992 1 0 42.77 9.929078 0.071798 1
Mozambique 1993 1 0 43.52 8.741259 0.087329 0
Mozambique 1994 1 0 45.7 8.689655 0.152744 0
Mozambique 1995 0 0 49.22 8.933333 0.358033 0
Mozambique 1996 0 0 49.12 9.506173 0.345609 0
Mozambique 1997 0 0 .... 4.011628 .... 0
Namibia 1990 0 1 .... 3.728814 .... 0
Namibia 1991 0 0 .... 4.010989 .... 0
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Namibia 1992 0 0 .... 34.28571 .... 0
Namibia 1993 0 0 .... 50 .... 0
Namibia 1994 0 0 38.97 43.33333 0.031425 0
Namibia 1995 0 0 .... 38 .... 0
Namibia 1996 0 0 .... 36.66667 .... 0
Namibia 1997 0 0 .... 40 .... 0
Nepal 1987 0 0 43.24 43.125 0.090719 0
Nepal 1988 0 0 42.97 56.25 0.084107 0
Nepal 1989 0 0 42.88 1.910112 0.081144 0
Nepal 1990 0 0 44.18 1.813187 0.117403 0
Nepal 1991 0 0 42.09 1.818182 0.071623 0
Nepal 1992 0 0 .... 1.937173 .... 0
Nepal 1993 0 0 41.01 1.818182 0.052486 0
Nepal 1994 0 0 39.18 1.921182 0.031206 0
Nepal 1995 0 0 .... 1.961722 0.033 0
Nepal 1996 0 0 39.76 1.962617 0.034734 0
Nepal 1997 0 0 .... 1.909091 0.0357 0
Netherlands 1987 0 0 31.84 1.822222 0.008223 0
Netherlands 1988 0 0 32.2 1.818182 0.008458 0
Netherlands 1989 0 0 32.38 556.4626 0.009159 1
Netherlands 1990 0 0 32.35 548.6486 0.009149 1
Netherlands 1991 0 0 32.31 552.7027 0.008972 1
Netherlands 1992 0 0 32.24 530.6667 0.008541 1
Netherlands 1993 0 0 32.67 514.5695 0.009076 1
Netherlands 1994 0 0 33.02 513.1579 0.00979 1
Netherlands 1995 0 0 33.53 471.2418 0.011398 1
Netherlands 1996 0 0 33.72 453.8961 0.011849 1
Netherlands 1997 0 0 33.9 439.3548 0.012406 1
NewZealand 1987 0 0 33.04 441.6667 0.024273 1
NewZealand 1988 0 0 33.46 438.4615 0.02353 1
NewZealand 1989 0 0 33.45 315.1515 0.020313 0
NewZealand 1990 0 0 34.32 336.3636 0.093514 1
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NewZealand 1991 0 0 33.58 324.2424 0.091842 0
NewZealand 1992 0 0 33.72 315.1515 0.086824 0
NewZealand 1993 0 0 34.55 283.9394 0.050161 0
NewZealand 1994 0 0 38.84 235.2941 0.054624 0
NewZealand 1995 0 0 38.93 246.7647 0.056951 0
NewZealand 1996 0 0 38.56 202.5714 0.051296 0
NewZealand 1997 0 0 .... 216 .... 1
Nicaragua 1987 1 0 .... 208.2857 .... 1
Nicaragua 1988 1 0 .... 212.7778 .... 0
Nicaragua 1989 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Nicaragua 1990 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Nicaragua 1991 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Nicaragua 1992 1 0 .... 82.77778 .... 0
Nicaragua 1993 1 0 .... 12.7027 .... 0
Nicaragua 1994 1 0 .... 10.52632 .... 1
Nicaragua 1995 0 0 .... 8.974359 .... 0
Nicaragua 1996 0 0 .... 8.292683 .... 0
Nicaragua 1997 0 0 .... 8.095238 .... 1
Niger 1987 0 0 .... 6.511628 .... 0
Niger 1988 0 0 .... 6.136364 .... 0
Niger 1989 0 0 .... 0 .... 0
Niger 1990 0 0 .... 2.222222 .... 0
Niger 1991 0 0 .... 2.837838 .... 0
Niger 1992 0 0 .... 0 .... 0
Niger 1993 1 0 .... 2.78481 .... 0
Niger 1994 1 0 .... 2.592593 .... 0
Niger 1995 1 0 .... 2.771084 .... 0
Niger 1996 1 0 .... 2.325581 .... 0
Niger 1997 1 0 .... 2.272727 .... 0
Nigeria 1987 0 0 .... 2.087912 .... 0
Nigeria 1988 0 0 .... 2.12766 .... 0
Nigeria 1989 0 0 .... 17.36375 .... 0
Table C.36: The Inequality and Military Expenditure Data
153
Nigeria 1990 0 0 .... 27.55228 .... 0
Nigeria 1991 0 0 41.22 25.86412 0.045396 1
Nigeria 1992 0 0 42.24 29.71098 0.06041 0
Nigeria 1993 1 0 42.46 37.73796 0.065732 0
Nigeria 1994 1 0 42.93 32.57329 0.073642 0
Nigeria 1995 1 0 .... 28.40426 .... 0
Nigeria 1996 1 0 .... 28.90705 .... 0
Nigeria 1997 1 0 .... 23.06931 .... 0
Norway 1987 0 0 30.8 20.07685 0.008992 0
Norway 1988 0 0 31.14 18.63933 0.009005 0
Norway 1989 0 0 31.52 828.5714 0.009295 1
Norway 1990 0 0 31.53 802.381 0.009014 1
Norway 1991 0 0 32.04 814.2857 0.010449 1
Norway 1992 0 0 33 823.8095 0.012647 1
Norway 1993 0 0 33.69 786.0465 0.012524 1
Norway 1994 0 0 32.22 876.7442 0.008768 1
Norway 1995 0 0 32.29 818.6047 0.009221 1
Norway 1996 0 0 32.09 874.4186 0.008877 1
Norway 1997 0 0 31.97 765.9091 0.008881 1
Oman 1987 0 0 .... 754.5455 0.053476 1
Oman 1988 0 0 .... 738.6364 0.05679 1
Oman 1989 0 0 .... 1262.5 0.06784 0
Oman 1990 0 0 .... 1068.75 0.068982 0
Oman 1991 0 0 .... 1111.765 0.078954 0
Oman 1992 0 0 .... 1238.889 0.089754 0
Oman 1993 0 0 43.08 1050 0.096892 0
Oman 1994 0 0 43.65 1173.684 0.113538 0
Oman 1995 0 0 43.8 1030 0.117735 0
Oman 1996 0 0 44.35 1014.286 0.130877 0
Oman 1997 0 0 43.56 990.4762 0.109577 0
Pakistan 1987 0 1 41.83 881.8182 0.057835 0
Pakistan 1988 0 1 41.58 791.3043 0.053575 0
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Pakistan 1989 0 1 41.87 27.64538 0.058429 1
Pakistan 1990 0 1 42.2 27.27273 0.064258 1
Pakistan 1991 0 1 42.55 26.44404 0.071088 1
Pakistan 1992 0 1 .... 28.88499 .... 1
Pakistan 1993 0 1 .... 27.88708 .... 1
Pakistan 1994 0 1 .... 31.20269 .... 1
Pakistan 1995 0 1 .... 29.77667 .... 1
Pakistan 1996 0 1 43.15 29.66855 0.08132 1
Pakistan 1997 0 1 .... 27.13608 .... 1
Panama 1987 0 0 41.33 27.06883 0.065572 0
Panama 1988 0 0 42.33 25.56732 0.081893 0
Panama 1989 1 0 41.97 52.17391 0.073007 0
Panama 1990 1 0 42.36 52.17391 0.085327 0
Panama 1991 0 0 42.03 52.6087 0.078167 0
Panama 1992 0 0 42.98 36.25 0.096789 0
Panama 1993 0 0 42.45 38.75 0.084432 0
Panama 1994 0 0 42.75 35.6 0.091987 1
Panama 1995 0 0 .... 41.2 .... 1
Panama 1996 0 0 43.52 40.38462 0.111849 0
Panama 1997 0 0 43.06 38.46154 0.100173 0
PapuaNewG 1987 0 0 44.92 38.14815 0.127663 0
PapuaNewG 1988 0 0 44.78 42.22222 0.124204 0
PapuaNewG 1989 0 0 44.78 12.22222 0.124198 0
PapuaNewG 1990 0 0 .... 11.94444 .... 0
PapuaNewG 1991 0 0 .... 13.51351 .... 0
PapuaNewG 1992 0 0 .... 18.15789 .... 0
PapuaNewG 1993 0 0 .... 12.5641 .... 0
PapuaNewG 1994 0 0 .... 13.5 .... 0
PapuaNewG 1995 0 0 .... 19.02439 .... 0
PapuaNewG 1996 0 0 .... 19.7619 .... 0
PapuaNewG 1997 0 0 .... 14.18605 .... 0
Paraguay 1987 0 0 .... 16.59091 .... 0
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Paraguay 1988 0 0 .... 14 .... 0
Paraguay 1989 0 0 .... 17.38095 .... 0
Paraguay 1990 0 0 .... 23.63636 .... 0
Paraguay 1991 0 0 37.05 24 0.893 0
Paraguay 1992 0 0 .... 22.34043 .... 0
Paraguay 1993 0 0 .... 31.13636 .... 0
Paraguay 1994 0 0 .... 33.11111 .... 0
Paraguay 1995 0 0 .... 25.65217 .... 0
Paraguay 1996 0 0 .... 22.76596 .... 0
Paraguay 1997 0 0 .... 24.69388 .... 0
Peru 1987 1 0 40.58 24.2 0.051385 0
Peru 1988 1 0 40.79 24.42308 0.054804 0
Peru 1989 1 0 44.19 140.9756 0.134028 0
Peru 1990 1 0 44.88 .... 0.158326 0
Peru 1991 1 0 42.33 .... 0.077412 0
Peru 1992 1 0 42.56 33.48624 0.080499 0
Peru 1993 1 0 43.84 27.33333 .... 0
Peru 1994 1 0 .... 35.86957 0.11347 0
Peru 1995 1 1 .... 35.61702 .... 0
Peru 1996 1 0 .... 37.58333 .... 0
Peru 1997 1 0 .... 40.65041 .... 0
Philippines 1987 1 0 41.91 39.04382 0.068882 0
Philippines 1988 1 0 41.99 52.73438 0.075132 0
Philippines 1989 1 0 41.69 17.16172 0.071046 0
Philippines 1990 1 0 42.16 20.48387 0.085568 0
Philippines 1991 0 0 42.15 22.51969 0.084369 0
Philippines 1992 1 0 42.04 22.15385 0.076757 0
Philippines 1993 1 0 42.46 20.72072 0.08373 0
Philippines 1994 1 0 42.51 18.94273 0.083767 0
Philippines 1995 1 0 42.09 21.37733 0.074722 0
Philippines 1996 1 0 42.15 19.63534 0.079458 0
Philippines 1997 1 0 42.12 14.81481 0.079455 0
Table C.39: The Inequality and Military Expenditure Data
156
Poland 1987 0 0 28.19 17.18121 0.00506 0
Poland 1988 0 0 27.93 16.68857 0.004307 0
Poland 1989 0 0 28.42 535.809 0.004808 1
Poland 1990 0 0 31.04 513.2275 0.010855 1
Poland 1991 0 0 30.73 494.7368 0.007736 1
Poland 1992 0 0 32.1 267.7165 0.010218 1
Poland 1993 0 0 32.9 218.3246 0.012297 1
Poland 1994 0 0 32.61 110.1563 0.01531 1
Poland 1995 0 0 33.66 127.2727 0.023787 1
Poland 1996 0 0 34.47 128.0519 0.031107 1
Poland 1997 0 0 35.99 162.4352 0.051381 1
Portugal 1987 0 0 35.53 162.1762 0.034577 1
Portugal 1988 0 0 36.36 145.0777 0.044363 1
Portugal 1989 0 0 36.47 201.0101 0.045921 1
Portugal 1990 0 0 .... 220.202 .... 1
Portugal 1991 0 0 .... 231.3131 .... 1
Portugal 1992 0 0 .... 238.3838 .... 1
Portugal 1993 0 0 .... 243.4343 .... 1
Portugal 1994 0 0 .... 247.4747 .... 1
Portugal 1995 0 0 .... 239.3939 .... 1
Portugal 1996 0 0 .... 230.303 .... 1
Portugal 1997 0 0 .... 244.4444 .... 1
Qatar 1987 0 0 44.5 236.3636 0.29626 1
Qatar 1988 0 0 46.09 241.4141 0.412732 1
Qatar 1989 0 0 47.2 .... 0.453421 0
Qatar 1990 0 0 45.99 .... 0.484937 0
Qatar 1991 0 0 45.55 .... 0.363012 0
Qatar 1992 0 0 47.23 .... 0.419541 0
Qatar 1993 0 0 46.14 2120 0.551744 0
Qatar 1994 0 0 .... 1788 0.427171 0
Qatar 1995 0 0 .... 1441.667 0.356431 1
Qatar 1996 0 0 .... 1491.667 0.289012 1
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Qatar 1997 0 0 .... 1508.333 0.26789 0
Congo 1987 0 0 .... 1653.333 0.13786 0
Congo 1988 0 0 .... .... 0.137057 0
Congo 1989 0 0 .... 48.5 0.147 0
Congo 1990 0 0 .... .... 0.149 0
Congo 1991 0 0 .... .... 0.153 0
Congo 1992 0 0 .... 38.63636 0.159 0
Congo 1993 1 0 .... 58.26087 0.166 0
Congo 1994 1 0 .... 50.43478 0.1629 0
Congo 1995 1 0 .... 40 0.1666 0
Congo 1996 0 0 .... 20 0.1753 0
Congo 1997 1 0 .... 21.2 0.1888 0
Romania 1987 0 0 .... 20.8 .... 0
Romania 1988 0 0 .... 28.46154 .... 0
Romania 1989 1 0 .... 432.7434 .... 1
Romania 1990 0 0 24.58 389.8678 .... 1
Romania 1991 0 0 26.31 369.2982 .... 1
Romania 1992 0 0 28.86 198.6842 .... 0
Romania 1993 0 0 29.06 186.7841 .... 0
Romania 1994 0 0 30.23 125.9912 .... 1
Romania 1995 0 0 .... 82.37885 .... 1
Romania 1996 0 0 .... 103.5398 .... 1
Romania 1997 0 0 .... 108.4071 .... 1
Russia 1992 1 1 .... 87.55556 .... 1
Russia 1993 1 1 33.59 101.3333 0.041924 1
Russia 1994 0 1 35.17 531.6285 0.054784 1
Russia 1995 0 1 36.26 453.8721 0.066814 1
Russia 1996 0 1 36.63 439.6494 0.06559 1
Russia 1997 0 1 36.75 286.293 0.059879 1
Rwanda 1987 0 0 .... 259.3094 .... 1
Rwanda 1988 0 0 .... 283.0957 .... 1
Rwanda 1989 0 0 .... 7.076923 .... 1
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Rwanda 1990 1 0 .... 5.294118 .... 0
Rwanda 1991 1 0 .... 5.857143 .... 0
Rwanda 1992 1 0 .... 11.97183 .... 0
Rwanda 1993 1 0 .... 16.62162 .... 0
Rwanda 1994 1 0 .... 13.73333 .... 0
Rwanda 1995 1 0 .... 12.85714 .... 0
Rwanda 1996 1 0 .... 5.671642 .... 0
Rwanda 1997 1 0 .... 10.5 .... 0
SaoTome 1987 0 0 .... 14.12698 .... 0
SaoTome 1988 0 0 .... 10.51948 .... 0
SaoTome 1989 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SaoTome 1990 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SaoTome 1991 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SaoTome 1992 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SaoTome 1993 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SaoTome 1994 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SaoTome 1995 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SaoTome 1996 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SaoTome 1997 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SaudiArabia 1987 0 1 .... 10 .... 0
SaudiArabia 1988 0 0 .... .... 0.181 0
SaudiArabia 1989 0 0 45.77 1489.655 0.184693 1
SaudiArabia 1990 0 0 .... 1139.073 0.1944 1
SaudiArabia 1991 0 0 .... 1147.436 0.3419 1
SaudiArabia 1992 0 0 .... 1704.403 0.245 0
SaudiArabia 1993 0 0 .... 2496.894 0.255 0
SaudiArabia 1994 0 0 .... 2323.353 0.355 1
SaudiArabia 1995 0 0 .... 1270.115 0.375 0
SaudiArabia 1996 0 0 .... 1022.222 0.385 1
SaudiArabia 1997 0 0 .... 1021.39 0.398 1
Senegal 1987 0 0 37.37 969.0722 0.015184 0
Senegal 1988 0 0 40.7 1049.751 0.040468 1
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Senegal 1989 0 1 41.01 11.04478 0.04574 0
Senegal 1990 0 1 40.79 10.57971 0.042369 0
Senegal 1991 0 0 42.87 9.861111 0.074631 0
Senegal 1992 0 0 42.21 10.13514 0.06113 0
Senegal 1993 0 0 41.2 9.61039 0.045853 0
Senegal 1994 0 0 44.06 13.41772 0.10107 0
Senegal 1995 0 0 42.62 11.46341 0.069388 0
Senegal 1996 0 0 43.62 8.235294 0.092246 0
Senegal 1997 0 0 43.27 7.613636 0.083159 0
SerbiaM 1992 0 0 .... 7.692308 .... 0
SerbiaM 1993 0 0 .... 7.340426 .... 0
SerbiaM 1994 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SerbiaM 1995 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SerbiaM 1996 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SerbiaM 1997 1 0 .... 100 .... 0
SierraLeone 1987 0 0 .... .... .... 0
SierraLeone 1988 0 0 .... 114.2857 .... 0
SierraLeone 1989 0 0 .... 1.794872 .... 0
SierraLeone 1990 0 0 .... 1.75 .... 0
SierraLeone 1991 1 0 .... 2.439024 .... 0
SierraLeone 1992 1 0 .... 3.72093 .... 0
SierraLeone 1993 1 0 48.19 5.454545 .... 0
SierraLeone 1994 1 0 .... 7.209302 .... 0
SierraLeone 1995 1 0 .... 7.44186 .... 0
SierraLeone 1996 1 0 .... 9.090909 .... 0
SierraLeone 1997 1 0 .... 8.695652 .... 0
Singapore 1987 0 0 32.9 12.34043 0.043129 0
Singapore 1988 0 0 31.66 9.795918 0.041465 0
Singapore 1989 0 0 31.34 757.1429 0.039144 1
Singapore 1990 0 0 31.03 820.6897 0.037038 1
Singapore 1991 0 0 31.01 820 0.03642 1
Singapore 1992 0 0 30.93 926.6667 0.033286 1
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Singapore 1993 0 0 31.24 893.5484 0.034328 1
Singapore 1994 0 0 30.77 1046.875 0.029661 1
Singapore 1995 0 0 30.45 1243.75 0.025702 1
Singapore 1996 0 0 30.61 1096.97 0.025674 1
Singapore 1997 0 0 30.9 1333.333 0.026751 1
Slovakia 1993 0 0 28.33 1411.765 0.00863 1
Slovakia 1994 0 0 29.97 1664.706 0.011585 1
Slovakia 1995 0 0 31.32 139.8113 0.015008 1
Slovakia 1996 0 0 32.2 141.4815 0.018359 1
Slovakia 1997 0 0 33.32 173.3333 .... 1
Slovenia 1992 0 0 28.22 172.037 0.020926 1
Slovenia 1993 0 0 28.54 167.2222 0.018884 1
Slovenia 1994 0 0 29 218.5 0.018287 0
Slovenia 1995 0 0 29.58 170 0.020936 0
Slovenia 1996 0 0 29.96 231.5 0.020702 1
Slovenia 1997 0 0 30.36 252 0.020538 1
Somalia 1987 0 0 .... 455.5 .... 1
Somalia 1988 1 0 .... 610 .... 0
Somalia 1989 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Somalia 1990 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Somalia 1991 1 0 .... 4.390244 .... 0
Somalia 1992 1 0 .... 2.771084 .... 0
Somalia 1993 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Somalia 1994 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Somalia 1995 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Somalia 1996 1 0 .... .... .... 0
Somalia 1997 1 0 .... .... .... 0
SouthAfrica 1987 1 0 38.77 .... 0.062598 0
SouthAfrica 1988 1 0 38.71 .... 0.062145 0
SouthAfrica 1989 1 0 38.84 132.6648 0.063122 1
SouthAfrica 1990 1 0 38.94 132.5843 0.063282 1
SouthAfrica 1991 1 0 39.03 133.7912 0.06194 1
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SouthAfrica 1992 1 0 39.15 128.2258 0.061014 1
SouthAfrica 1993 1 0 39.15 104.4737 0.058478 1
SouthAfrica 1994 1 0 39.52 92.24806 0.063724 1
SouthAfrica 1995 0 0 39.64 81.26582 0.066675 1
SouthAfrica 1996 0 0 39.84 88.55721 0.069163 1
SouthAfrica 1997 0 0 39.9 73.10513 0.069662 1
Soviet 1987 0 1 .... 72.35577 .... 1
Soviet 1988 0 1 .... 54.9763 .... 1
Soviet 1989 0 0 .... .... .... 1
Soviet 1990 0 0 .... .... .... 1
Soviet 1991 0 0 .... .... .... 1
Spain 1987 0 0 35.68 .... 0.024917 1
Spain 1988 0 0 35.9 .... 0.027324 1
Spain 1989 0 0 36.04 252.3316 0.029328 1
Spain 1990 0 0 35.99 233.3333 0.029204 1
Spain 1991 0 0 35.97 240.8269 0.02872 1
Spain 1992 0 0 36.2 223.7113 0.029534 1
Spain 1993 0 0 36.04 214.433 0.033353 1
Spain 1994 0 0 36.14 195.8869 0.033631 1
Spain 1995 0 0 36.01 213.0769 0.032135 1
Spain 1996 0 0 36.09 193.0769 0.034038 1
Spain 1997 0 0 35.9 199.2327 0.03272 1
SriLanka 1987 1 0 41.6 195.6522 0.065359 1
SriLanka 1988 1 0 41.11 196.1637 0.057276 1
SriLanka 1989 1 0 40.23 17.57576 0.046034 0
SriLanka 1990 1 0 40.72 26.82635 0.05567 0
SriLanka 1991 1 0 39.65 25.29412 0.040917 0
SriLanka 1992 1 0 38.37 29.47674 0.027895 0
SriLanka 1993 1 0 38.95 30.22989 0.042989 0
SriLanka 1994 1 0 38.79 24.31818 0.041921 0
SriLanka 1995 1 0 39.57 28.14607 0.051855 0
SriLanka 1996 1 0 .... 33.31492 0.0534 0
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SriLanka 1997 1 0 .... 47.26776 0.0591 0
Sudan 1987 1 0 .... 44.64865 0.0365 0
Sudan 1988 1 0 .... 40.74866 0.0375 0
Sudan 1989 1 0 .... 7.449393 0.0385 0
Sudan 1990 1 0 .... 8.537549 0.095 0
Sudan 1991 1 0 .... 9.147287 0.1001 0
Sudan 1992 1 0 .... 6.428571 0.136 0
Sudan 1993 1 0 .... 15.87591 0.152 0
Sudan 1994 1 0 .... 0 0.163 0
Sudan 1995 1 0 .... 17.50865 0.1982 0
Sudan 1996 1 0 .... 12.92929 0.2012 0
Sudan 1997 1 0 .... 13.88889 0.2012 0
Suriname 1987 0 0 40.31 14.98413 0.051396 0
Suriname 1988 0 0 40.85 12.63804 0.058519 0
Suriname 1989 0 0 40.85 0 0.058863 0
Suriname 1990 0 0 40.53 100 0.051589 0
Suriname 1991 0 0 41.77 90 0.073541 0
Suriname 1992 0 0 41.02 137.5 0.059861 0
Suriname 1993 0 0 41.37 135 0.063469 0
Suriname 1994 0 0 .... 80 0.075 0
Suriname 1995 0 0 .... 47.5 0.085 0
Suriname 1996 0 0 .... 22.5 0.0921 0
Suriname 1997 0 0 .... 32.5 0.0952 0
Swaziland 1987 0 0 43.65 32.5 0.13131 0
Swaziland 1988 0 0 44.73 42.5 0.178619 0
Swaziland 1989 0 0 44.34 13.75 0.179339 0
Swaziland 1990 0 0 43.43 13.75 0.147438 0
Swaziland 1991 0 0 40.13 15 0.039293 0
Swaziland 1992 0 0 41.91 21.11111 0.065652 0
Swaziland 1993 0 0 42.41 21.11111 0.074574 0
Swaziland 1994 0 0 43.85 26.66667 0.111877 0
Swaziland 1995 0 0 40.25 31.11111 0.040681 0
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Swaziland 1996 0 0 .... 28.88889 0.052 0
Swaziland 1997 0 0 .... 30 0.055 0
Sweden 1987 0 0 27.81 33.33333 0.004082 0
Sweden 1988 0 0 28.02 35.55556 0.004301 10
Sweden 1989 0 0 28.03 669.0476 0.004171 1
Sweden 1990 0 0 28.14 682.1429 0.003925 1
Sweden 1991 0 0 27.93 642.3529 0.003534 1
Sweden 1992 0 0 28.53 654.6512 0.003802 1
Sweden 1993 0 0 28.96 670.9302 0.003604 1
Sweden 1994 0 0 28.33 614.9425 0.002855 1
Sweden 1995 0 0 31.13 652.8736 0.008239 1
Sweden 1996 0 0 32.49 651.1364 0.013267 1
Sweden 1997 0 0 33.91 667.0455 0.021972 1
Switzerland 1987 0 0 .... 621.5909 .... 1
Switzerland 1988 0 0 .... 623.5955 .... 1
Switzerland 1989 0 0 .... 737.8788 .... 1
Switzerland 1990 0 0 .... 723.8806 .... 1
Switzerland 1991 0 0 .... 767.1642 .... 1
Switzerland 1992 0 0 .... 791.1765 .... 1
Switzerland 1993 0 0 .... 672.4638 .... 1
Switzerland 1994 0 0 .... 650 .... 1
Switzerland 1995 0 0 .... 574.6479 .... 1
Switzerland 1996 0 0 .... 583.0986 .... 1
Switzerland 1997 0 0 .... 561.1111 .... 1
Syria 1987 0 0 35.02 533.3333 0.008111 1
Syria 1988 0 0 36.67 536.1111 0.01376 1
Syria 1989 0 0 36.83 378.7611 0.014418 0
Syria 1990 0 0 36.28 0 0.011971 0
Syria 1991 0 0 35.14 433.0579 0.008253 0
Syria 1992 0 0 35.72 0 0.009892 0
Syria 1993 0 0 42.71 360.3053 0.139435 0
Syria 1994 0 0 46.81 330.8824 0.164762 1
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Syria 1995 0 0 46.39 274.4681 0.156343 0
Syria 1996 0 0 42.86 291.7808 0.00833 0
Syria 1997 0 0 42.73 278.8079 0.009293 0
Taiwan 1987 0 0 27.64 251.2821 0.011722 0
Taiwan 1988 0 0 28.05 211.1801 0.013515 0
Taiwan 1989 0 0 28.97 348.4848 0.016964 1
Taiwan 1990 0 0 29.66 402 0.01757 1
Taiwan 1991 0 0 29.92 465.8416 0.01785 1
Taiwan 1992 0 0 30.03 489.6552 0.018335 1
Taiwan 1993 0 0 29.71 502.439 0.015549 1
Taiwan 1994 0 0 29.46 516.9082 0.014444 1
Taiwan 1995 0 0 29.65 578.9474 0.014511 1
Taiwan 1996 0 0 29.9 540.2844 0.014804 1
Taiwan 1997 0 0 29.82 600.939 0.014404 1
Tajikistan 1992 1 0 .... 595.3488 .... 1
Tajikistan 1993 1 0 .... 603.6866 .... 1
Tajikistan 1994 1 0 .... 6.785714 .... 0
Tajikistan 1995 1 0 .... 61.57895 .... 0
Tajikistan 1996 1 0 .... 25.26316 .... 0
Tajikistan 1997 1 0 .... 12.93103 .... 0
Tanzania 1987 0 0 43.84 14.23729 0.098652 0
Tanzania 1988 0 0 44.08 19.15254 0.104264 0
Tanzania 1989 0 0 .... 5.80786 0.155 0
Tanzania 1990 0 0 41.65 4.788136 0.054668 0
Tanzania 1991 0 0 43.63 4.338843 0.093187 0
Tanzania 1992 0 0 .... 3.91129 0.095 0
Tanzania 1993 0 0 .... 3.984375 0.1121 0
Tanzania 1994 0 0 .... 4.448669 0.1323 0
Tanzania 1995 0 0 .... 3.726937 0.1534 0
Tanzania 1996 0 0 .... .... 0.1721 0
Tanzania 1997 0 0 .... 3.020833 0.141 0
Thailand 1987 0 0 .... 3.515358 0.215 0
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Thailand 1988 0 0 41.5 2.909699 0.073723 0
Thailand 1989 0 0 43.06 42.42424 0.130622 0
Thailand 1990 0 0 41.92 41.04478 0.111118 1
Thailand 1991 0 0 41.09 41.06814 0.082056 1
Thailand 1992 0 0 39.98 43.0127 0.074276 0
Thailand 1993 0 0 37.64 47.0377 0.05 0
Thailand 1994 0 0 .... 52.39787 0.038381 0
Thailand 1995 0 0 .... 60.87719 .... 0
Thailand 1996 0 0 .... 61.11111 .... 0
Thailand 1997 0 0 .... 60.13746 .... 0
Togo 1987 0 0 43.51 62.13922 .... 0
Togo 1988 0 0 42.13 56.80672 .... 0
Togo 1989 0 0 42.25 12.42424 .... 0
Togo 1990 0 0 42.57 .... .... 0
Togo 1991 1 0 37.02 11.42857 .... 0
Togo 1992 1 0 40.23 10.81081 .... 0
Togo 1993 1 0 39.57 10 .... 0
Togo 1994 1 0 42.05 9 .... 0
Togo 1995 0 0 .... 10.2439 .... 0
Togo 1996 0 0 .... 7.209302 .... 0
Togo 1997 0 0 .... 6.818182 .... 0
TrinidadT 1987 0 0 42.78 5.652174 0.119031 0
TrinidadT 1988 0 0 49.07 6.170213 0.381669 0
TrinidadT 1989 0 0 44.28 .... 0.198092 0
TrinidadT 1990 0 0 46.14 .... 0.336877 0
TrinidadT 1991 0 0 43.6 56.66667 0.179942 0
TrinidadT 1992 0 0 43.37 .... 0.167777 0
TrinidadT 1993 0 0 44.09 .... 0.209345 0
TrinidadT 1994 0 0 43.5 58.33333 0.179699 0
TrinidadT 1995 0 0 45 59.16667 0.265186 0
TrinidadT 1996 0 0 .... 67.5 0.3124 0
TrinidadT 1997 0 0 .... 55.83333 0.35548 0
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Tunisia 1987 1 0 .... 60 0.1231 0
Tunisia 1988 0 0 .... 75.45455 0.1354 0
Tunisia 1989 0 0 .... 33.28947 0.15671 0
Tunisia 1990 0 0 .... 44.54545 0.16239 0
Tunisia 1991 0 0 .... 45.6962 0.17431 0
Tunisia 1992 0 0 .... 46.125 0.18891 0
Tunisia 1993 0 0 43.2 45 0.197507 0
Tunisia 1994 0 0 44.09 42.58824 0.238643 0
Tunisia 1995 0 0 42.46 43.33333 0.179032 0
Tunisia 1996 0 0 42.55 43.06818 0.194423 0
Tunisia 1997 0 0 42.55 35.77778 0.199454 0
Turkey 1987 1 0 38.8 38.35165 0.032377 0
Turkey 1988 1 0 38.87 39.02174 0.033432 0
Turkey 1989 1 0 40.25 79.01701 0.049798 1
Turkey 1990 1 0 40.73 69.62963 0.056862 0
Turkey 1991 1 0 41.13 73.50272 0.061361 1
Turkey 1992 1 0 42.09 88.77005 0.082226 1
Turkey 1993 1 0 41.5 93.35664 0.069337 1
Turkey 1994 1 0 41.54 100 0.068577 1
Turkey 1995 1 0 42.03 108.2631 0.07922 1
Turkey 1996 1 0 41.26 102.9801 0.065268 1
Turkey 1997 1 0 40.92 104.7231 0.061097 1
Turkmenistan 1992 0 0 .... 116.48 .... 1
Turkmenistan 1993 0 0 .... 122.6772 .... 1
Turkmenistan 1994 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Turkmenistan 1995 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Turkmenistan 1996 0 0 .... .... .... 0
Turkmenistan 1997 0 0 .... 32.19512 .... 0
Uganda 1987 0 1 44.15 42.61905 0.097755 0
Uganda 1988 0 0 47.02 71.19048 0.203165 0
Uganda 1989 0 0 44.39 12.22222 0.110486 0
Uganda 1990 0 0 .... 6.540881 0.11 0
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Uganda 1991 0 0 .... 7.878788 0.0921 0
Uganda 1992 0 1 .... 7.764706 0.0889 0
Uganda 1993 0 1 .... 7.359551 0.0789 0
Uganda 1994 0 1 .... 5.459459 0.06999 0
Uganda 1995 0 1 .... 4.739583 0.05789 0
Uganda 1996 0 1 .... 7.878788 0.04213 0
Uganda 1997 0 1 .... 9.852941 0.03789 0
Ukraine 1992 0 0 33.28 11.72249 0.033419 0
Ukraine 1993 0 0 31.49 12.46512 0.014762 0
Ukraine 1994 0 0 31.65 86.0735 0.012703 0
Ukraine 1995 0 0 35.42 66.86047 0.0405 1
Ukraine 1996 0 0 37.19 82.49027 0.06463 1
Ukraine 1997 0 0 37.67 79.64775 0.066968 1
Emirates 1987 0 0 .... 81.88976 0.032146 1
Emirates 1988 0 0 .... 84.92063 0.078038 1
Emirates 1989 0 0 .... 1177.778 0.007894 0
Emirates 1990 0 0 .... 1005 0.005832 0
Emirates 1991 0 0 .... 919.0476 0.006793 1
Emirates 1992 0 0 .... 1317.391 0.006989 1
Emirates 1993 0 0 .... 2775 0.007123 0
Emirates 1994 0 0 .... 1109.524 0.002487 0
Emirates 1995 0 0 .... 1090.476 0.002 0
Emirates 1996 0 0 .... 1080.952 0.002398 0
Emirates 1997 0 0 .... 1022.727 0.00131 1
uk 1987 0 0 32.01 1022.727 0.017771 1
uk 1988 0 0 31.96 1004.348 0.017729 1
uk 1989 0 0 31.93 845.3427 0.017453 1
uk 1990 0 0 32.2 795.0963 0.01843 1
uk 1991 0 0 32.48 800.6993 0.017718 1
uk 1992 0 0 32.71 801.3937 0.017708 1
uk 1993 0 0 33.14 818.0243 0.019352 1
uk 1994 0 0 32.79 730.5699 0.018383 1
Table C.51: The Inequality and Military Expenditure Data
168
uk 1995 0 0 32.74 701.7241 0.018341 1
uk 1996 0 0 32.74 680.9605 0.0166 1
uk 1997 0 0 32.73 630.7692 0.016129 1
US 1987 0 1 34.07 637.138 0.027309 1
US 1988 0 1 34.07 600.3401 0.027455 1
US 1989 0 1 34.11 1548.6 0.027057 1
US 1990 0 1 34.26 1510.204 0.027407 1
US 1991 0 1 34.6 1496.159 0.027874 1
US 1992 0 0 34.49 1436.575 0.026683 1
US 1993 0 0 34.55 1254.949 0.026698 1
US 1994 0 0 34.72 1323.414 0.027977 1
US 1995 0 0 34.69 1243.704 0.028114 1
US 1996 0 0 35.02 1170.376 0.030729 1
US 1997 0 0 35.73 1098.859 0.03897 1
Uruguay 1987 0 0 37.44 1039.548 0.039715 1
Uruguay 1988 0 0 37.61 1030.235 0.040401 1
Uruguay 1989 0 1 36.09 95 0.036159 0
Uruguay 1990 0 0 36.77 103.2258 0.042619 0
Uruguay 1991 0 0 37.42 112.9032 0.048636 0
Uruguay 1992 1 0 37.91 115.8065 0.050871 0
Uruguay 1993 0 0 38.73 108.0645 0.058455 0
Uruguay 1994 0 0 39.1 123.2258 0.05952 0
Uruguay 1995 0 0 39.9 100.3125 0.069363 0
Uruguay 1996 0 0 40.28 145.3125 0.071218 0
Uruguay 1997 0 0 40.76 102.8125 0.081281 0
Uzbekistan 1992 0 0 .... 86.875 .... 0
Uzbekistan 1993 0 0 .... 84.54545 .... 0
Uzbekistan 1994 0 0 .... 78.24074 .... 0
Uzbekistan 1995 0 0 .... 91.36364 .... 0
Uzbekistan 1996 0 0 .... 40.625 .... 1
Uzbekistan 1997 0 0 .... 28.72807 .... 1
Venezuela 1987 0 0 39.21 63.20346 0.045174 1
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Venezuela 1988 0 0 38.94 .... 0.042416 1
Venezuela 1989 0 0 39.1 106.1453 0.042294 1
Venezuela 1990 0 0 40.05 77.17391 0.054692 0
Venezuela 1991 0 0 41.74 74.07407 0.090678 0
Venezuela 1992 0 0 40.66 73.57513 0.065726 5
Venezuela 1993 0 0 41.92 143.9394 0.088692 0
Venezuela 1994 0 0 41 102.4631 0.066066 0
Venezuela 1995 0 0 42.03 68.11594 0.085707 0
Venezuela 1996 0 0 43.12 59.71564 0.116565 0
Venezuela 1997 0 0 .... 68.98148 .... 0
Vietnam 1987 0 0 .... 48.63636 .... 0
Vietnam 1988 0 0 .... 83.03571 .... 0
Vietnam 1989 0 0 .... 36.47799 .... 1
Vietnam 1990 0 0 .... 53.69231 .... 1
Vietnam 1991 0 0 .... 76.1171 .... 0
Vietnam 1992 0 0 .... 85.06787 .... 0
Vietnam 1993 0 0 .... 62.33383 .... 0
Vietnam 1994 0 0 .... 40.14493 .... 1
Vietnam 1995 0 0 .... 29.30299 .... 0
Vietnam 1996 0 0 .... 37.43017 .... 0
Vietnam 1997 0 0 .... 40.7967 .... 0
YemanA 1987 0 0 .... 0 0.01235 0
YemanA 1988 0 0 .... 45.13981 0.03456 0
YemanA 1989 0 0 .... 116.6667 0.089234 0
Yemans 1987 0 0 .... 118.3333 0.067123 0
Yemans 1988 0 0 .... 116.4 0.059213 0
Yemans 1989 0 0 .... 13.69231 0.079356 0
Yemans 1990 0 0 .... 24.02985 0.081435 0
Yemans 1991 1 0 .... 26.52174 0.12569 0
Yemans 1992 0 0 .... 32.06897 0.054321 0
Yemans 1993 0 0 .... 31.24031 0.068973 0
Yemans 1994 1 0 .... 32.08955 0.23689 0
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Yemans 1995 0 0 .... 31.00719 0.004321 0
Yemans 1996 0 0 .... 37.22222 0.00543 1
Yemans 1997 0 0 .... 28.12081 0.03458 0
Yugoslavia 1987 0 0 35.32 24.77124 0.047718 0
Yugoslavia 1988 0 0 36.27 25.84906 0.062042 0
Yugoslavia 1989 0 0 37.73 217.5214 0.093604 1
Yugoslavia 1990 0 0 38.26 183.0508 0.10182 1
Yugoslavia 1991 0 0 .... 136.2869 .... 1
Zambia 1987 0 1 43.47 184.4538 .... 1
Zambia 1988 0 0 43.12 172.8033 .... 1
Zambia 1989 0 0 .... 13.15068 .... 0
Zambia 1990 0 0 .... 13.28947 .... 0
Zambia 1991 0 0 .... 19.10256 .... 0
Zambia 1992 0 0 .... 16.375 .... 0
Zambia 1993 0 0 .... 10.97561 .... 0
Zambia 1994 0 0 .... 12.38095 .... 0
Zambia 1995 0 0 .... 6.744186 .... 0
Zambia 1996 0 0 .... 7.727273 .... 0
Zambia 1997 0 0 .... 6.292135 .... 0
Zimbabwe 1987 0 0 39.06 4.725275 0.036678 0
Zimbabwe 1988 0 0 39.75 4.408602 0.045612 0
Zimbabwe 1989 0 0 39.53 39.8913 0.042478 0
Zimbabwe 1990 0 0 40.04 35.10417 0.048488 0
Zimbabwe 1991 0 0 39.78 33.83838 0.044747 0
Zimbabwe 1992 0 0 44.69 33.66337 0.183827 0
Zimbabwe 1993 0 0 40.14 29.70588 0.046899 0
Zimbabwe 1994 0 0 41.13 25.86538 0.060959 1
Zimbabwe 1995 0 0 41.3 23.67925 0.063481 0
Zimbabwe 1996 0 0 41.51 24.24528 0.067338 1
Zimbabwe 1997 0 0 42.06 26.69811 0.077741 0
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Country year Food Cost civilwar interwar fim_ti aid_gni
Afghanistan 1974 0.08 0 0 22.88 2.28
Afghanistan 1975 0.06 0 0 24.42 2.98
Afghanistan 1976 0.03 0 0 16.32 2.85
Afghanistan 1977 0.05 0 0 15.35 2.91
Afghanistan 1978 0.05 1 0 ... 2.52
Afghanistan 1979 0.05 1 0 15.15 2.85
Afghanistan 1980 0.07 1 0 14.63 0.87
Afghanistan 1981 0.21 1 0 16.30 0.65
Afghanistan 1982 0.18 1 0 14.41 ...
Afghanistan 1983 0.15 1 0 10.39 ...
Afghanistan 1984 0.16 1 0 ... ...
Afghanistan 1985 0.17 1 0 ... ...
Afghanistan 1986 0.10 1 0 ... ...
Afghanistan 1987 0.10 1 0 ... ...
Afghanistan 1988 0.11 1 0 ... ...
Algeria 1967 0.49 0 1 29.42 3.19
Algeria 1968 0.44 0 1 19.30 3.15
Algeria 1969 0.38 0 0 15.71 3.09
Algeria 1970 0.33 0 0 12.74 2.58
Algeria 1971 0.33 0 0 15.63 2.40
Algeria 1972 0.30 0 0 19.10 1.64
Algeria 1973 0.26 0 0 16.09 1.36
Algeria 1974 0.26 0 0 19.82 0.92
Algeria 1975 0.26 0 0 21.70 1.14
Algeria 1976 0.25 0 1 17.64 0.79
Algeria 1977 0.25 0 1 17.18 0.60
Algeria 1978 0.28 0 0 16.61 0.51
Algeria 1979 0.28 0 0 18.52 0.32
Algeria 1980 0.28 0 0 20.96 0.43
Algeria 1981 0 0 20.74 0.39
Algeria 1982 0 0 20.69 0.31
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Algeria 1983 0 0 21.22 0.20
Algeria 1984 0.25 0 0 19.20 0.23
Algeria 1985 0.21 0 0 25.42 0.31
Algeria 1986 0.21 0 0 21.95 0.27
Algeria 1987 0.17 0 0 27.35 0.33
Algeria 1988 0.23 1 0 27.50 0.30
Algeria 1989 0.22 1 0 35.24 0.29
Algeria 1990 0.24 1 0 23.69 0.44
Algeria 1991 0.23 1 0 26.07 0.78
Algeria 1992 0.25 1 0 28.51 0.89
Algeria 1993 0.28 1 0 27.36 0.72
Algeria 1994 0.28 1 0 33.04 1.03
Algeria 1995 0.39 1 0 29.45 0.79
Algeria 1996 0.47 1 0 31.27 0.69
Algeria 1997 0.58 1 0 31.82 0.55
Angola 1960 0.22 0 0 ... ...
Angola 1961 0.22 0 0 ... ...
Angola 1962 0.21 0 0 19.34 ...
Angola 1963 0.21 0 0 19.21 ...
Angola 1964 0.21 0 0 19.58 ...
Angola 1965 0.27 0 0 17.97 ...
Angola 1992 0.21 1 0 ... 9.86
Angola 1993 0.27 1 0 ... 8.99
Bangladesh 1967 0.00 0 0 ... ...
Bangladesh 1968 0.00 0 0 ... ...
Bangladesh 1969 0.00 0 0 ... ...
Bangladesh 1970 0.00 0 1 ... ...
Bangladesh 1971 0.00 0 1 ... ...
Bangladesh 1972 0.00 0 0 ... ...
Bangladesh 1973 0.00 1 0 ... 5.21
Bangladesh 1974 0.00 1 0 50.92 4.20
Bangladesh 1975 0.00 1 0 52.55 5.31
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Bangladesh 1976 0.00 1 0 41.91 5.23
Bangladesh 1977 0.00 1 0 17.61 7.98
Bangladesh 1978 0.00 1 0 20.59 7.47
Bangladesh 1979 0.00 1 0 25.31 7.49
Bangladesh 1980 0.00 1 0 23.63 7.27
Bangladesh 1981 0.00 1 0 20.19 5.66
Bangladesh 1982 0.00 1 0 25.97 7.63
Bangladesh 1983 0.00 1 0 19.96 6.29
Bangladesh 1984 0.00 1 0 28.99 6.21
Bangladesh 1985 0.00 1 0 24.25 5.34
Bangladesh 1986 0.00 1 0 19.36 6.78
Bangladesh 1987 0.00 1 0 29.92 7.52
Bangladesh 1988 0.00 1 0 27.19 6.25
Bangladesh 1989 0.00 1 0 24.14 6.72
Bangladesh 1990 0.00 1 0 18.95 6.98
Bangladesh 1991 0.00 1 0 17.34 6.10
Bangladesh 1992 0.00 1 0 18.27 5.76
Burundi 1971 0.04 1 0 20.68 8.93
Burundi 1972 0.05 1 0 16.05 10.99
Burundi 1973 0.07 1 0 21.41 9.09
Burundi 1974 0.06 0 0 18.48 11.15
Burundi 1975 0.04 0 0 21.57 11.67
Burundi 1976 0.07 1 0 16.19 10.18
Burundi 1977 0.06 1 0 19.04 8.98
Burundi 1978 0.09 0 0 17.07 12.51
Burundi 1979 0.10 0 0 ... 12.32
Burundi 1980 0.09 0 1 13.21 12.73
Burundi 1983 0.09 0 1 11.08 12.99
Burundi 1986 0.09 0 0 ... 16.36
Burundi 1987 0.20 1 0 ... 17.91
Burundi 1988 0.18 1 0 ... 19.05
Burundi 1989 0.18 0 0 ... 18.91
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Burundi 1990 0.33 0 0 ... 23.64
Burundi 1991 0.37 0 0 ... 22.30
Chad 1975 0.18 1 0 14.52 8.04
Chile 1963 0.15 0 0 21.44 2.69
Chile 1964 0.14 0 0 20.71 2.34
Chile 1965 0.14 0 0 20.07 1.92
Chile 1966 0.14 0 0 18.53 1.98
Chile 1967 0.14 0 0 16.77 1.52
Chile 1968 0.12 0 0 17.21 1.27
Chile 1969 0.12 0 1 16.97 1.24
Chile 1970 0.12 0 0 14.64 0.86
Chile 1971 0.12 0 0 17.73 0.47
Chile 1972 0.13 0 0 23.42 0.45
Chile 1973 0.13 1 0 25.82 0.31
Chile 1974 0.14 1 0 32.66 0.16
Chile 1975 0.16 0 0 18.53 1.85
Chile 1976 0.16 0 0 25.57 0.09
Chile 1977 0.19 0 0 12.42 0.08
Chile 1978 0.17 0 0 16.67 0.05
Chile 1979 0.18 0 0 12.70 -0.14
Chile 1980 0.18 0 0 15.03 -0.04
Chile 1981 0.18 0 0 11.97 -0.02
Chile 1982 0.19 0 0 16.21 -0.04
Chile 1983 0.20 0 0 17.98 0.00
Chile 1984 0.20 0 0 13.54 0.01
Chile 1985 0.19 0 0 8.31 0.28
Chile 1986 0.20 0 0 5.08 -0.03
Chile 1987 0.20 0 0 4.81 0.11
Chile 1988 0.21 0 0 5.29 0.20
Chile 1989 0.21 0 0 3.58 0.24
Chile 1990 0.21 0 0 4.38 0.36
Chile 1991 0.21 0 0 5.79 0.37
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Chile 1992 0.21 0 0 6.31 0.33
Chile 1993 0.20 0 0 5.99 0.41
Chile 1994 0.21 0 0 6.94 0.31
Chile 1995 0.21 0 0 6.72 0.25
Chile 1996 0.21 0 0 7.16 0.30
Chile 1997 0.21 0 0 6.73 0.18
Chile 1998 0.20 0 1 ... 0.15
China 1977 0.06 0 1 ... ...
China 1978 0.06 0 1 ... ...
China 1979 0.06 0 1 ... 0.01
China 1980 0.06 0 0 ... 0.03
China 1981 0.06 0 0 ... 0.25
China 1982 0.07 0 0 ... 0.26
China 1983 0.07 0 0 ... 0.29
China 1984 0.07 0 0 9.03 0.31
China 1985 0.07 0 0 ... 0.31
China 1986 0.07 0 0 ... 0.37
Colombia 1963 0.22 0 0 5.50 1.52
Colombia 1964 0.22 0 0 9.05 0.88
Colombia 1965 0.24 0 0 8.35 0.61
Colombia 1966 0.25 0 0 10.72 1.68
Colombia 1967 0.26 0 0 7.35 1.90
Colombia 1968 0.22 0 0 7.70 3.27
Colombia 1969 0.22 0 0 7.96 1.92
Colombia 1970 0.25 1 0 7.69 2.29
Colombia 1971 0.20 1 0 10.31 1.72
Colombia 1972 0.21 1 0 8.65 1.42
Colombia 1973 0.20 1 0 12.09 1.48
Colombia 1974 0.22 1 0 13.32 0.90
Colombia 1975 0.25 1 0 9.42 0.67
Colombia 1976 0.23 1 0 12.21 0.51
Colombia 1977 0.23 1 0 12.44 0.26
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Colombia 1978 0.26 1 0 10.73 0.31
Colombia 1979 0.25 1 0 10.54 0.20
Colombia 1980 0.29 1 0 11.71 0.27
Colombia 1981 0.31 1 0 10.21 0.28
Colombia 1982 0.34 1 0 10.72 0.26
Colombia 1983 0.38 1 0 10.91 0.23
Colombia 1984 0.36 1 0 10.23 0.24
Colombia 1985 0.35 1 0 9.49 0.19
Colombia 1986 0.35 1 0 8.70 0.19
Colombia 1987 0.35 1 0 7.95 0.22
Colombia 1988 0.37 1 0 8.69 0.17
Colombia 1989 0.38 1 0 6.92 0.18
Colombia 1990 0.39 1 0 7.07 0.23
Colombia 1991 0.39 1 0 6.69 0.29
Colombia 1992 0.43 1 0 9.31 0.49
Colombia 1993 0.41 1 1 7.61 0.16
Colombia 1994 0.43 1 1 8.84 0.10
Colombia 1995 0.42 1 0 9.39 0.19
Colombia 1996 0.45 1 0 12.57 0.20
Colombia 1997 0.47 1 0 11.13 0.19
Colombia 1998 0.45 1 0 ... 0.17
Congo, Rep. 1968 0.94 0 0 14.74 8.61
Congo, Rep. 1969 0.90 0 0 17.09 6.62
Congo, Rep. 1970 0.92 0 0 20.11 6.16
Congo, Rep. 1971 0.87 0 0 16.27 5.51
Congo, Rep. 1972 0.82 0 0 18.08 5.74
Congo, Rep. 1973 0 0 14.54 5.13
Congo, Rep. 1974 0 0 16.97 6.68
Congo, Rep. 1975 0.81 0 0 16.39 7.64
Congo, Rep. 1976 0.42 0 0 16.51 10.18
Congo, Rep. 1981 0.59 0 0 11.01 4.30
Congo, Rep. 1982 0.37 0 0 9.65 4.60
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Congo, Rep. 1983 0.26 0 0 14.22 5.62
Congo, Rep. 1984 0.39 0 0 19.03 4.68
Congo, Rep. 1985 0.35 0 1 19.13 3.41
Congo, Rep. 1986 0.53 0 1 18.51 5.70
Congo, Rep. 1987 0.53 0 1 ... 6.36
Congo, Rep. 1988 0.52 0 1 ... 4.55
Cyprus 1963 0.17 1 0 18.47 ...
Cyprus 1964 0.16 0 0 26.16 ...
Cyprus 1965 0.16 0 0 20.58 ...
Cyprus 1966 0.15 0 0 19.89 ...
Cyprus 1967 0.16 0 0 19.22 ...
Cyprus 1968 0.16 0 0 15.73 ...
Cyprus 1969 0.16 0 0 16.76 ...
Cyprus 1970 0.16 0 0 16.85 ...
Cyprus 1971 0.17 0 0 15.80 ...
Cyprus 1972 0.15 0 0 17.13 ...
Cyprus 1973 0.14 0 0 23.58 ...
Cyprus 1974 0.14 1 0 19.64 ...
Cyprus 1975 0.14 0 0 26.18 4.49
Cyprus 1976 0.13 0 0 24.30 6.91
Cyprus 1977 0.12 0 0 17.63 9.07
Cyprus 1978 0.12 0 0 17.19 3.53
Cyprus 1979 0.11 0 0 15.45 1.69
Cyprus 1980 0.11 0 0 14.78 2.43
Cyprus 1981 0.11 0 0 16.27 2.10
Cyprus 1982 0.11 0 0 15.25 1.43
Cyprus 1983 0.11 0 0 17.27 0.88
Cyprus 1984 0.12 0 0 15.15 0.76
Cyprus 1985 0.12 0 1 15.13 1.54
Cyprus 1986 0.13 0 1 15.92 1.14
Cyprus 1987 0.12 0 1 14.02 1.10
Cyprus 1988 0.13 0 0 13.61 1.02
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Cyprus 1989 0.13 0 0 12.96 0.87
Cyprus 1990 0.13 0 0 14.51 0.68
Cyprus 1991 0.13 0 0 16.71 0.68
Cyprus 1992 0.14 0 0 16.38 0.38
Cyprus 1993 0.15 0 0 17.59 0.51
Cyprus 1994 0.16 0 0 18.36 0.59
Cyprus 1995 0.18 0 0 20.53 0.24
Cyprus 1996 0.20 0 0 24.64 0.25
Cyprus 1997 0.20 0 0 27.14 0.49
Cyprus 1998 0.21 0 0 ... 0.38
Dominica 1963 0.76 0 0 ... ...
Dominica 1964 0.79 0 0 ... ...
Dominica 1965 0.76 1 0 ... ...
Dominica 1966 0.74 0 0 ... ...
Dominica 1967 0.71 0 0 ... ...
Dominica 1968 0.71 0 0 ... ...
Dominica 1969 0.70 0 0 ... ...
Dominica 1970 0.71 0 0 28.43 ...
Dominican R 1971 0.70 0 0 28.83 ...
Dominican R 1972 0.68 1 0 33.45 ...
Dominican R 1973 0.63 1 0 33.07 0.36
Dominican R 1974 0.63 0 0 35.47 12.92
Dominican R 1975 0.66 0 0 35.26 26.84
Dominican R 1976 0.62 0 0 37.60 15.36
Dominican R 1977 0.59 0 0 35.07 13.64
Dominican R 1978 0.57 0 0 34.73 15.88
Dominican R 1979 0.55 0 0 32.67 20.66
Dominican R 1980 0.54 0 1 27.34 29.80
Dominican R 1981 0.56 0 0 31.03 22.92
Dominican R 1982 0.58 0 0 25.46 23.90
Dominican R 1983 0.55 0 0 29.12 12.86
Dominican R 1984 0.53 0 0 ... 18.89
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Dominican R 1985 0.51 0 0 26.36 18.06
Egypt 1964 0.10 0 0 30.47 4.74
Egypt 1965 0.12 0 0 28.48 2.23
Egypt 1966 0.11 0 1 28.58 1.35
Egypt 1967 0.12 0 1 41.99 0.54
Egypt 1968 0.12 0 1 33.96 0.42
Egypt 1969 0.13 0 0 26.14 0.17
Egypt 1970 0.14 0 0 23.22 2.26
Egypt 1971 0.14 0 0 29.57 1.55
Egypt 1972 0.13 0 0 28.67 1.48
Egypt 1973 0.13 0 1 31.67 7.96
Egypt 1974 0.13 0 0 44.27 14.06
Egypt 1975 0.13 0 0 35.92 19.70
Egypt 1976 0.13 0 0 28.32 15.48
Egypt 1977 0.13 0 1 23.12 16.54
Egypt 1978 0.14 0 0 25.85 16.72
Egypt 1979 0.14 1 0 26.16 8.49
Egypt 1980 0.14 1 0 32.39 6.46
Egypt 1981 0.14 1 0 34.20 5.94
Egypt 1982 0.14 1 0 30.77 6.05
Egypt 1983 0.14 1 0 25.54 5.55
Egypt 1984 0.15 1 0 27.68 6.21
Egypt 1985 0.15 1 0 27.08 5.60
Egypt 1986 0.15 1 0 30.02 5.22
Egypt 1987 0.15 1 0 27.33 4.32
Egypt 1988 0.15 1 0 26.52 4.30
Egypt 1989 0.15 1 0 31.80 3.95
Egypt 1990 0.15 1 0 31.54 12.94
Egypt 1991 0.16 0 1 25.26 13.72
Egypt 1992 0.13 0 0 29.39 8.67
Egypt 1993 0.13 0 0 23.90 5.14
Egypt 1994 0.13 0 0 27.50 5.20
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Egypt 1995 0.13 0 0 28.38 3.34
Egypt 1996 0.13 0 0 29.47 3.23
Egypt 1997 0.14 0 0 26.42 2.59
Egypt 1998 0.13 0 0 ... 2.33
El Salvador 1960 1 0 ... 0.06
El Salvador 1961 0 0 ... 1.10
El Salvador 1962 0 0 19.76 0.79
El Salvador 1963 0.77 0 0 17.14 1.72
El Salvador 1964 0.71 0 0 14.79 1.55
El Salvador 1965 0.53 0 0 15.66 1.62
El Salvador 1966 0.77 1 0 16.32 2.15
El Salvador 1967 0.66 1 0 14.76 1.46
El Salvador 1968 0.44 0 1 17.63 1.36
El Salvador 1969 0.61 0 1 15.45 1.23
El Salvador 1970 0.66 0 1 13.91 1.33
El Salvador 1971 0.56 0 0 12.57 1.09
El Salvador 1972 0.37 0 0 10.64 1.46
El Salvador 1973 0.37 0 0 12.15 1.61
El Salvador 1974 0.37 0 0 10.34 1.82
El Salvador 1975 0.34 0 0 12.18 2.26
El Salvador 1976 0.34 0 0 11.19 1.30
El Salvador 1977 0.36 1 0 10.31 1.55
El Salvador 1978 0.23 1 0 11.52 1.80
El Salvador 1979 0.46 1 0 12.80 1.74
El Salvador 1980 0.43 0 0 17.73 2.76
El Salvador 1981 0.40 0 0 16.48 5.02
El Salvador 1982 0.35 0 0 17.89 6.67
El Salvador 1983 0.38 0 0 17.00 8.60
El Salvador 1984 0.24 0 0 12.97 7.40
El Salvador 1985 0.28 0 0 15.51 9.37
Ethiopia 1965 0.32 0 0 ... ...
Ethiopia 1966 0.33 0 0 ... ...
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Ethiopia 1967 0.29 0 0 ... ...
Ethiopia 1968 0.24 0 0 ... ...
Ethiopia 1969 0.18 0 0 ... ...
Ethiopia 1970 0.14 0 0 ... ...
Ethiopia 1971 0.16 0 0 ... ...
Ethiopia 1972 0.19 0 0 ... ...
Ethiopia 1973 0.22 0 0 ... ...
Ethiopia 1974 0.25 0 1 ... ...
Ethiopia 1975 0.29 0 1 ... ...
Ethiopia 1976 0.23 0 1 ... ...
Ethiopia 1977 0.14 0 1 ... ...
Ethiopia 1978 0.14 0 1 ... ...
Ethiopia 1979 0.23 0 1 ... ...
Ethiopia 1980 0.22 0 1 ... ...
Ethiopia 1981 0.20 0 1 ... 4.74
Ethiopia 1982 0.21 0 1 ... 3.67
Ethiopia 1983 0.21 0 1 ... 5.61
Ethiopia 1984 0.19 0 1 ... 6.33
Ethiopia 1985 0.23 0 1 ... 10.65
Ethiopia 1986 0.23 0 1 ... 9.08
Ethiopia 1987 0.20 0 1 ... 8.47
Ethiopia 1988 0.20 0 1 ... 12.64
Ethiopia 1989 0.21 0 1 ... 9.47
Ethiopia 1990 0.21 0 1 ... 14.96
Ethiopia 1991 0.23 0 1 ... 20.74
Ethiopia 1992 0.20 0 0 ... 21.33
Ethiopia 1993 0.21 0 0 16.04 17.71
Ethiopia 1994 0.22 0 0 ... 22.21
Ethiopia 1995 0.21 0 0 13.83 15.44
Ethiopia 1996 0.26 0 0 ... 13.71
Ethiopia 1997 0.28 0 0 2.43 9.20
Ethiopia 1998 0.18 0 0 ... 10.24
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Georgia 1990 0 0 ... 78.35
Georgia 1991 1 0 ... 82.27
Georgia 1992 1 0 ... 86.38
Georgia 1993 1 0 ... 90.70
Georgia 1994 1 0 ... 95.24
Georgia 1995 0 0 ... 100.00
Georgia 1996 0 0 ... 104.21
Georgia 1997 0 0 ... 109.07
Georgia 1998 0 0 ... 113.30
Guatemala 1968 0.51 0 0 12.69 1.05
Guatemala 1969 0.51 0 0 11.01 1.04
Guatemala 1970 0.56 0 0 9.73 1.18
Guatemala 1971 0.58 0 0 10.98 1.01
Guatemala 1972 0.66 0 0 10.11 1.32
Guatemala 1973 0.69 0 0 9.01 1.06
Guatemala 1974 0.60 0 0 8.46 0.86
Guatemala 1975 0.65 0 0 8.30 1.12
Guatemala 1976 0.65 0 0 9.49 1.51
Guatemala 1977 0.66 0 0 5.87 1.13
Guatemala 1978 0.66 0 ... 6.18 1.18
Guatemala 1979 0.67 0 0 6.93 0.97
Guatemala 1980 0.69 0 0 7.01 0.93
Guatemala 1981 0.65 0 0 7.57 0.88
Guatemala 1982 0.67 1 0 6.24 0.74
Guatemala 1983 0.67 1 0 8.63 0.85
Guatemala 1984 0.68 1 0 8.59 0.71
Guatemala 1985 0.70 1 0 7.28 0.87
Guatemala 1986 0.68 1 0 9.17 1.92
Guatemala 1987 0.66 1 0 12.11 3.49
Guatemala 1988 0.63 1 0 10.58 3.07
Guatemala 1989 0.63 1 0 11.67 3.19
Guatemala 1990 0.66 1 0 12.88 2.68
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Guatemala 1991 0.68 1 0 10.22 2.09
Guatemala 1992 0.73 1 0 11.98 1.89
Guatemala 1993 0.74 1 0 11.11 1.87
Guatemala 1994 0.76 1 0 11.10 1.71
Guatemala 1995 0.79 1 0 13.30 1.45
Guatemala 1996 0.82 0 0 11.85 1.25
Guatemala 1997 0.77 0 0 14.28 1.51
Haiti 1968 0.41 0 0 24.93 1.65
Haiti 1969 0.44 0 0 27.89 1.40
Haiti 1970 0.45 0 0 20.81 2.02
Haiti 1971 0.45 0 0 24.11 1.42
Haiti 1972 0.42 0 0 25.56 1.45
Haiti 1973 0.38 0 0 24.94 1.45
Haiti 1974 0.35 0 0 24.02 2.06
Haiti 1975 0.30 0 0 28.72 8.30
Haiti 1976 0.24 0 0 30.90 8.23
Haiti 1977 0.22 0 0 27.84 8.98
Haiti 1978 0.22 0 0 25.63 9.42
Haiti 1979 0.26 0 0 23.57 8.37
Haiti 1980 0.25 0 1 21.54 7.27
Haiti 1981 0.23 0 1 26.10 7.35
Haiti 1982 0.22 0 0 22.71 8.68
Haiti 1983 0.22 0 0 19.26 8.29
Haiti 1984 0.25 0 0 ... 7.40
Haiti 1985 0.25 0 0 ... 7.53
Haiti 1986 0.27 0 0 ... 8.16
Haiti 1987 0.22 0 0 ... 9.97
Haiti 1988 0.22 0 0 ... 6.49
India 1963 0.07 0 0 15.20 2.34
India 1964 0.07 0 0 16.86 2.49
India 1965 0.08 0 1 22.01 2.15
India 1966 0.08 0 0 34.15 2.61
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India 1967 0.08 0 0 32.09 2.73
India 1968 0.08 0 0 25.04 1.75
India 1969 0.09 0 0 23.30 1.55
India 1970 0.09 0 0 20.92 1.36
India 1971 0.09 0 1 14.58 1.53
India 1972 0.09 0 1 9.60 0.88
India 1973 0.09 0 0 20.07 0.93
India 1974 0.10 0 0 19.69 1.27
India 1975 0.12 0 0 25.78 1.64
India 1976 0.13 0 0 27.48 1.40
India 1977 0.13 0 0 16.43 0.83
India 1978 0.13 0 0 13.85 0.84
India 1979 0.12 0 0 8.92 0.91
India 1980 0.14 0 0 8.99 1.20
India 1981 0.15 0 0 8.54 1.04
India 1982 0.15 0 0 ... 0.84
India 1983 0.12 0 0 11.66 0.87
India 1984 0.12 0 0 10.18 0.81
India 1985 0.13 0 0 8.41 0.70
India 1986 0.12 0 0 7.04 0.82
India 1987 0.14 0 0 8.44 0.62
India 1988 0.15 0 0 8.05 0.67
India 1989 0.16 1 0 3.51 0.61
India 1990 0.17 1 0 3.24 0.45
India 1991 0.18 1 0 2.70 1.04
India 1992 0.18 1 0 3.82 0.95
India 1993 0.18 1 0 3.13 0.54
India 1994 0.18 1 0 6.03 0.73
India 1995 0.17 0 0 4.31 0.50
India 1996 0.18 0 0 4.71 0.50
India 1997 0.18 0 0 5.62 0.41
India 1998 0.18 0 0 ... 0.39
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Indonesia 1970 0.31 0 0 15.37 4.80
Indonesia 1971 0.35 0 0 9.42 5.98
Indonesia 1972 0.27 0 1 9.94 4.39
Indonesia 1973 0.25 0 1 10.32 3.65
Indonesia 1974 0.25 0 0 14.97 2.51
Indonesia 1975 0.20 1 0 12.50 2.21
Indonesia 1976 0.17 1 0 14.57 1.72
Indonesia 1977 0.17 1 0 16.34 1.08
Indonesia 1978 0.16 1 0 17.64 1.19
Indonesia 1979 0.16 1 0 16.00 1.37
Indonesia 1980 0.16 1 0 12.68 1.27
Indonesia 1981 0.15 1 0 11.05 1.09
Indonesia 1982 0.14 1 0 7.16 1.01
Indonesia 1983 0.14 0 0 7.73 0.91
Indonesia 1984 0.14 0 0 6.50 0.82
Indonesia 1985 0.16 0 0 6.91 0.73
Indonesia 1986 0.16 1 0 7.17 0.94
Indonesia 1987 0.17 0 0 7.00 1.73
Indonesia 1988 0.15 0 0 7.66 1.93
Indonesia 1989 0.16 0 0 7.60 1.90
Indonesia 1990 0.12 0 0 5.05 1.59
Indonesia 1991 0.12 0 0 5.47 1.53
Indonesia 1992 0.10 0 0 6.36 1.56
Indonesia 1993 0.12 0 0 6.46 1.32
Indonesia 1994 0.10 0 0 7.76 0.95
Indonesia 1995 0.13 0 0 8.84 0.71
Indonesia 1996 0.11 0 0 10.79 0.51
Iran 1963 0.16 0 0 13.49 ...
Iran 1964 0.13 0 0 16.19 ...
Iran 1965 0.15 0 0 16.11 ...
Iran 1966 0.14 0 0 9.91 ...
Iran 1967 0.20 0 0 7.46 ...
Table C.69: The Food Cost Data
186
Iran 1968 0.21 0 0 8.04 ...
Iran 1969 0.21 0 0 4.92 ...
Iran 1970 0.21 0 0 6.55 ...
Iran 1971 0.22 0 0 10.65 ...
Iran 1972 0.20 0 0 10.55 ...
Iran 1973 0.19 0 0 10.49 ...
Iran 1974 0.18 0 0 18.38 0.02
Iran 1975 0.19 0 0 16.26 -0.01
Iran 1976 0.20 0 0 11.10 -0.02
Iran 1977 0.22 0 0 12.70 0.05
Iran 1978 0.22 1 0 ... 0.17
Iran 1979 0.14 1 0 16.13 0.01
Iran 1980 0.15 0 1 20.85 0.03
Iran 1981 0.13 0 1 23.83 0.01
Iran 1982 0.14 0 1 18.05 0.00
Iran 1983 0.14 0 1 12.10 0.03
Iran 1984 0.13 0 1 ... 0.01
Iran 1985 0.12 0 1 ... 0.01
Iran 1986 0.14 0 1 ... 0.01
Iran 1987 0.14 0 1 ... 0.05
Iran 1988 0.12 0 1 ... 0.06
Iran 1989 0.13 0 0 ... 0.08
Iran 1990 0.11 0 0 ... 0.09
Iran 1991 0.12 0 0 ... ...
Iran 1992 0.13 0 0 ... ...
Iran 1993 0.14 0 0 ... 0.25
Iraq 1963 0.17 0 0 23.48 0.20
Iraq 1964 0.17 0 0 22.20 0.50
Iraq 1965 0.16 0 0 28.93 0.35
Iraq 1966 0.17 0 0 24.34 0.06
Iraq 1967 0.20 0 0 18.58 0.05
Iraq 1968 0.21 0 0 22.11 0.07
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Iraq 1969 0.20 0 0 23.66 0.13
Iraq 1970 0.27 0 0 20.38 0.23
Iraq 1971 0.27 0 0 17.71 0.40
Iraq 1972 0.27 0 0 31.26 0.43
Iraq 1973 0.36 0 1 19.62 0.21
Iraq 1974 0.26 0 0 23.96 0.04
Iraq 1975 0.27 1 0 28.68 0.41
Iraq 1976 0.30 0 0 17.51 0.04
Iraq 1977 0.30 0 0 14.94 0.31
Iraq 1978 0.27 0 0 14.55 0.19
Iraq 1979 0.26 0 0 12.58 0.04
Iraq 1980 0.26 0 1 11.73 0.02
Iraq 1981 0.26 0 1 13.30 0.03
Iraq 1982 0.25 0 1 9.11 0.02
Iraq 1983 0.28 0 1 10.09 0.03
Iraq 1984 0.23 0 1 15.83 0.01
Iraq 1985 0.25 0 1 ... 0.06
Iraq 1986 0.26 0 1 ... 0.08
Iraq 1987 0.26 0 1 ... 0.21
Iraq 1988 0 1 ... 0.02
Iraq 1989 0.26 0 0 ... 0.02
Iraq 1990 0.20 0 0 ... 0.13
Iraq 1991 0.14 0 0 ... ...
Iraq 1992 0.14 0 1 ... ...
Israel 1963 0.13 0 1 18.22 3.79
Israel 1964 0.14 0 1 15.79 2.80
Israel 1965 0.13 0 1 16.48 3.35
Israel 1966 0.14 0 1 20.00 2.61
Israel 1967 0.14 0 1 18.99 1.61
Israel 1968 0.13 0 1 14.81 1.58
Israel 1969 0.12 0 1 12.92 1.22
Israel 1970 0.11 0 1 14.03 1.20
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Israel 1971 0.11 0 1 13.68 1.32
Israel 1972 0.11 0 1 12.73 1.21
Israel 1973 0.11 0 1 13.35 2.07
Israel 1974 0.11 0 1 13.49 0.96
Israel 1975 0.10 0 1 15.53 3.93
Israel 1976 0.10 0 1 14.15 5.35
Israel 1977 0.11 0 1 13.13 5.94
Israel 1978 0.10 0 1 10.71 6.81
Israel 1979 0.09 0 1 11.37 7.04
Israel 1980 0.09 0 1 10.70 4.24
Israel 1981 0.10 0 1 12.44 3.41
Israel 1982 0.11 0 1 11.04 3.60
Israel 1983 0.11 0 1 10.09 5.06
Israel 1984 0.10 0 1 10.68 5.04
Israel 1985 0.09 0 1 9.58 8.54
Israel 1986 0.10 0 1 9.22 6.76
Israel 1987 0.11 0 1 7.89 3.64
Israel 1988 0.12 0 1 8.82 2.90
Israel 1989 0.11 0 1 9.10 2.74
Israel 1990 0.11 0 1 7.85 2.68
Israel 1991 0.10 0 1 7.43 3.01
Israel 1992 0.10 0 1 7.16 3.20
Israel 1993 0.10 0 1 6.82 1.95
Israel 1994 0.10 0 1 6.88 1.68
Israel 1995 0.10 0 1 6.61 0.39
Israel 1996 0.10 0 1 6.88 2.33
Jordan 1963 0.16 0 0 33.76 ...
Jordan 1964 0.16 0 0 29.43 ...
Jordan 1965 0.16 0 0 29.75 8.15
Jordan 1966 0.16 0 0 30.00 8.04
Jordan 1967 0.16 0 0 29.93 5.21
Jordan 1968 0.13 0 0 31.20 7.94
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Jordan 1969 0.14 0 0 29.42 6.78
Jordan 1970 0.17 0 0 31.04 12.18
Jordan 1971 0.09 1 0 30.19 8.28
Jordan 1972 0 0 31.47 12.89
Jordan 1973 0 0 31.46 19.60
Jordan 1974 0.11 0 1 29.17 22.33
Jordan 1975 0.12 0 0 22.40 30.20
Jordan 1976 0.12 0 0 25.83 28.13
Jordan 1977 0.11 0 0 18.27 17.40
Jordan 1978 0.13 0 0 21.35 16.80
Jordan 1979 0.09 0 0 20.16 39.38
Jordan 1980 0.09 0 0 18.16 31.82
Jordan 1981 0.09 0 0 17.08 23.49
Jordan 1982 0.08 0 0 18.22 16.24
Jordan 1983 0.08 0 0 17.71 15.49
Jordan 1984 0.09 0 0 19.73 13.49
Jordan 1985 0.10 0 0 18.81 10.69
Jordan 1986 0.11 0 0 21.78 9.34
Jordan 1987 0.10 0 0 18.99 9.16
Jordan 1988 0.10 0 0 19.24 7.26
Jordan 1989 0.12 0 0 16.99 7.03
Jordan 1990 0.13 0 0 26.10 23.33
Jordan 1991 0.14 0 0 26.95 24.03
Jordan 1992 0.13 0 0 21.23 8.47
Jordan 1993 0.13 0 0 20.15 5.75
Jordan 1994 0.13 0 0 21.73 6.22
Jordan 1995 0.13 0 0 20.77 8.27
Jordan 1996 0.12 0 0 ... 7.54
Jordan 1997 0.13 0 0 23.91 6.50
Jordan 1998 0 0 ... 5.26
Kenya 1960 0 0 ... 2.70
Kenya 1961 0 0 ... 8.17
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Kenya 1962 0 0 ... 5.71
Kenya 1963 0.19 0 1 ... 6.08
Kenya 1964 0.19 0 1 ... 5.62
Kenya 1965 0.20 0 0 ... 7.21
Kenya 1966 0.21 0 0 12.83 4.66
Kenya 1967 0.19 0 0 5.73 2.84
Kenya 1968 0.19 0 0 6.17 4.71
Kenya 1969 0.19 0 0 5.46 3.98
Kenya 1970 0.19 0 0 5.92 3.73
Kenya 1971 0.18 0 0 8.75 3.91
Kenya 1972 0.20 0 0 9.75 3.53
Kenya 1973 0.20 0 0 9.81 4.02
Kenya 1974 0.20 0 0 6.98 4.13
Kenya 1975 0.21 0 0 6.04 4.11
Kenya 1976 0.22 0 0 7.87 4.88
Kenya 1977 0.21 0 0 5.84 3.78
Kenya 1978 0.22 0 0 6.86 4.89
Kenya 1979 0.20 0 0 6.32 5.99
Kenya 1980 0.20 0 0 7.73 5.63
Kenya 1981 0.19 0 0 6.13 6.77
Kenya 1982 0.21 0 0 7.71 7.84
Kenya 1983 0.21 0 0 9.45 6.89
Kenya 1984 0.25 0 0 12.20 6.79
Kenya 1985 0.23 0 0 9.70 7.27
Kenya 1986 0.24 0 0 9.27 6.37
Kenya 1987 0.19 0 0 7.19 7.31
Kenya 1988 0.20 0 0 6.24 10.25
Kenya 1989 0.19 0 0 ... 13.31
Kenya 1990 0.19 0 0 9.33 14.66
Kenya 1991 0.20 1 0 9.77 12.13
Kenya 1992 0.21 1 0 16.98 11.63
Kenya 1993 0.22 1 0 13.61 19.94
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Kenya 1994 0.23 0 0 19.78 10.03
Kenya 1995 0.23 0 0 10.09 8.45
Kenya 1996 0.24 0 0 12.03 6.60
Kenya 1997 0.24 0 0 16.69 4.31
Kenya 1998 0.24 0 0 ... 4.23
Kuwait 1967 0.06 0 0 17.34 -0.05
Kuwait 1968 0.06 0 0 19.85 0.00
Kuwait 1969 0.06 0 0 17.62 0.04
Kuwait 1970 0.08 0 0 19.79 0.04
Kuwait 1971 0.14 0 0 20.76 0.04
Kuwait 1972 0.13 0 0 20.50 0.04
Kuwait 1973 0.09 0 0 20.00 0.03
Kuwait 1974 0.08 0 0 17.79 0.01
Kuwait 1975 0.09 0 0 17.07 0.01
Kuwait 1976 0.12 0 0 14.28 0.01
Kuwait 1977 0.11 0 0 11.98 0.02
Kuwait 1978 0.11 0 0 14.61 0.02
Kuwait 1979 0.10 0 0 15.56 0.01
Kuwait 1980 0.10 0 0 14.80 0.03
Kuwait 1981 0.10 0 0 14.62 0.03
Kuwait 1982 0.09 0 0 13.61 0.02
Kuwait 1983 0.10 0 0 14.00 0.02
Kuwait 1984 0.10 0 0 17.42 0.02
Kuwait 1985 0.10 0 0 ... 0.02
Kuwait 1986 0.09 0 0 18.03 0.02
Kuwait 1987 0.08 0 0 19.64 0.01
Kuwait 1988 0.08 0 0 18.62 0.02
Kuwait 1989 0.08 0 0 19.71 0.01
Kuwait 1990 0.08 0 0 17.08 0.02
Kuwait 1991 0.06 0 1 10.72 0.03
Kuwait 1992 0.08 0 1 13.44 0.01
Kuwait 1993 0.07 0 1 15.14 0.00
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Kuwait 1994 0.07 0 1 17.01 0.01
Kuwait 1995 0.08 0 1 15.55 0.01
Kuwait 1996 0.09 0 1 15.77 0.01
Kuwait 1997 0.09 0 1 15.55 0.00
Liberia 1980 0.10 0 0 18.89 8.97
Liberia 1981 0.11 0 0 22.28 10.11
Liberia 1982 0.08 0 0 22.34 10.36
Liberia 1983 0.09 0 0 26.08 12.12
Liberia 1984 0.06 0 0 25.01 13.38
Liberia 1985 0.07 0 0 ... 8.79
Liberia 1986 0.08 0 0 ... 9.61
Libya 1964 0.18 0 0 15.56 1.87
Libya 1965 0.22 0 0 13.80 0.51
Libya 1966 0.17 0 0 15.66 0.07
Libya 1967 0.18 0 0 18.23 0.06
Libya 1968 0.16 0 0 13.79 0.24
Libya 1969 0.16 0 0 14.18 0.26
Libya 1970 0.16 0 0 22.59 0.15
Libya 1971 0.20 0 0 22.26 0.09
Libya 1972 0.19 0 0 16.69 0.13
Libya 1973 0.18 0 0 17.87 0.19
Libya 1974 0.18 0 0 17.35 0.10
Libya 1975 0.20 0 0 17.13 0.04
Libya 1976 0.19 0 0 14.80 0.06
Libya 1977 0.30 0 1 18.72 0.06
Libya 1978 0.29 0 0 16.62 0.07
Libya 1979 0.19 0 0 16.74 0.02
Libya 1980 0.17 0 0 19.29 0.05
Mexico 1984 0.08 0 0 16.03 0.05
Mexico 1985 0.08 0 0 12.44 0.08
Mexico 1986 0.08 0 0 9.06 0.21
Mexico 1987 0.08 0 0 10.78 0.12
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Mexico 1988 0.08 0 0 14.25 0.10
Mexico 1989 0.08 0 0 15.95 0.05
Mexico 1990 0.08 0 0 14.64 0.06
Mexico 1991 0.08 0 0 10.93 0.09
Mexico 1992 0.09 1 0 8.96 0.09
Mexico 1993 0.09 1 0 8.14 0.11
Mexico 1994 0.10 1 0 8.32 0.10
Mexico 1995 0.09 0 0 6.29 0.14
Mexico 1996 0.09 0 0 7.62 0.09
Mexico 1997 0.08 0 0 6.07 0.03
Mexico 1998 0.08 0 0 ... 0.01
Morocco 1967 0.30 0 0 31.49 1.98
Morocco 1968 0.32 0 0 26.67 2.87
Morocco 1969 0.12 0 0 18.57 2.15
Morocco 1970 0.11 0 0 20.66 2.17
Morocco 1971 0.11 0 0 24.83 3.06
Morocco 1972 0.11 0 0 21.57 2.02
Morocco 1973 0.11 0 0 27.79 1.52
Morocco 1974 0.11 0 0 28.19 1.51
Morocco 1975 0.11 0 1 29.61 2.68
Morocco 1976 0.10 0 1 19.95 2.23
Morocco 1977 0.09 0 1 16.98 5.15
Morocco 1978 0.08 0 1 19.81 3.27
Morocco 1979 0.09 0 1 19.19 3.03
Morocco 1980 0.09 0 1 19.79 4.88
Morocco 1981 0.08 0 1 23.43 6.99
Morocco 1982 0.08 0 1 16.30 5.11
Morocco 1983 0.08 0 1 17.64 2.92
Morocco 1984 0.20 0 1 20.54 2.78
Morocco 1985 0.18 0 1 17.50 6.27
Morocco 1986 0.18 0 0 15.89 2.31
Morocco 1987 0.19 0 0 13.45 2.34
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Morocco 1988 0.18 0 0 12.71 2.15
Morocco 1989 0.18 0 0 12.94 2.07
Morocco 1990 0.18 0 0 9.78 4.22
Morocco 1991 0.15 0 0 10.35 4.61
Morocco 1992 0.17 0 0 14.11 3.45
Mozambique 1963 0.26 0 0 17.09 ...
Mozambique 1964 0.28 0 0 17.48 ...
Mozambique 1965 0.27 0 0 17.32 ...
Mozambique 1966 0.27 0 0 17.26 ...
Mozambique 1967 0.29 0 0 16.91 ...
Mozambique 1968 0.27 0 0 16.88 ...
Mozambique 1969 0.29 0 0 15.52 ...
Mozambique 1970 0.27 0 0 13.49 ...
Mozambique 1971 0.33 0 0 13.71 ...
Mozambique 1972 0.33 0 0 10.00 ...
Mozambique 1990 0.30 1 0 ... 43.20
Mozambique 1991 0.33 1 0 ... 46.61
Mozambique 1992 0.32 1 0 ... 87.06
Mozambique 1993 0.33 0 0 ... 65.03
Mozambique 1994 0.32 0 0 17.93 60.48
Mozambique 1995 0.28 0 0 22.31 49.90
Mozambique 1996 0.18 0 0 22.03 33.22
Mozambique 1997 0.24 0 0 ... 29.46
Nicaragua 1965 0.36 0 0 12.62 1.75
Nicaragua 1966 0.42 0 0 10.65 2.73
Nicaragua 1967 0.35 0 0 9.60 2.50
Nicaragua 1968 0.44 0 0 11.16 2.62
Nicaragua 1969 0.48 0 0 9.34 2.65
Nicaragua 1970 0.48 0 0 9.81 3.32
Nicaragua 1971 0.47 0 0 10.54 2.53
Nicaragua 1972 0.64 1 0 11.69 1.69
Nicaragua 1973 0.74 1 0 12.67 3.33
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Nicaragua 1974 0.72 1 0 7.96 3.36
Nicaragua 1975 0.73 0 0 8.51 2.83
Nicaragua 1976 0.74 0 0 8.83 2.31
Nicaragua 1977 0.68 1 0 7.74 1.75
Nicaragua 1978 0.70 1 0 10.01 2.15
Nicaragua 1979 0.74 1 0 13.82 8.00
Nicaragua 1980 0.76 1 0 15.43 10.93
Nicaragua 1981 0.77 1 0 17.34 6.33
Nicaragua 1982 0.77 1 0 12.25 5.26
Nicaragua 1983 0.72 1 0 12.74 4.67
Nicaragua 1984 0.78 1 0 13.62 3.87
Nicaragua 1985 0.77 1 0 9.50 4.07
Nigeria 1963 0.06 0 0 12.14 0.35
Nigeria 1964 0.06 0 0 9.32 0.77
Nigeria 1965 0.08 0 0 9.17 1.27
Nigeria 1966 0.10 0 0 11.02 1.03
Nigeria 1967 0.07 0 0 10.47 1.32
Nigeria 1968 0.10 0 0 8.11 1.36
Nigeria 1969 0.10 0 0 8.79 1.33
Nigeria 1970 0.12 0 0 8.26 0.89
Nigeria 1971 0.11 0 0 8.63 1.26
Nigeria 1972 0.12 0 0 10.15 0.73
Nigeria 1973 0.11 0 0 10.85 0.55
Nigeria 1974 0.09 0 0 9.64 0.31
Nigeria 1975 0.12 0 0 9.53 0.30
Nigeria 1976 0.10 0 0 10.32 0.15
Nigeria 1977 0.09 0 0 13.04 0.12
Nigeria 1978 0.10 0 0 14.33 0.12
Nigeria 1979 0 0 17.15 0.06
Nigeria 1980 0.09 0 0 15.10 0.06
Nigeria 1981 0.10 0 0 15.64 0.07
Nigeria 1982 0.14 0 0 18.51 0.08
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Nigeria 1983 0.11 0 0 21.73 0.14
Nigeria 1984 0.10 0 0 21.76 0.12
Nigeria 1985 0.12 0 0 18.50 0.12
Nigeria 1991 0.39 0 0 6.36 1.05
Nigeria 1992 0.35 0 0 ... 0.87
Nigeria 1993 0.03 0 0 ... 1.47
Nigeria 1994 0.02 0 0 ... 0.89
Pakistan 1963 0.09 0 0 21.96 ...
Pakistan 1964 0.09 0 0 20.41 ...
Pakistan 1965 0.09 1 0 20.16 ...
Pakistan 1966 0.10 0 0 15.75 ...
Pakistan 1967 0.10 0 0 21.55 6.48
Pakistan 1968 0.10 0 0 19.01 4.99
Pakistan 1969 0.10 0 0 8.36 3.83
Pakistan 1970 0.10 0 0 20.91 4.24
Pakistan 1971 0.10 1 0 19.03 3.93
Pakistan 1972 0.11 0 0 30.17 3.32
Pakistan 1973 0.10 1 0 24.86 4.53
Pakistan 1974 0.10 0 0 23.18 5.11
Pakistan 1975 0.11 0 0 23.60 5.90
Pakistan 1976 0.11 0 0 20.90 7.68
Pakistan 1977 0.13 0 0 17.00 3.93
Pakistan 1978 0.13 0 0 19.32 3.60
Pakistan 1979 0.12 0 0 19.91 3.65
Pakistan 1980 0.13 0 0 13.03 5.05
Pakistan 1981 0.13 0 0 14.05 2.96
Pakistan 1982 0.14 0 0 13.57 3.01
Pakistan 1983 0.15 0 0 14.03 2.57
Pakistan 1984 0.14 0 0 17.08 2.38
Pakistan 1985 0.14 0 0 18.89 2.51
Pakistan 1986 0.14 0 0 17.85 2.93
Pakistan 1987 0.13 0 0 13.81 2.51
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Pakistan 1988 0.13 0 0 15.92 3.60
Pakistan 1989 0.13 0 0 18.66 3.68
Pakistan 1990 0.13 0 0 17.35 2.89
Pakistan 1991 0.13 0 0 12.15 3.08
Pakistan 1995 0.12 0 0 17.74 1.39
Papua N. G. 1963 0.05 0 0 28.20 ...
Papua N. G. 1964 0.06 0 0 27.11 ...
Papua N. G. 1965 0.06 0 0 25.28 24.21
Papua N. G. 1966 0.05 0 0 ... 22.00
Papua N. G. 1967 0.06 0 0 7.39 22.34
Papua N. G. 1968 0.06 0 0 23.72 22.89
Papua N. G. 1969 0.06 0 0 24.54 21.85
Papua N. G. 1970 0.06 0 0 20.22 23.59
Papua N.G. 1971 0.06 0 0 18.87 21.15
Papua N. G. 1972 0.06 0 0 20.16 23.89
Papua N. G. 1973 0.07 0 0 23.21 16.10
Papua N.G. 1974 0.08 0 0 27.16 19.31
Papua N. G. 1975 0.09 0 0 21.76 23.76
Papua N. G. 1976 0.10 0 0 23.02 16.46
Papua N. G. 1977 0.11 0 0 ... 15.89
Papua N. G. 1978 0.15 0 0 ... 15.41
Papua N. G. 1979 0.17 0 0 21.66 12.69
Papua N. G. 1980 0.21 0 0 20.98 13.10
Papua N. G. 1981 0.18 0 1 19.61 13.92
Papua N. G. 1982 0.24 0 0 19.66 13.80
Papua N. G. 1983 0.25 0 0 18.38 13.72
Papua N. G. 1984 0.24 0 0 19.69 12.89
Papua N. G. 1985 0.24 0 0 18.67 11.01
Papua N. G. 1986 0.24 0 0 19.46 10.06
Papua N. G. 1987 0.23 0 0 17.57 10.59
Papua N. G. 1988 0.24 1 0 17.36 10.64
Papua N. G. 1989 0.24 1 0 15.66 10.17
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Peru 1979 0.31 0 0 20.27 1.37
Peru 1980 0.31 0 0 19.77 1.03
Peru 1981 0.31 1 0 19.18 0.97
Peru 1982 0.33 1 0 17.77 0.79
Peru 1983 0.33 1 0 25.17 1.65
Peru 1984 0.35 1 0 23.54 1.67
Peru 1985 0.36 1 0 19.45 1.79
Peru 1986 0.34 1 0 22.71 1.58
Peru 1987 0.29 1 0 19.47 1.29
Peru 1988 0.33 1 0 18.66 2.51
Peru 1989 0.30 1 0 21.43 1.75
Peru 1990 0.32 1 0 23.57 1.57
Peru 1991 0.36 1 0 20.09 2.75
Peru 1992 0.39 1 0 21.87 1.17
Peru 1993 0.43 0 0 19.64 1.69
Peru 1994 0.44 0 0 17.63 0.78
Philippines 1963 0.19 0 0 14.43 0.41
Philippines 1964 0.19 0 0 16.73 1.30
Philippines 1965 0.19 0 0 20.35 1.50
Philippines 1966 0.19 0 0 15.84 0.59
Philippines 1967 0.23 0 0 16.15 1.08
Philippines 1968 0.18 0 0 13.25 0.80
Philippines 1969 0.18 0 0 12.79 0.90
Philippines 1970 0.19 0 0 11.22 0.70
Philippines 1971 0.19 0 0 13.64 0.99
Philippines 1972 0.20 1 0 15.26 2.07
Philippines 1973 0.20 1 0 13.87 2.23
Philippines 1974 0.20 1 0 11.11 1.15
Philippines 1975 0.22 1 0 10.49 1.20
Philippines 1976 0.18 1 0 9.88 1.10
Philippines 1977 0.20 1 0 9.53 0.94
Philippines 1978 0.18 1 0 7.98 1.11
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Philippines 1979 0.16 1 0 7.38 0.97
Philippines 1980 0.18 1 0 7.81 0.92
Philippines 1981 0.20 1 0 8.50 1.06
Philippines 1982 0.19 1 0 10.17 0.90
Philippines 1983 0.18 1 0 8.86 1.30
Philippines 1984 0.18 1 0 8.54 1.25
Philippines 1985 0.20 1 0 10.71 1.54
Philippines 1986 0.19 1 0 10.27 3.15
Philippines 1987 0.20 1 0 8.54 2.25
Philippines 1988 0.18 1 0 10.55 2.19
Philippines 1989 0.17 1 0 10.20 1.96
Philippines 1990 0.20 1 0 10.34 2.89
Philippines 1991 0.20 1 0 8.54 2.30
Philippines 1992 0.16 0 0 8.44 3.18
Philippines 1993 0.18 1 0 7.78 2.69
Philippines 1994 0.17 1 0 8.10 1.61
Philippines 1995 0.17 1 0 8.35 1.17
Philippines 1996 0.17 1 0 8.14 1.04
Philippines 1997 0.17 0 0 7.61 0.81
Russian F 1993 0.13 1 0 ... 0.63
Russian F 1994 0.14 1 0 ... 0.58
Russian F 1995 0.13 1 0 ... 0.49
Russian Fe 1996 0.14 1 0 17.83 0.31
Russian F 1997 0.15 1 0 18.59 0.19
Russian F 1998 0.14 1 0 ... 0.40
Rwanda 1969 0.61 0 0 18.69 9.37
Rwanda 1970 0.64 0 0 19.22 9.90
Rwanda 1971 0.49 0 0 14.04 11.33
Rwanda 1972 0.44 0 0 18.64 12.21
Rwanda 1973 0.39 0 0 17.11 13.51
Rwanda 1974 0.40 0 0 13.30 15.22
Rwanda 1977 0.53 0 0 ... 12.49
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Rwanda 1978 0.65 0 0 11.93 14.42
Rwanda 1979 0.72 0 0 11.74 14.35
Rwanda 1984 0.48 0 0 ... 10.36
Rwanda 1985 0.48 0 0 ... 10.52
Rwanda 1986 0.47 0 0 ... 10.77
Sierra Leone 1981 0.52 0 0 27.17 ...
Sierra Leone 1993 0.42 1 0 ... ...
Somalia 1967 0.78 0 0 27.55 4.35
Somalia 1968 0.73 0 0 23.83 11.16
Somalia 1969 0.73 0 0 27.98 10.81
Somalia 1970 0.70 0 0 33.68 8.61
Somalia 1971 0.69 0 0 37.71 9.28
Somalia 1972 0.50 0 0 26.20 7.17
Somalia 1973 0.47 0 0 22.71 9.46
Somalia 1974 0.41 0 0 20.37 17.33
Somalia 1975 0.44 0 0 26.01 21.37
Somalia 1976 0.39 0 0 24.91 12.66
Somalia 1977 0.35 0 0 22.72 38.64
Somalia 1978 0.37 0 0 20.72 34.84
Somalia 1979 0.31 0 0 18.83 37.16
Somalia 1980 0.57 0 0 32.49 71.90
South Africa 1963 0.26 0 1 ... ...
South Africa 1964 0.22 0 1 5.60 ...
South Africa 1965 0 1 5.01 ...
South Africa 1966 0.20 0 1 8.08 ...
South Africa 1967 0 1 5.96 ...
South Africa 1968 0.19 0 0 5.06 ...
South Africa 1969 0 0 3.66 ...
South Africa 1970 0.18 0 0 5.53 ...
South Africa 1971 0 0 4.82 ...
South Africa 1972 0.17 0 0 4.48 ...
South Africa 1973 0.18 0 0 5.63 ...
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South Africa 1974 0.18 0 0 5.40 ...
South Africa 1975 0.19 1 0 4.93 ...
South Africa 1976 0.18 1 0 4.85 ...
South Africa 1977 0.19 1 0 6.34 ...
South Africa 1978 0.19 1 0 4.75 ...
South Africa 1979 0.18 1 0 4.94 ...
South Africa 1980 0.18 1 0 2.92 ...
South Africa 1981 0.17 1 0 3.53 ...
South Africa 1982 0.18 1 0 3.48 ...
South Africa 1983 0.18 1 0 6.52 ...
South Africa 1984 0.19 1 0 8.04 ...
South Africa 1985 0.20 1 0 6.11 ...
South Africa 1986 0.21 1 0 ... ...
South Africa 1987 0.22 1 0 ... ...
South Africa 1988 0.22 1 0 4.93 ...
South Africa 1989 0.23 1 0 4.90 ...
South Africa 1990 0.23 1 0 4.99 ...
South Africa 1991 0.24 0 0 5.17 ...
South Africa 1992 0.26 0 0 8.39 ...
South Africa 1993 0.26 0 0 6.16 0.22
South Africa 1994 0.22 0 0 6.34 0.22
South Africa 1995 0.21 0 0 6.68 0.26
South Africa 1996 0.22 0 0 6.39 0.26
South Africa 1997 0.21 0 0 5.54 0.34
South Africa 1998 0.21 0 0 ... 0.40
South Africa 1999 0.21 0 0 ... 0.43
Sri Lanka 1966 0.10 0 0 47.87 1.48
Sri Lanka 1967 0.09 0 0 45.65 2.25
Sri Lanka 1968 0.08 0 0 46.10 2.88
Sri Lanka 1969 0.19 0 0 37.81 2.41
Sri Lanka 1970 0.20 0 0 46.98 2.18
Sri Lanka 1971 0.17 1 0 46.85 2.39
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Sri Lanka 1972 0.15 0 0 47.68 2.29
Sri Lanka 1973 0.18 0 0 50.70 2.04
Sri Lanka 1974 0.16 0 0 45.95 2.28
Sri Lanka 1975 0.12 0 0 50.46 4.06
Sri Lanka 1976 0.14 0 0 36.28 4.36
Sri Lanka 1977 0.15 0 0 39.83 4.60
Sri Lanka 1978 0.12 0 0 29.71 11.92
Sri Lanka 1979 0.14 0 0 23.31 9.64
Sri Lanka 1980 0.11 0 0 20.40 9.75
Sri Lanka 1981 0.12 0 0 19.36 8.73
Sri Lanka 1982 0.11 0 0 12.82 8.63
Sri Lanka 1983 0.12 1 0 17.17 9.16
Sri Lanka 1984 0.14 1 0 15.28 7.78
Sri Lanka 1985 0.15 1 0 19.96 7.87
Sri Lanka 1986 0.15 1 0 17.74 8.59
Sudan 1963 0.16 1 0 20.25 ...
Sudan 1967 0.19 1 0 23.21 ...
Sudan 1968 0.16 1 0 21.36 ...
Sudan 1969 0.26 1 0 14.00 ...
Sudan 1970 0.20 1 0 21.27 ...
Sudan 1971 0.22 1 0 21.02 ...
Sudan 1972 0.30 1 0 23.31 ...
Syrian 1963 0.29 0 0 12.86 -0.16
Syrian 1964 0.29 0 0 24.68 -0.03
Syrian 1965 0.30 0 0 22.49 -0.10
Syrian 1966 0.29 0 0 23.52 0.05
Syrian 1967 0.28 0 1 20.28 0.07
Syrian 1968 0.32 0 0 21.06 0.29
Syrian 1969 0.27 0 0 16.57 0.48
Syrian 1970 0.23 0 0 28.59 0.99
Syrian 1971 0.24 0 0 36.11 0.58
Syrian 1972 0.24 0 1 25.16 1.34
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Syrian 1973 0.25 0 1 26.45 8.91
Syrian 1974 0.24 0 0 28.14 11.00
Syrian 1975 0.25 0 0 21.38 9.51
Syrian 1976 0.25 0 0 17.18 6.54
Syrian 1977 0.22 0 0 11.85 10.25
Syrian 1978 0.24 0 0 18.02 7.52
Syrian 1979 0.26 0 0 13.62 17.14
Syrian 1980 0.31 0 0 14.10 12.51
Syrian 1981 0.25 1 0 15.63 9.33
Syrian 1982 0.23 1 0 14.46 5.74
Syrian 1983 0.34 1 0 19.80 4.49
Syrian 1984 0.39 0 1 18.82 3.55
Syrian 1985 0.37 0 1 18.96 3.60
Syrian 1986 0.39 0 1 17.16 5.33
Syrian 1987 0.40 0 1 16.39 6.03
Syrian 1988 0.39 0 1 ... 1.82
Syrian 1989 0.39 0 1 24.88 1.34
Syrian 1990 0.42 0 1 31.07 5.71
Syrian 1991 0.43 0 1 ... 3.03
Syrian 1992 0.42 0 1 19.02 1.53
Syrian 1993 0.41 0 0 ... 1.94
Syrian 1994 0.35 0 0 ... 7.24
Syrian 1995 0.36 0 0 16.70 3.10
Syrian 1996 0.32 0 0 15.62 1.59
Syrian 1997 0.30 0 0 20.69 1.38
Syrian 1998 0.30 0 0 ... 1.06
Thailand 1967 0.08 1 0 6.24 0.98
Thailand 1968 0.13 1 0 6.76 1.15
Thailand 1969 0.09 1 0 7.09 1.02
Thailand 1970 0.15 1 0 5.39 1.05
Thailand 1971 1 0 5.98 0.85
Thailand 1972 1 0 6.10 0.66
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Thailand 1973 1 0 4.49 0.57
Thailand 1974 0.10 1 0 4.12 0.53
Thailand 1975 0.10 1 0 4.34 0.59
Thailand 1976 0.10 1 0 4.53 1.00
Thailand 1977 0.16 1 0 4.63 0.67
Thailand 1978 0.13 1 0 4.34 1.09
Thailand 1979 0.12 1 0 4.14 1.45
Thailand 1980 1 0 5.23 1.30
Thailand 1981 1 0 4.41 1.19
Thailand 1982 0.11 1 0 4.72 1.08
Thailand 1983 1 0 4.11 1.08
Thailand 1984 0.10 1 0 4.95 1.12
Thailand 1985 1 0 5.17 1.20
Thailand 1986 0.11 0 0 6.86 1.10
Thailand 1987 0 0 5.21 0.95
Thailand 1988 0.16 0 0 5.77 0.88
Thailand 1989 0.11 0 0 5.51 1.01
Thailand 1990 0.08 0 0 5.05 0.95
Thailand 1991 0.10 0 0 5.43 0.74
Thailand 1992 0 0 5.54 0.71
Thailand 1993 0.11 0 0 4.71 0.50
Thailand 1994 0.10 0 0 4.34 0.41
Turkey 1963 0.15 0 0 13.82 ...
Turkey 1964 0.15 0 0 6.77 ...
Turkey 1965 0.15 0 0 5.98 ...
Turkey 1966 0.15 0 0 5.67 ...
Turkey 1967 0.14 0 0 1.45 ...
Turkey 1968 0.13 0 0 0.87 0.96
Turkey 1969 0.12 0 0 3.17 0.85
Turkey 1970 0.13 0 0 7.63 0.97
Turkey 1971 0.13 0 0 2.01 1.16
Turkey 1972 0.12 0 0 2.03 1.05
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Turkey 1973 0.12 0 0 2.27 0.29
Turkey 1974 0.13 0 0 9.78 0.13
Turkey 1975 0.12 0 0 7.43 0.12
Turkey 1976 0.11 0 0 2.83 0.23
Turkey 1977 0.12 0 0 1.32 0.15
Turkey 1978 0.13 1 0 1.38 0.26
Turkey 1979 0.11 1 0 1.77 0.63
Turkey 1980 0.12 1 0 3.50 1.37
Turkey 1981 0.12 0 0 2.77 1.01
Turkey 1982 0.12 0 0 2.61 0.99
Turkey 1983 0.11 0 0 1.84 0.58
Turkey 1984 0.11 1 0 5.73 0.40
Turkey 1985 0.11 1 0 5.24 0.27
Turkey 1986 0.11 1 0 4.94 0.45
Turkey 1987 0.11 1 0 5.19 0.43
Turkey 1988 0.10 1 0 4.25 0.30
Turkey 1989 0.11 1 0 7.96 0.13
Turkey 1990 0.12 1 0 8.32 0.80
Turkey 1991 0.12 1 0 6.05 1.07
Turkey 1992 0.13 1 0 5.95 0.17
Turkey 1993 0.13 1 0 5.62 0.22
Turkey 1994 0.12 1 0 4.95 0.12
Turkey 1995 0.12 1 0 6.99 0.18
Turkey 1996 0.12 1 0 6.50 0.13
Turkey 1997 0.12 1 0 5.45 0.00
Turkey 1998 0.12 1 0 ... 0.01
Uganda 1963 0.46 0 0 2.75 2.75
Uganda 1964 0.51 0 0 ... 2.41
Uganda 1965 0.50 0 0 ... 1.66
Uganda 1966 0.52 0 0 7.85 1.69
Uganda 1967 0.56 0 0 7.45 1.47
Uganda 1968 0.60 0 0 5.66 1.48
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Uganda 1969 0.53 0 0 5.78 ...
Uganda 1970 0 0 6.57 ...
Uganda 1971 0.44 1 0 6.32 ...
Uganda 1984 0.74 1 0 ... 4.60
Uganda 1985 0.27 1 0 ... 5.20
Uganda 1986 0.02 1 0 ... 4.95
Uganda 1987 0.12 1 0 ... 4.81
Uganda 1988 0.20 1 0 ... 6.16
Uganda 1989 0.80 1 0 ... 8.72
United States 1963 0.08 0 1 23.42 ...
United States 1964 0.08 0 1 22.28 ...
United States 1965 0.07 0 1 19.61 ...
United States 1966 0.07 0 1 18.74 ...
United States 1967 0.07 0 1 18.20 ...
United States 1968 0.07 0 1 16.91 ...
United States 1969 0.07 0 1 15.27 ...
United States 1970 0.07 0 1 16.12 ...
United States 1971 0.07 0 1 14.54 ...
United States 1972 0.07 0 1 13.68 ...
United States 1973 0.07 0 1 13.76 ...
United States 1974 0.07 0 1 11.18 ...
United States 1975 0.07 0 1 10.84 ...
United States 1976 0.07 0 0 10.18 ...
United States 1977 0.07 0 0 9.93 ...
United States 1978 0.06 0 0 9.62 ...
United States 1979 0.06 0 0 9.18 ...
United States 1980 0.06 0 0 8.22 ...
United States 1981 0.06 0 0 7.71 ...
United States 1982 0.06 0 0 7.87 ...
United States 1983 0.06 0 0 7.85 ...
United States 1984 0.06 0 0 7.17 ...
United States 1985 0.06 0 0 7.03 ...
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United States 1986 0.06 0 0 7.15 ...
United States 1987 0.06 0 0 6.48 ...
United States 1988 0.06 0 0 5.94 ...
United States 1989 0.06 0 0 5.72 ...
United States 1990 0.06 0 0 5.81 ...
United States 1991 0.06 0 1 5.93 ...
United States 1992 0.07 0 1 5.73 ...
United States 1993 0.07 0 1 5.33 ...
United States 1994 0.07 0 1 5.04 ...
United States 1995 0.06 0 1 4.78 ...
United States 1996 0.06 0 1 4.93 ...
United States 1997 0.06 0 1 4.99 ...
United States 1998 0.05 0 1 ... ...
Yemen, Rep. 1969 0.01 1 0 42.43 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1970 0.01 0 0 62.63 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1971 0.01 0 0 43.78 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1972 0.02 0 0 51.08 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1973 0.05 0 0 51.35 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1974 0.10 0 0 44.10 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1975 0.07 0 0 45.49 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1976 0.03 0 0 40.93 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1977 0.04 0 0 ... ...
Yemen, Rep. 1978 0.11 0 0 27.97 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1979 0.09 0 0 26.25 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1980 0.09 0 0 28.36 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1981 0.10 0 0 31.98 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1982 0.11 0 0 25.76 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1983 0.10 0 0 25.81 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1984 0.10 0 0 ... ...
Yemen, Rep. 1985 0.07 0 0 ... ...
Yemen, Rep. 1986 0.09 1 0 ... ...
Yugoslavia 1962 0.11 0 0 16.53 ...
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United States 1986 0.06 0 0 7.15 ...
United States 1987 0.06 0 0 6.48 ...
United States 1988 0.06 0 0 5.94 ...
United States 1989 0.06 0 0 5.72 ...
United States 1990 0.06 0 0 5.81 ...
United States 1991 0.06 0 1 5.93 ...
United States 1992 0.07 0 1 5.73 ...
United States 1993 0.07 0 1 5.33 ...
United States 1994 0.07 0 1 5.04 ...
United States 1995 0.06 0 1 4.78 ...
United States 1996 0.06 0 1 4.93 ...
United States 1997 0.06 0 1 4.99 ...
United States 1998 0.05 0 1 ... ...
Yemen, Rep. 1969 0.01 1 0 42.43 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1970 0.01 0 0 62.63 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1971 0.01 0 0 43.78 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1972 0.02 0 0 51.08 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1973 0.05 0 0 51.35 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1974 0.10 0 0 44.10 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1975 0.07 0 0 45.49 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1976 0.03 0 0 40.93 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1977 0.04 0 0 ... ...
Yemen, Rep. 1978 0.11 0 0 27.97 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1979 0.09 0 0 26.25 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1980 0.09 0 0 28.36 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1981 0.10 0 0 31.98 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1982 0.11 0 0 25.76 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1983 0.10 0 0 25.81 ...
Yemen, Rep. 1984 0.10 0 0 ... ...
Yemen, Rep. 1985 0.07 0 0 ... ...
Yemen, Rep. 1986 0.09 1 0 ... ...
Yugoslavia 1962 0.11 0 0 16.53 ...
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Yugoslavia 1963 0.09 0 0 20.38 ...
Yugoslavia 1964 0.09 0 0 14.24 ...
Yugoslavia 1965 0.09 0 0 16.14 ...
Yugoslavia 1966 0.07 0 0 15.85 ...
Yugoslavia 1967 0.07 0 0 12.53 ...
Yugoslavia 1968 0.06 0 0 8.42 ...
Yugoslavia 1969 0.06 0 0 7.38 ...
Yugoslavia 1970 0.06 0 0 7.93 ...
Yugoslavia 1971 0.08 0 0 10.84 ...
Yugoslavia 1972 0.10 0 0 10.95 ...
Yugoslavia 1973 0.12 0 0 11.87 ...
Yugoslavia 1974 0.13 0 0 9.76 ...
Yugoslavia 1975 0.13 0 0 6.91 ...
Yugoslavia 1976 0.12 0 0 9.64 ...
Yugoslavia 1977 0.12 0 0 8.96 ...
Yugoslavia 1978 0.12 0 0 7.15 ...
Yugoslavia 1979 0.11 0 0 7.87 ...
Yugoslavia 1980 0.11 0 0 7.71 ...
Yugoslavia 1981 0.11 0 0 6.31 ...
Yugoslavia 1982 0.11 0 0 6.12 ...
Yugoslavia 1983 0.12 0 0 6.44 ...
Yugoslavia 1984 0.11 0 0 5.50 ...
Yugoslavia 1985 0.12 0 0 4.75 ...
Yugoslavia 1986 0.12 0 0 7.55 ...
Yugoslavia 1987 0.13 0 0 6.51 ...
Yugoslavia 1988 0.13 0 0 7.38 ...
Yugoslavia 1989 0.14 0 0 8.42 ...
Yugoslavia 1990 0.27 1 0 11.97 ...
Yugoslavia 1991 1 0 ... ...
Yugoslavia 1992 1 0 ... ...
Yugoslavia. 1993 1 0 ... ...
Yugoslavia 1994 1 0 ... ...
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Yugoslavia 1995 0.29 1 0 ... ...
Yugoslavia 1996 0.33 1 0 ... ...
Yugoslavia 1997 0.32 1 0 ... ...
Yugoslavia 1998 0.33 1 1 ... 0.79
Zimbabwe 1960 0 0 ... ...
Zimbabwe 1961 0 0 ... 0.00
Zimbabwe 1962 0 0 ... ...
Zimbabwe 1963 0.28 0 0 ... 0.98
Zimbabwe 1964 0.27 0 0 ... 0.39
Zimbabwe 1965 0.30 0 0 7.32 0.28
Zimbabwe 1966 0.31 0 0 ... 0.02
Zimbabwe 1967 0.29 0 0 ... 0.02
Zimbabwe 1968 0.29 0 0 ... 0.14
Zimbabwe 1969 0.27 0 0 ... 0.04
Zimbabwe 1970 0.26 0 0 ... 0.04
Zimbabwe 1971 0.26 1 0 ... 0.04
Zimbabwe 1972 0.24 1 0 ... 0.03
Zimbabwe 1973 0.24 1 0 ... 0.03
Zimbabwe 1974 0.23 1 0 ... 0.04
Zimbabwe 1975 0.24 1 0 ... 0.09
Zimbabwe 1976 0.26 1 0 ... 0.15
Zimbabwe 1977 0.30 1 0 ... 0.16
Zimbabwe 1978 0.32 1 0 ... 0.22
Zimbabwe 1979 0.32 1 0 0.86 0.25
Zimbabwe 1980 0.30 1 0 6.44 2.48
Zimbabwe 1981 0.29 1 0 3.55 2.71
Zimbabwe 1982 0.31 1 0 2.97 2.62
Zimbabwe 1983 0.35 1 0 5.48 2.79
Zimbabwe 1984 0.36 0 0 8.12 4.82
Zimbabwe 1985 0.36 0 0 4.96 4.31
Zimbabwe 1986 0.37 0 0 3.27 3.73
Zimbabwe 1987 0.35 0 0 ... 4.49
Table C.94: The Food Cost Data
211
Zimbabwe 1988 0.32 0 0 ... 3.59
Zimbabwe 1989 0.31 0 0 ... 3.28
Zimbabwe 1990 0.26 0 0 3.68 4.00
Zimbabwe 1991 0.30 0 0 2.23 4.70
Zimbabwe 1992 0.29 0 0 17.82 12.23
Zimbabwe 1993 0.30 0 0 11.17 7.89
Zimbabwe 1994 0.31 0 0 4.83 8.50
Zimbabwe 1995 0.34 0 0 6.00 7.23
Zimbabwe 1996 0.29 0 1 10.36 4.46
Zimbabwe 1997 0.30 0 1 7.15 4.11
Zimbabwe 1998 0.31 0 1 ... 4.74
Table C.95: The Food Cost Data
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